

ABSTRACT

Navigating Hell, Awaiting Judgment:
The Role of the Argentine and Chilean Catholic Church During the Military Regimes

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This thesis examines the personal formation of various bishops in the Chilean and Argentine episcopacies who were critical in determining the stance of the Roman Catholic Church during the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s. This thesis focuses on: the archbishops in Buenos Aires and Santiago, the bishops who served in the military vicariates, the papal nuncios, and other bishops during the military regimes. The genesis of these men reveals a new perspective on the development of episcopal opinion and helps explain why the Argentine Catholic hierarchy complied and supported the military leaders responsible for the Dirty War while the Chilean episcopacy protected civilians and stood apart from Pinochet's military dictatorship.

Navigating Hell, Awaiting Judgment:
The Role of the Argentine and Chilean Catholic Church During the Military Regimes

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A Thesis

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To those I call family

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

In a humble Catholic Church in the Conchalí neighborhood of Santiago, Chile, the congregation greeted Archbishop Juan Francisco Fresno with roaring applause and hymns of welcome in 1983. A reporter who witnessed the event and later interviewed several Chileans related how the warm reception expressed the gratitude many Chileans felt toward their religious leaders throughout the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte.¹ The Chilean Catholic Church as a whole offered itself as a shield against the violence and repression of the military government during the seventeen-year dictatorship. The affection displayed by the Chileans in the salutation to Archbishop Fresno at Conchalí and overall positive image of the Catholic Church throughout the military dictatorship contrasted markedly with how Argentines viewed their Catholic Church during the military regime or Dirty War. In the human rights trials following the fall of the military junta, Argentine citizens testified to atrocities committed by the military government that the Catholic Church ignored and even encouraged. The testimony of ex-prisoner Ernesto Reynaldo Saman confirmed the complicity of the Bishop of Jujuy, Monsignor José Miguel Medina. According to Saman, in the bishop's mass for the imprisoned of Villa Gorriti Jujuy Prison the bishop not only acknowledged that he understood how and why the prison and other extrajudicial activities in Argentina operated, but also that he approved. Rather than offering succor to the incarcerated

¹Stephen Kinzer, "Church in Chile Doesn't Just Pray for Reform," *New York Times*, November 20, 1983.

victims, Monsignor Medina expressed the belief that the military's actions saved the country.² Saman's and numerous other testimonies document the collusion of the Argentine Catholic hierarchy with the military controlled state that persecuted the faithful in the country. The actions of the Argentine episcopacy are highlighted by the contrasting path taken by the Chilean Catholic hierarchy under its own military regime.

Despite this notable difference in the Catholic Church's actions, the two Southern Cone states share marked similarities. Geographically, Argentina and Chile share the same spine, the Andes Mountains. Culturally, both states possess analogous European-like cultures as a result of extensive, European immigration and decimation of indigenous peoples in their territories. Though European immigration to Argentina reached levels far above those of Chile, the two countries mutually claim cultures heavily influenced by Europe. Economically, both Argentina and Chile are relatively prosperous when compared to the rest of Latin America.³ Religiously, both states are heirs to the Spanish tradition of Roman Catholicism. After independence both states assumed the rights of *patronato real* and recast it as *patronato nacional* perpetuating ties between the Catholic Church and their states. The echoes of those ties, though formally severed, reverberate today in the local Catholic parish. Yet, despite obvious and comparable characteristics shared by the two countries, the Catholic episcopates of Argentina and Chile reacted in dramatically different ways under similarly oppressive military regimes.

²Testimony of Ernesto Reynaldo Saman, File No. 4841, *Nunca Más*, Report of CONADEP (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons), 1984, in the web archive of Nuncamas.org, <http://web.archive.org/web/20050205181354/nuncamas.org/testimon/testimon.htm> (accessed October 13, 2009).

³Anthony Gill, *Rendering Unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 121.

The reason the Catholic hierarchy responded differently beneath concurrent martial governments remains unsatisfactorily explained. While a myriad of literature discusses this episode in recent Argentine and Chilean history few explicitly examine the Catholic Church's role in depth. The majority of books incorporating the military regimes of Chile and Argentina do precisely what Patricia and William Marchak do in *God's Assassins* or follow the example of the tri-authored *Chile, 1973-1988: La historia oculta del regimen militar*. The Marchaks include a separate section on the role of the Church in the Argentina's Dirty War. The section contrasts the actions of the bishops and those of the parish priests who became active in helping the Argentine citizens throughout the regime.⁴ The book, *Chile, 1973-1988*, integrates the role of the Chilean episcopate into a larger chronicle of events that occurred during the Pinochet dictatorship. However, it focuses almost entirely upon the role of the archbishop of Santiago instead of the Chilean episcopate as a whole.⁵ Of those books that discuss the Catholic Church few concentrate solely on the Church during these military regimes. Of the small number of works that treat the Church most survey the actions of the hierarchy and not the motivations behind them. Hugo Cancino Troncoso's *Chile: Iglesia y dictadura, 1973-1988* detailed the Chilean Church's activities during the dictatorship using public

⁴Patricia and William Marchak, *God's Assassins: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s* (Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 235-318.

⁵Ascanio Cavallo Castro, Manuel Salazar Salvo and Oscar Sepúlveda Pacheco, *Chile, 1973-1988: La historia oculta del regimen militar* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Antártica S.A., 1989).

statements and official documents of the Chilean Catholic hierarchy.⁶ By focusing on the official statements produced in Catholic magazines and published by the episcopate Troncoso ignores the personal motivations behind the men that made these public announcements. He, like so many others, fails to analyze the hierarchy's response on a basic human level, why did the men leading the episcopacy react the way they did? Emilio Mignone's *Witness to the Truth: The Complicity of Church and Dictatorship in Argentina* is another book that only describes the movements, or lack thereof, of the episcopate during the military government. Mignone analyzes the ideology that framed the Argentine episcopacy's response.⁷ Also, like Mignone, the bulk of the works exploring the Church's role during the military regimes focus on a single country. Books describing both episcopacies' actions during this crucial time are scarce.

Those that discuss the Catholic Church in both Argentina and Chile generally juxtapose the dissimilar reactions, but offer no reasons behind them.⁸ Jeffery Klaiber's book on the role of the Church during the dictatorships throughout Latin America includes perspectives on both national episcopacies in Argentina and Chile for his larger

⁶Hugo Cancino Troncoso, *Chile: Iglesia y dictadura 1973 – 1989: Un estudio sobre el rol político de la Iglesia católica y el conflicto con el régimen militar* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1997).

⁷Emilio F. Mignone, *Witness to the Truth: The Complicity of Church and Dictatorship in Argentina, 1976-1983*, trans. Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988).

⁸Anthony Gill compares the Catholic Church in Argentina and Chile in *Rendering Unto Caesar*, but does so in order to prove an economic theory of religious competition to explain the different responses of the hierarchies.

analysis on the role of the Church in the hemisphere.⁹ His discussion focuses on how the Catholic Church dealt with military regimes and the transition back to democracy in many Latin American countries. However, Klaiber treats each country separately from the rest and generally does not draw comparisons. Lack of scholarly inquiry into the motivations behind the different reactions of the Chilean and Argentine episcopacies represents a significant gap. It prevents a complete picture of how the military regimes operated in these two states and obscures how Church reaction was manufactured and applied. This work begins the process of filling in that lacuna of historical knowledge.

As individuals remain the smallest unit available for historic investigation, this work focuses upon the individuals who determined the performance of the Catholic Church in Argentina and Chile - the bishops of each country. While the whole of the Catholic Church is universally united underneath the Pope on the level of the sovereign state, in the Church hierarchy, the bishops lead. The episcopate, the collective voice of all the bishops in a country or region, tailors pronouncements, forms programs and overall leads the faithful in their own country. This thesis will demonstrate that the personal formation and background of key Church leaders determined the stance that the Catholic Church took during the tumultuous times of Argentina's Dirty War and Chile's military dictatorship. The respective bishops in Chile and Argentina established the official and public stance of the Catholic Church, which in turn directed the faithful in a response to the military governments. This work offers a comparison of key bishops in Chile and Argentina; it will examine how their various backgrounds influenced their

⁹Jeffery Klaiber, S.J., *The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998).

responses to the armed forces' regimes and how this translated to the official, public stance of the Catholic Church hierarchies.

The sources used in this thesis include a variety of documents. Personal biographical information on the Church leaders, as can be obtained, is fundamental. Most of the bishops discussed in this thesis did not write memoirs. Only two bishops left memoirs: one a three-volume memoir and the other a single book. To replicate the level of resource richness found in these memoirs for the remaining bishops this thesis draws on a variety of sources. One such source is local newspapers in the birthplace of the bishops. Hometowns often print articles when one of their own is ordained or promoted, and thereby offer a uniquely homogenous biographical survey of their local son. Another source is the major newspapers of the two Southern Cone countries. In most Catholic states the major newspapers produce articles covering the selection of a new bishop that include personal references; many times the bishop himself is interviewed for the article. For that reason newspapers for the week surrounding the official elevation of a bishop provide useful biographical information. Most bishops, at one point or another, during their career appear in religious magazines to make a statement about how they view the work of a particular organization, the Church's stance on certain political issues, or other Church matters. This produces another source of information for personal histories and the bishops' ideological views. Diocesan newsletters and archives also record views and personal histories of their bishop, many dioceses record the major homilies or theological works produced by their bishop. Additionally, the statements or perceptions of other bishops who wrote memoirs and commented upon their colleagues' personality, pastoral work and leadership will also be used. The Holy See or the Vatican records any and all

communications with bishops. Access to the archives with this information is strictly guarded, nonetheless, the Holy See's website does post the several of the communiqués online and they are utilized in this thesis. Finally, those bishops who have leadership positions in their national episcopacies often write letters about the stance of the episcopacy that the others sign to show unity in the Church's hierarchy. For these reasons episcopal statements authored by bishops in this thesis are used as a reflection of their ideological stance and included in their personal histories. In summary, this thesis will rely on many sources including: newspapers; magazines (both secular and religious); homilies given by the bishops; papal documents and letters; diocesan and episcopate statements; and several other sources to reveal the real men behind the bishops' masks.

This approach, introducing a new, narrower focus on the key bishops that determined the Catholic Church's stance toward the military regimes in Chile and Argentina, highlights the distinction in Church activities from both sides of the Andes. The second chapter, "The States of the Church," provides necessary background of the Catholic Church as a whole as well as the movements of the Catholic Church in Argentina and Chile. It details the most recent and pertinent history of the Church in relation to the state, including how the two institutions separated. While battles between Church and state remained inevitable as the latter steadily encroached upon the traditional ground of the former, the two Southern Cone countries differed in the execution of that separation. This backdrop underpins the traditional framework within which the bishops operated and helps explain how and why certain bishops were more effective than others throughout the military regimes. The brief background concludes with a comprehensive

picture of the Catholic Church in each of the two states prior to the establishment of the military regimes during the 1970s.

Chapter three, “Capital Men,” examines the bishops who controlled the archdioceses of the capitals in Argentina and Chile. Buenos Aires and Santiago are mega cities with vast populations. Because both capitals are classified as archdioceses of the Catholic Church, the archbishop of Santiago and the archbishop of Buenos Aires have jurisdiction over several dioceses that form an ecclesiastical province.¹⁰ These men wield, when they chose too, enormous influence. Chapter three presents the story of each archbishop that ruled over a capital city during the military regime. It analyzes their personal formations and reactions to the military regime. The first man discussed is Argentina’s Juan Carlos Aramburu who acted as archbishop of Buenos Aires from 1975-1990. The chapter then shifts countries to chronicle Chile’s two capital archbishops: Raúl Silva Henríquez, archbishop from 1961 to 1983, and Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín, archbishop from 1983 to 1990.

Chapter four, “Whom Do They Serve, Mars or God?” focuses on the men who spiritually guided the armed forces throughout the rule of the military governments. Both Chile and Argentina had a military vicariate designed to serve the religious needs of men under arms. Yet the military vicar in Argentina, Adolfo Servando Tortolo, openly supported the junta and provided spiritual comfort to the soldiers involved in the Dirty War. In direct contrast, the Chilean military vicars during the dictatorship, Francisco Javier Gillmore Stock and his successor, José Joaquín Matte Varas, kept low profiles and

¹⁰Alphonse Van Hove, *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909) s.v. "Diocese," <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05001a.htm> (accessed November 15, 2009).

remained relatively unknown. This chapter introduces the military vicariate of each Southern Cone country before discussing the vicars themselves. Each vicar, in turn, is discussed with regard to their personal formation and their response to the military regime. Argentina's military vicar, Adolfo Servando Tortolo, is considered first followed by Chile's two military vicars, Francisco Javier Gillmore Stock and his successor, José Joaquín Matte Varas.

Chapter five, "A Spectrum of the Church's Men," provides broader depth to the episcopacies of Chile and Argentina by offering additional examples of church leadership under the military regimes; as well as considering the men who linked the Chilean and Argentine episcopates to the larger Catholic Church centered in Rome. It also examines other significant bishops in Argentina and Chile in the same manner. The bishop's personal formation is detailed before discussing his reaction to the military regime. The apostolic nuncios or the Holy See's ambassadors represent the pope's interests as a world leader and regularly report to the pontiff about local conditions. The nuncio speaks with authority in defense of local believers if a threat to their religious freedom materializes.¹¹ Both Argentina's and Chile's papal nuncios became embroiled in the tragedy of the military regimes as they represented the pontiff locally. This chapter connects the Chilean and Argentine episcopates to the larger, global Catholic Church and demonstrates a broader dimension of the national episcopacies.

Finally, chapter six, or the conclusion, compares the men of the Argentine and Chilean episcopacies. It examines how each bishop's personal formation influenced his

¹¹John Allen, Jr., *All the Pope's Men: The Inside Story of How the Vatican Really Thinks* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 45.

actions during the military regimes. The capital archbishops are compared first, then the military vicars and finally those bishops who provided a broader dimension to the Church. The thesis ends with an overall comparison of the national episcopacies and their legacies.

CHAPTER TWO

The States of the Church

Argentina, Tumultuous Affair

Church and state were tied together in Argentina, as in all Latin America, before the country even existed. Argentina claimed *patronato real* from the Spanish Crown. In 1493, Pope Alexander VI granted the king and queen of Castille and León lands in the New World for the purpose of instructing the indigenous peoples in the Catholic faith. Less than two decades later, in 1508, Pope Julius II afforded the king, queen and their descendants the privilege of nominating suitable persons for ecclesiastical service in the New World.¹ Upon independence in the early nineteenth century, Argentina's government asserted its right to these privileges as a *patronato nacional*. However, the Vatican did not formally acknowledge the right. Instead, it merely acquiesced to its own limitations and reached a *modus vivendi* with the new Argentine government. The state nominated men to fill vacant bishoprics and, after confidential negotiations with the Holy See, the Church appointed the state-chosen men without referencing the state's nomination. While serviceable, this arrangement remained prone to tense moments when the state tried to formalize *patronato* or when the Church attempted to act independently.²

¹Lowell S. Gustafson, "Church and State in Argentina," in *The Religious Challenge to the State* eds. Matthew C. Moen and Lowell S. Gustafson (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 20.

²Gustafson, "Church and State in Argentina," 22; Santiago de Estrada, *Nuestras relaciones con la Iglesia: hacia un concordat entre la Sede Apostolica y el estado Argentino* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Theoría 1963), 100-01.

The state, however, would not relinquish the right of *patronato* tying the Church to the state because the attachment proved useful. Political leaders could select ecclesiastical leaders who were closer to their own political ideology than the leaders the Holy See might have. With these appointments, political leaders could utilize the religious authority of bishops to demonstrate legitimacy for their own political leanings and agendas.

Having the Catholic Church directly connected to the civil authority also helped legitimize the newly formed state by anchoring it in a tradition with over a millennia and a half of weight behind it. All Argentine constitutions adopted Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state; even the proposed radical constitution of 1813 stated that the “Catholic religion is and always will be that of the State.”³ The 1853 Constitution cemented the union of the two institutions because it formally incorporated the right of *patronato* into the state – without the consent of the Holy See - which again caused tension. The Church protested this presumption, but its ability to challenge the state remained limited. The 1853 Constitution established Catholicism the official religion of the state, which was protected and financed by the Argentine government. However, the constitution also granted the right of foreigners to conduct business no matter their religious preferences. The president exercised the *patronato*, approving or denying Church declarations and the nomination of bishops. However, he was checked by the Argentine Supreme Court’s approval. Congress possessed the final authority to grant or refuse any agreements with the Church. The government acted as an intermediary between Rome and the Argentine Church; all communications between the two parts of

³Gustafson, “Church and State in Argentina,” 26.

the Catholic Church were directed through the state.⁴ This item particularly annoyed the Holy See because it prevented direct contact with the faithful. Sealed together officially now, Argentina's Church and state settled into a tense relationship of co-existence. The Church received necessary financial aid to continue its pastoral mission, along with other *fueros* or privileges, like being the official religion. The state received the legitimization of the Catholic Church and exerted control over the Church's expression in Argentina through bishop appointments and its role as an intermediary between the head in Rome and the local branch.

The tension filled existence between the two institutions erupted in the 1880s. Liberal positivists, in control of the government after 1880, carried anticlericalism as they rose to prominence; the era was virulent against religion and they stripped away traditional Church *fueros*.⁵ The state assumed control of the registries of birth, marriage, and death records. The passage of anticlerical laws drove a wedge between the two institutions without any prospect of reconciliation. Church leaders came to view liberalism and liberals who sponsored anticlerical laws, as the enemy. It drove the Argentine Church into a firm alliance with conservative political forces. Church leaders prayed that conservative devout Catholics would restore lost privileges.⁶ While loss of

⁴Lowell S. Gustafson, "Church and State in Argentina," 26-28; Austen Ivereigh, *Catholicism and Politics in Argentina 1810-1960* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 53; Estrada, *Nuestras relaciones con la Iglesia*, 101-05.

⁵A *fuero* is a traditional Spanish privilege that was granted to the Roman Catholic Church as the religion of the state. A *fuero* manifested itself as in a variety of forms, including a grant of land, promise of work, or the right of the Church to have their own separate courts for those men and women that fall under its jurisdiction.

⁶Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995) 13-16.

control over registries rankled Church leaders, the state's encroachment on the Church's monopoly on education provoked a strong reaction. After two decades of dispute, the Argentine state created a public education system in the 1880s. The Argentine state removed education from the hands of the Church. The Church had always instructed young followers in the tenets of Catholicism through schools and viewed this removal as a denial of God. The state, on the other hand, wanted to educate youths in what it meant to be Argentine and indoctrinate loyalty to the state. The Argentine government further argued that since the Church did not possess the means to teach every child who had a right to be educated, the state would assume the responsibility. The liberal government believed that the future citizens or current children possessed a duty to the republic to be educated and formed to make reasoned choices; state-controlled education was the first step to this goal.⁷ The Church lobbied unsuccessfully for the return of the right to teach religion in public schools until 1943, when a conservative military government returned that right to the Church.⁸ Anticlerical attitudes at the end of the nineteenth century destroyed easy Church-state relations. Church leaders remained bitter and antagonistic toward the state and worked with conservative groups to thwart the liberal state as well as for the return of traditional Church privileges.

In the early twentieth century the global Catholic Church possessed twin concerns: the advancement of social action and the growing fear of socialism. The Church's fear of socialism included anything that resembled its ideology, including

⁷Ivereigh, *Catholicism and Politics in Argentina*, 57-59; Gustafson, "Church and State in Argentina," 29.

⁸Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 53.

Marxism, a political theory, based on socialist principles and communism, a socialist based government. Before the turn of the century, in 1896, Pope Leo XIII issued a papal encyclical in an attempt to correct the misguided faithful who promoted communism.⁹ The pontiff addressed the errors of socialism, labeled it an injustice against the natural rights of humankind and accused it of promoting evils such as envy and discord. The Church under Pope Leo XIII insisted that rejection of teachings of socialism would reduce or halt growing class conflict.¹⁰ Despite the Holy Father's encyclical, socialism continued to grow in strength, increasingly after World War I and the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. In the 1930s, fear of socialism as an economic system the accompanying suggestions of communist governments reached new heights and compelled the Catholic Church to form social action groups, like Catholic Action. These groups became the Church's local instruments in reclaiming the faithful from the dangerous lure of socialism. The Holy See demonstrated continued concern over socialist strength when Pope Pius XI issued another papal encyclical in 1931, which reaffirmed the truth and importance of Pope Leo XIII's rejection of it.¹¹ However, while Catholic Action was

⁹A papal encyclical is "a profound letter addressed by the pope to all the patriarchs, primates, archbishops, and prelates nullius of the worldwide Church . . . Each is written in Latin. The purpose of an encyclical is not personal but to condemn certain current errors; to inform the faithful, through the hierarchy . . . to explain conduct that should be followed by Christians." Robert C. Broderick, ed. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, rev. ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1987), s.v. "Encyclical."

¹⁰"Rerum Novarum," The Holy See Website, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html (accessed February 3, 2010).

¹¹"Quadragesimo Anno," The Holy See Website, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html (accessed January 17, 2010).

established throughout the various Catholic countries in the world, as a social group it failed to engage those most prone to the enticements of communism and its similar ideologies of socialism and Marxism, the poor. The growing attraction of socialism in Argentina coincided with the rise of populism and the enigmatic figure of Juan Domingo Perón. He rose to prominence in the early 1940s as a military leader who appealed to the working class. His charisma, attractive political speeches supporting the workers' rights, and charming wife, Evita, launched him into the highest political circles. By the time of Perón's rise, the Catholic Church had regained most of the powers it had lost under liberals. By the 1940s, the church was, once again, an institution with political weight. As a shrewd judge of political advantage, Juan Perón made common cause with the Argentine Catholic Church during his rise to power.

Juan Perón manipulated the nominal Catholicism of Argentina to bring the both the Church and its numerous followers to support him. During his first term as president (1946-1952), he made frequent public appearances at religious ceremonies and openly pursued the favor of the Catholic episcopacy. He secured the episcopate's support with legalization of the right for the Catholic Church to teach religion in public schools, which had been granted outside usual legal jurisdiction to the Church under the previous military-led administration. He appropriated popular religious imagery, like the celebration of certain saints for the benefit of the state. Religious holidays were now Peronist and public holidays.¹² Demonstrating great political savvy Perón employed Catholicism to make himself into a civil religion for Argentina.

¹²Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 54-55.

The cordial relationship between the Church and the Perón government formed during his first term in office ended during his second. As militancy in Argentina rose, including among the lower ranks of the Church, in the early 1950s, Perón and his followers fell under intense criticism. Militant Catholics harassed Peronist followers and in turn the police made retaliatory arrests and detained priests and Catholics. While these incidents strained the relationship between the Catholic hierarchy and the Perón government, the break came after the 1952 death of Perón's popular and beloved wife, Evita. Perón further tarnished his reputation with the faithful by openly cavorting with young girls and experimenting with spiritualism. The final crisis came with passage of a law granting the state exclusive authority over religious education in public schools, nullifying the Church's role in schools. When some Church leaders openly resisted, Perón accused three bishops of being enemies of the state.¹³ With that the Church hierarchy turned against Perón and Peronism. The episcopacy's turn against Perón united various opposition forces resulting in his ouster from power in 1955.

Argentina remained in constant turmoil economically and politically over the next several decades. After Perón's exile, Argentina suffered from a constant government turnover, each averaging twenty-two months in length. Each new regime proposed different economic policies causing financial chaos.¹⁴ All of Argentine society shifted during this period, even the Catholic Church reformed itself in the early 1960s with the Second Vatican Council. One of the most significant changes in official Church doctrine

¹³Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 57-62.

¹⁴Thomas C. Wright, *State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 96.

was the abandonment of its traditional position of Church-state unification. This stance came at sloth's pace in the Catholic Church, even as late as the 1885; Pope Leo XIII espoused the dangers of separating the two institutions completely.¹⁵ After Vatican II, the Church no longer consigned its "hope in privileges conferred by civil authority."¹⁶ Instead, it emphasized that the Catholic hierarchy in each state bore the responsibility of properly guiding citizens' spiritual formation, which should influence their political thoughts. Yet, in Argentina this newly desired separation remained impossible, because the government retained *patronato*. Lack of separation endangered the freedom of the Argentine Catholic Church leaving it subject to the whims of the secular government. Recognizing the problematic situation in Argentina and elsewhere, Vatican II addressed the lingering, awkward issue of *patronato*. The council recommended rescinding the rights or privileges of civil authorities to nominate, present or designate candidates for the office of bishop in order to protect the freedom of the Church and the welfare of the faithful.¹⁷ Ultimately, relations between the Church and state had to be determined at the state level. In Argentina, the process of designing a concordat, an agreement or compromise between the Holy See and a civil government, began shortly after the

¹⁵"Immortale Dei," The Holy See Website, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_01111885_immortale-dei_en.html (accessed 8 October 2009).

¹⁶"Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World," no. 76 in *The Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder Association Press, 1966), 288.

¹⁷"Decree on the Bishops' Pastoral Office in the Church," no. 20 in *The Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J.

election of Pope John XXIII.¹⁸ Argentine President Arturo Frondizi, in late 1958, approached the pontiff to resolve this thorny connection.¹⁹ Events under the previous Argentine administration of General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu disabused skeptics of the need to sever this bond. While Aramburu's administration reversed the losses the Church suffered under Perón, it also proved that the Argentine governments, especially the martial governments, enjoyed exercising *patronato* in their own favor. Under Aramburu, the Supreme Court refused to approve two bishops appointed by Rome.²⁰ Clearly, the military dominated governments did not hesitate to use the Argentine Church for its own ends. It took four different political administrations (the administrations of Arturo Frondizi, José María Guido, Arturo Umberto Illía, and Juan Carlos Onganía) of different origins and political ideology to complete concordat negotiations. Its signing, in 1966, returned the right to nominate and appoint bishops in Argentina to the appropriate ecclesiastical authority a mere decade before the Dirty War began.

The Argentine government retained full privileges of *patronato nacional* until concordat ratification by the state and the Vatican.²¹ Past Church-state controversies and disagreements over who should fill the vacancy of archbishop of Buenos Aires in the 1920s prompted earlier discussions on both sides to end *patronato* although the timing of

¹⁸ Robert C. Broderick, ed. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, rev. ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1987), s.v. "Concordat."

¹⁹ Angel M. Centeno, "El Acuerdo con la Santa Sede," *Criterio* 2080 (October 24, 1991), 588.

²⁰ Ivereigh, *Catholicism and Politics in Argentina*, 200; Centeno, "El Acuerdo con la Santa Sede," *Criterio*, 589.

²¹ Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 41n.

Vatican II sped it to its final conclusion.²² But while the concordat revoked specific privileges of the *patronato* the Argentine Catholic Church remained established constitutionally, preventing the total separation of Church and state.²³ The concordat assumed continuance of good relations between the Argentine government and the Holy See. While the accord placed the power to name those elevated to bishoprics or higher ecclesiastical titles with the Church, and its Curia, the Argentine government continued to exercise an opinion. Article III of the concordat stated that the Holy See should, through secret communication, give the nominee's names to the state and granted it thirty days to object to the political character of a nominated bishop.²⁴ This article allowed military generals, when in power, to express their preferences regarding the appointment or elevation of certain bishops within the Argentine episcopate.²⁵ Despite the official resolution of *patronato*, the Argentine government and the Catholic Church remained intrinsically linked.

In addition to settling issues like *patronato*, the Second Vatican Council also clarified the bishop's role, both individually and collectively. According to the council, it

²²Abelardo Jorge Soneira, *Las estrategias institucionales de la Iglesia Católica* (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1989), 88-90.

²³Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, ix; Centeno, "El Acuerdo con la Santa Sede," 588-90.

²⁴Apéndice II: 'Acuerdo entre la Santa Sede y la República Argentina (Ley 17.032)' in Laura San Martino de Dromi, *Historia de las relaciones institucionales entre Iglesia y Estado en Argentina* (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina, 1999), 44-45.

²⁵Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 7-8 describes conclusion of a year long contest between the Vatican and the military leaders for the appointment of a new military vicar in 1982; Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 216-17 describes the military leaders attempts to prevent the elevation of Archbishop Juan Carlos Aramburu to the cardinal's primate seat in 1976.

was the right and duty of the hierarchy “to pass moral judgments, even on matters touching the political order, whenever basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make such judgments necessary.”²⁶ Pastoral leaders of the Catholic Church now had an obligation to denounce a government or any other organization whose actions violated personal rights. The council also explicitly ruled that bishops should dedicate themselves unreservedly to those who follow Christ and that their ultimate goal is for all followers to walk entirely in goodness, truth, and justice.²⁷ Additionally, Vatican II pronounced another important note for bishops: the Church’s connection with the world. As the mission of the Catholic Church operated within the larger, secular society the council charged each bishop with the responsibility of being present in the world, connecting with the followers. This contact would enable the bishop to lead effectively the people to salvation.²⁸ This newly defined duty clearly demonstrated a criticism of the past practices. It answered complaints about distant bishops who did not see the common believer’s suffering, but instead dealt solely with elites who suffered little in comparison. This exhortation to heed the needs of the ordinary of Christ’s flock indicated the Catholic Church’s new direction as a clear preference for the poor.

The Latin American Bishop’s Conference or *Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano* (CELAM) clearly reflected that shift in its meeting in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968, to expand the social mission of the Church expressed in Vatican II. The bishops alarmed by

²⁶“Decree on the Bishops’ Pastoral Office in the Church,” no. 20 in *The Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J.

²⁷*Ibid.*, no. 11.

²⁸*Ibid.*, no. 12.

the establishment of godless communism in Cuba and rumblings elsewhere as well as inspired by Vatican II's preference for the poor pushed for fundamental change. The conference established a new awareness of the plight of the poor in Latin America and the realization that if the Catholic hierarchy did not become involved in the alleviation of the poverty stricken the faithful would be attracted to alternatives that promised to do so. CELAM challenged the previously pervasive assumption that the poor were insignificant; the Latin American Church now would give voice to the voiceless poor.²⁹ This new definition of the Church, as more engaged in the world and concerned for the rights of all, fell on deaf ears among most of the Argentine hierarchy. As the turmoil in Argentina increasingly grew after the 1950s, the episcopate emphasized the rigidity of hierarchical organization and submission to ecclesiastical authority in an effort to help contain the chaos of the country.

The Argentine Catholic Church reflected the polarization of society under Perón's influence. After his exile in 1955, his anti-elite rhetoric continued to resonate with the working classes who remained steadfastly loyal to him and demanded his return in the early 1970s. Among the regular clergy, or ordinary parish priests, a socialist movement entitled Movement of Priests for the Third World or *Movimiento de Sacerdotes para el Tercer Mundo* (MSTM) grew. Ordinary priests and lay Catholics in the late 1960s and early 1970s were attracted "to a left-wing and anti-imperialist 'third-worldist' discourse, which placed particular emphasis on the Christ-like qualities of the poor."³⁰ The

²⁹Gustavo Gutiérrez, "Church for the Poor," in *Born of the Poor: The Latin American Church Since Medellín*, Edward C. Cleary, ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 17, 21, and 14.

³⁰Ivereigh, *Catholicism and Politics in Argentina*, 202.

Argentine episcopacy perceived the third-world movement as a challenge to the legitimacy of the hierarchical organization and ecclesiastical authority of the Catholic Church. A number of conflicts between bishops and priests erupted over authority disagreements. A typical situation revolved around ordinary parish priests pushing for progressive reforms and programs while bishops stymied their efforts.³¹

The Church's own problems were played out against the backdrop of political confusion and economic turmoil in Argentina. In 1973, Juan Perón returned to lead Argentina thanks to radical, popular demand. In a year he was dead, succeeded in the presidency by his third wife, Isabel Perón. She assumed the presidency and operated an ineffective government until the military overthrew her in March 1976. The junta then commenced its policy of "national reorganization" and state terrorism.

Chile, Manageable Ties

In comparison with Argentina's separation of Church and state Chile's seemed remarkably easy, because division came gradually before the official break. Time, like sandpaper, wore the resistance of the Chilean Catholic Church down until Church and state leaders welcomed separation when it arrived. Unlike Argentina, Chile did not experience radical anti-clericalism in the 1880s. It did exist, but not to the divisive levels it reached in Argentina. Chilean anti-clericalism never linked to liberal groups and, while some protests greeted the reform laws enacted in the 1870s and 1880s, they were accepted. Any attempts by the Catholic hierarchy to halt or reverse them proved ineffective. The Chilean reforms subjected clerics to public trial, and wrested control of birth, marriage, and death records from the Church. Like Argentina, the Chilean state

³¹Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 123.

had permitted foreign traders, like the British, to practice their religion, so that by the mid-nineteenth century religious freedom was *de facto* if not *de jure*. Finally, the Chilean Catholic Church, which existed in relative poverty, did not provoke resentment by obvious material wealth, as in Mexico and other Latin American countries.³² The Chilean situation at the approach of the official separation of Church and state proved calm compared to Argentina.

The election of Arturo Alessandri Palma, presidential candidate of the Liberal Alliance, in 1920, signaled the coming end between formal union of Church and state in Chile. President Alessandri urged that after over half a century of waiting the hour had come to complete the promise of religious freedom by separating Church and state once and for all. Alessandri believed the separation would prevent the Conservative Party from using religion as a political tool to gather Catholic votes.³³ Strong objections existed among some of the Chilean Church hierarchy, like archbishop of Santiago, Cresente Errázuriz Valdivieso, who proclaimed that separation of Church and state meant the “solemn and public denial of God.”³⁴ Ultimately, the hierarchy did not protest loudly or with much vigor. Throughout 1924 and 1925, Alessandri communicated with the Vatican Secretary of State, Cardinal Pietro Gasparri. He even visited the pope and Gasparri during his brief ousting from power in early 1925 to discuss the terms of the

³²Brian Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 70-2.

³³Maximo Pacheco Gomez, *La separación de la Iglesia y el Estado en Chile y la diplomacia vaticana* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 2004), 25-26; Smith, 72.

³⁴Gomez, *La separación de la Iglesia y el Estado*, 29.

separation.³⁵ Negotiations for severing the bond went smoothly as the Holy See wished to avoid violent conflicts seen in Mexico in 1917, which left bitter feelings and greatly weakened the Church.³⁶

By the mid-1920s both the Chilean episcopate and the Vatican saw advantages to separation of Church and state. Traditionally, the secular government had to approve all major organizational changes within the Church. This meant that for the construction of a new diocese Chile's exercise of *patronato* required Congress's approval and Congress rarely approved. At its independence Chile possessed four dioceses. A century later it still only had four despite decades of appeal by Rome and the Chilean hierarchy to establish new ones.³⁷ On the very day that the new Chilean constitution was promulgated, October 18, 1925, the Vatican created six new dioceses.³⁸ The acceptance of the 1925 Chilean Constitution severed most ties between Church and state, but it did not touch Catholic education in public schools. That link continued and in the 1950s during difficult economic times the Chilean government passed a series of laws to aid Catholic schools.³⁹ Overall, however, the separation of Church and state in Chile progressed calmly because both sides viewed the event as an advantage and education, a key battleground in Argentina, was left untouched for the moment.

³⁵Gomez, *La separación de la Iglesia y el Estado*, 35-36; Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 74-75.

³⁶Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 75.

³⁷Ibid., 74.

³⁸Archbishop of Antofagasta, Carlos Oviedo interviewed by Brian Smith, Santiago, Chile, August 25, 1975 in Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 77.

³⁹Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 102-03.

Throughout the rise of the Popular Front, a political alliance that sometimes included sectors of the left, in the late 1930s and early 1940s the Chilean Church maintained an official position to avoid involvement in politics.⁴⁰ By the mid-1930s the Catholic hierarchy had completely disentangled itself from the Conservative Party, the party with which it had been linked in the past. The Conservative Party, however, continued to assert that it was the party closest to Catholic teachings, thereby enticing Catholic support throughout the 1940s and 1950s.⁴¹ While being politically uninvolved, the Chilean hierarchy gradually adopted progressive social stances.

The Holy See led the Church as a whole by urging social reform and the Chilean episcopacy followed suit. However, given the relative poverty of the Church and the conservative-liberal plurality of Congress in the 1930s and 1940s, which prevented major structural reforms benefitting the lower or working classes from passing, little change toward social reform was made. Simultaneously, throughout this era the universal Church became more and more concerned with growing strength of communism, socialism and Marxism. The Holy See and the Chilean hierarchy warned Catholics not to become involved in Marxism or communism.⁴² In 1937, Pope Pius XI condemned communism as “intrinsically wrong” and stated that anyone who collaborated with communism wished to see the end of Christian civilization.⁴³ While concern for

⁴⁰Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 88.

⁴¹Ibid., 82-84.

⁴²Ibid., 90-94.

⁴³Pope Pius XI, “Divini Redemptoris, March 28, 1937” in *The Papal Encyclicals in their Historical Context* ed. Anne Freemantle (New York: New American Library, 1963), 261.

Marxism and communism grew, exhortations and reasoning to prevent the appeal of communism among the poor flourished. Realizing the conditions of the poor coupled with the need to prevent the lure of communism from attracting the faithful pushed the hierarchy to emphasize the wider Church's call for social reform.

In the Church, this call would continually grow until a new generation of clerical leaders, educated with this social awareness, assumed leadership positions in the Church. In the 1930s they established Catholic Action programs, similar to those in Argentina. These programs failed to reach the lower classes because they aimed primarily at the middle classes and elites. They were designed to train lay people in the social principles of Catholicism, which Pope Leo XIII in his papal encyclical, *Rerum Novarum* and Pope Pius XI in his papal encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, had espoused.⁴⁴ Catholic Action programs provided training and awareness of the middle and upper classes.⁴⁵ The formation of these programs aimed at progressive development of the lay coincided with the rise of new progressive political parties (*Falange Nacional* in 1938 and its successor the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* or PDC in 1957). Many of those trained by the Church-sponsored programs would filter into these progressive political parties and into the Catholic hierarchy in the 1950s and 1960s, when another generation of clerical leaders began to assume control.

This new generation benefitted from the guidance of men like Rev. Emilio Tagle, who later became the archbishop of Valparaíso. In 1950, Tagle took charge of a major

⁴⁴Brian Smith, "The Catholic Church and Politics in Chile," in *Church and Politics in Latin America*, Dermot Keogh, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 322.

⁴⁵Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 96.

seminary in Santiago, one of two in the country, and transformed the curriculum there to place more emphasis on social awareness and clerical responsibility. Tagle ensured that the seminary students were directly exposed to the needs of the poor through part-time service in working class parishes. This and other means to educate about the plight of the poor and the responsibility of the Church to them resulted in a generation of socially aware and motivated clergy. Between 1955 and 1964, twenty-eight bishops retired or died and their replacements tended to be social progressives. Seven of the new bishops as young priests acted as chaplains for Catholic Action programs.⁴⁶ These new progressive leaders made a clear statement with the release of two pastoral letters in 1962 that detailed the Chilean social problems present and suggested how to deal with them.⁴⁷ These two pastoral letters received applause from the international community and signaled the realization of the past several decades' efforts to change the mentality of the episcopate.

In the early 1960s, Vatican II demonstrated how advanced Latin American bishops, especially Chilean bishops, were in regards to the social concerns. The council stated bishops of a country and/or a region needed to form and regularly hold conferences for the exchange of views and the furthering of the greater good in their collective territory.⁴⁸ This instruction served as a mere formality legitimating the national

⁴⁶Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 112.

⁴⁷Episcopado Chileno, "La Iglesia y el campesino chileno" *Mensaje* 11 (May 1962), 185-94A; Episcopado Chileno, "El deber social y politico en la hora presente," *Mensaje* 11 (November 1962), 577-87; Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 107-09.

⁴⁸"Decree on the Bishops' Pastoral Office in the Church," nos. 37 and 38 in *The Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J.

episcopacies and the already existent CELAM. The regional bishops conference began operating in 1955 and met yearly to help alleviate the isolation national episcopacies felt in addressing local problems. CELAM worked to find appropriate solutions and coordinate efficiency of Catholic activity on the continent; it became another outlet for Chilean progressive leadership. By 1959, the official meetings of CELAM reflected the innovation of Chilean bishops thanks, in part, to the influence of the capable vice-president Bishop Manuel Larraín of Talca, Chile.⁴⁹ The Chilean hierarchy worked to lead the rest of their Latin American colleagues to effect change and work for social reform in the continent.

While Latin America did not need the legitimization of regional conferences from Vatican II, the experience of participating in the council only solidified the Chilean bishops' devotion to carrying out reform in their home dioceses. Skills honed by efforts in their own country and in CELAM enabled Chilean leadership to show brightly at Vatican II. An Italian bishop remarked that Chile was advanced and the leading episcopate of Latin America; an opinion seconded by a Central American bishop who stated that "the Chilean bishops have the leadership in Latin America."⁵⁰ Vatican II demonstrated that diverse bishops could work together to implement reform in the universal church, and it strengthened the determination of Chilean bishops to push for progressive change at home. The council's encouragement of change strengthened the

⁴⁹Thomas G. Sanders, *Catholic Innovation in a Changing Latin America* (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Centro Intercultural de Documentación, 1969), 1/3 - 1/7.

⁵⁰The author kept all interviews anonymous so that each interviewee would feel comfortable to freely express their opinion. Both bishops interviewed by Rock Caporale, S.J., Rome, Italy, Fall 1963 in Rock Caporale S.J., *Vatican II: Last of the Councils* (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1964), 158-59.

Chilean hierarchy's commitment to social action for the sake of the poor, decentralization of authority and increased lay responsibilities.⁵¹ Vatican II's boost to the Chilean episcopacy's reform work was seconded by the Medellín conference a few years later. The bishops' progressive stance seemed entirely cemented into the fabric of Chilean Catholic Church by the end of the 1960s.

Throughout the Chilean Church's movement toward progressive reform the hierarchy retained political neutrality, for the most part. The 1962 pastoral letters from the Chilean episcopate, which emphasized the need for major economic changes in the country, combined with vitalized Church-sponsored programs in poor areas and other manifestations of the new progressive approach to society that the episcopate took, acted like an adrenaline shot to the Christian Democratic Party or PDC (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*). Though never directly involved with the PDC the Chilean hierarchy had either educated or grew up with important PDC leaders. Leaders in both the Church and the political arena had attended the same schools and had participated in the same Catholic Action programs in the first half of the twentieth century. As a consequence of this simultaneous growth and similar ideological background the PDC and the Church had markedly similar goals in the early 1960s. The PDC's political platform reflected the personality of the Chilean hierarchy and the progressive changes in attitudes.⁵² This emphasis on the need for change promoted by the episcopate coupled with the explicit

⁵¹Renato Poblete, S.J. interviewed by Brian Smith, Santiago, Chile, November 16, 1975 in Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 121.

⁵²Smith, *Church and Politics*, 130-33; Thomas G. Sanders, "A Note on Chilean Politics: The Coming Elections, Prospects and Personalities," in *West Coast South American Series* vol. XV, no. 4 (November 1986), 6.

warnings against communism and its many similar forms, found its way into the presidential election of 1964. The Chilean hierarchy's condemnation of socialism during the presidential campaign contributed to the defeat of socialist, Salvador Allende, in favor of Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian Democratic Party.

During Frei's presidency, the congruence between the PDC's political agenda and the Chilean episcopate's progressive push dissolved over the next six years. The growing division in Chilean society over issues like socialism as well as the generally economic upheaval in the late 1960s shifted the hierarchy's focus. As many of those active in the PDC were also active in the lay pastoral and social programs sponsored by the Church, the ideological conflicts experienced by the PDC in 1967 spilled over to the pastoral programs causing tension within the Church.⁵³ The hierarchy's blanket condemnation of Marxism faded in an effort to calm the polarization within not only the Church, but also Chilean society as a whole. Instead of exhortations for social reform and serving the poor, the Chilean episcopacy issued pastoral letters emphasizing the "Church's contribution to social solidarity and dialogue amidst unavoidable disruptions and conflicts associated" with any type of progressive change.⁵⁴ As social reform unfolded in Chile, the Church placed its moral weight behind the democratic and constitutional processes to resolve conflicts.⁵⁵ The hierarchy emphasized this as a strategy to avoid the agitation in the country from turning into violence. Even after the 1970 election of socialist Salvador Allende Gossens, the hierarchy continued to call for adherence to

⁵³Smith, "The Catholic Church and Politics in Chile," 323.

⁵⁴Smith, *Church and Politics*, 130-34.

⁵⁵Ibid., 134.

legitimate process to decide conflicts. Throughout the first two and half years of President Allende's term in office the episcopate issued public statements "supporting continued structural transformations in the economy favoring the poor . . . and denouncing such tactics of the irresponsible opposition as black market profiteering, the accelerated export of capital, and sabotage."⁵⁶ During the last six months of Allende's government the relationship between the Church and the state became tense. His administration found it increasingly difficult to maintain social order and control sectors of its coalition, which heightened polarization of society. This coupled with the continuation of nationalizations, without congressional approval, throughout the country worried the Chilean hierarchy. The announcement of an educational reform bill affecting private schools opened a rift between the episcopate and the Allende administration. In March 1973 parliamentary elections resulted in a stalemate after a proposal from Allende's government to form a national school system requiring all schools, both public and private, to accept a 'socialist humanism' ideology under state supervision. The Catholic hierarchy openly denounced this proposal. Despite its withdrawal the Chilean episcopate turned on the administration and used its public influence to undermine the regime. Nevertheless, right up to the military coup the episcopacy condemned violence on all sides, no matter its perpetrator, and supported constitutional solutions to the political situation of the country.⁵⁷ In spite of the efforts of the episcopate to preserve peace the political atmosphere deteriorated after the educational proposal and in September 1973 it exploded as a military coup took control of the Chilean government.

⁵⁶Smith, "The Catholic Church and Politics in Chile," 325.

⁵⁷Ibid., 326-7.

The Catholic Church in the Southern Cone

On the verge of military takeover, both Argentina and Chile had traversed the same path, but at radically different speeds. Both states had officially severed *patronato* Chile in 1925 and Argentina in 1966. However, Chile's four-decade head start over Argentina meant that the Chilean Catholic hierarchy learned to adjust and utilize separation from the state. The Chilean episcopacy had nearly fifty years before the military coup to discover its own voice and to distance itself from the country's politics in both calm and unstable times. Therefore, the Chilean hierarchy possessed a unique institutional backdrop of independent commentator for the country that enabled the personalities of Chilean bishops to reveal themselves at critical moments.

In contrast to Chilean hierarchy's lengthy development period, the Argentine hierarchy gained an incomplete independence, the concordat still allowed the Argentine government input on bishop appointments a mere decade prior to the military takeover. The Argentine episcopacy never had the opportunity to establish its own voice separate from the traditional allegiance with those in power. When the hierarchy finally broke away from official entanglement with the state, the country was in chaos. During ten years of constant turnover of governments and increasing political violence the Argentine bishops clung to what they knew, allegiance to the political power. Prior to the concordat in 1966, the military governments that frequently controlled the state after Perón's exile, had already inflicted considerable damage on the episcopacy's voice by using their influence and control to appoint bishops the armed forces preferred. These institutional factors stifled the development of the Argentine episcopacy's expression. Without previous experience the Argentine bishops fell victim to tradition and uniformity, hence

they rejected any voice of change, which deviated from what they had always known. The timing of Church-state separation gave the Argentine episcopacy an institutional disadvantage in dealing with change, and suppressed any liberalizing tendencies within the hierarchy.

Understanding the institutional and other environmental developments leading up to the military takeover in each Southern Cone country supplies the necessary larger setting where each individual bishops' formation occurred. The bishops who led throughout the military regimes developed during and reacted to these larger societal, political, economic and religious trends. The bishops' personal development and their work as an episcopacy reflected the broader influence of the events happening in their countries.

CHAPTER THREE

Capital Men

The various political and religious currents that pervaded Argentina and Chile throughout the twentieth century helped form the next generation of ecclesiastical leaders. The bishops who guided the capital cities, Buenos Aires and Santiago, stood out among their fellows in the national episcopacies as men of considerable influence. They shepherded the largest populace. Indeed, the size of the capital cities ensured a more volatile and complex population. In 1975, Buenos Aires, Argentina's capital possessed approximately 9.3 million inhabitants, which comprised over a third of the country's total population. In the same year, Santiago, Chile's capital city also contained a rough third of the state's entire population with 3.4 million occupants.¹ Buenos Aires and Santiago acted as population hubs where different ideologies met and clashed. The pastoral leaders of these capitals held enormous amounts of potential power in their hands, but suffered from an enormous burden. The personal formation of the capital archbishops dictated their response to the military regimes as pastoral leaders.

Quiet Through Turbulence in Argentina, Juan Carlos Aramburu

The man who would lead the archdiocese of Buenos Aires throughout the Dirty War, Juan Carlos Aramburu, was born on February 11, 1912, in Reducción, the diocese of Río Cuarto, Argentina. He spent his childhood in a variety of locales including

¹Center for Policy Studies of the Population Council, "Population Brief: Latin America" *Population and Development Review* 6, no. 1 (March 1980), 142. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable1972661> (accessed February 8, 2010).

Reducción, Buenos Aires, and Spain. Aramburu began his education in the city he would one day oversee ecclesiastically, at the *Colegio de La Salle*. At age eleven he entered the Seminary of Córdoba in 1923.² This seminary along with many others in Argentina remained very conservative and formed their seminarians to follow the model of adherence to order and tradition.³ As a consequence of conservative training in seminary Aramburu lacked important ideological resources that would have given him the tools to conceptualize an objection or criticism to the military regime later in his pastoral career. After seminary he traveled to Rome to enroll in the *Collegio Pio Latino Americano* where he earned his first doctorate in philosophy. He pursued further education in Rome at the Pontifical Gregorian University and obtained his second doctorate in canon law. In the midst of all the academic rigors of pursuing doctorates Aramburu received his ordination as a priest on October 28, 1934.⁴ The young priest followed the established model set before him, never questioning the rigidity of the traditional emphasis of order and tradition.

Father Aramburu returned to his homeland to first complete pastoral work in the diocese of Río Cuarto and then to serve as vicar cooperador, or a pastoral assistant, in Villa de Rosario the province of Córdoba. However, he did not remain in Rosario for long. He quickly ended his contact at the parish level by transferring to the city of

²Salvador Miranda, “Biographies – Aramburu, Juan Carlos,” in *The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church*, Florida International University Library, <http://www.fiu.edu/~mirandas/bios-a.htm#Aramburu> (accessed November 23, 2009).

³Jeffery Klaiber, S.J., *The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America*, 78.

⁴Miranda, “Biographies – Aramburu, Juan Carlos.”

Córdoba to become a professor of Canonical Law and Philosophy and vice-rector for the *Nuestro Señora de Loreto* Seminary.⁵ He eventually became a professor of higher religious studies at the faculty of arts and philosophy of the National University of Córdoba.⁶ There he continued to perpetuate the conventional educational model, adherence to order and tradition, for students – a result, perhaps of his limited contact at the parish level, which could have opened his perspective to beyond the traditional.

Monsignor Aramburu's conservative pastoral and educational work earned him the respect of the established hierarchy. This resulted in Pope Pius XII's elevation of Aramburu to the titular bishopric of Platea and naming him auxiliary bishop of Tucumán in October 1946.⁷ The Archbishop of Córdoba, Fermín Lafitte, consecrated Aramburu as a bishop two months later. Bishop Aramburu followed in Lafitte's footsteps as Ordinary for the Faithful Oriental Rite in Argentina. Seven years later, in 1953, Monsignor Aramburu became the bishop of Tucumán. In his episcopal role, Bishop Aramburu

⁵“Monseñor Aramburu es el arzobispo de Buenos Aires,” *Los Andes* (Mendoza, Argentina), April 23, 1975.

⁶Holy See Press Office, “Aramburu Card. Juan Carlos,” Biographical Notes, College of Cardinals in the Holy See website, http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/cardinali_biografie/cardinali_bio_aramburu_jc_en.html (accessed November 23, 2009).

⁷A titular bishop or a bishop *in partibus infidelium* is the title given to a bishop ordained to a diocese that existed at one time, but which for various reasons is no longer an existent or distinct diocese. Therefore, the bishop is “titular” because the diocese does not exist, so he is therefore not required to fulfill the responsibilities associated with an ordinary bishop office. An auxiliary or coadjutor bishop assists another bishop, generally an archbishop, to fulfill all the work required to operate his see. He is granted all the required faculties to make the bishopric work dignified and more effective. However, the auxiliary bishop's position and purpose should never challenge the authority of the diocesan bishop, nor place the unity of the diocese in jeopardy. See Robert C. Broderick, ed. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, rev. ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1987), s.v. “Bishop, Titular; Bishop in Partibus Infidelium; Bishop, Auxiliary; Bishop, Coadjutor.”

proclaimed and followed the traditional line of the Roman Catholic Church and attempted to influence those in power to protect Catholic tenets. In 1954, when a divorce bill came before the Argentine Senate he personally sent a telegram to President Juan Perón urging him to veto the bill. As a good defender of the faith, Aramburu's stance on divorce would never soften with time. Years later, in the mid-1980s, in a Palm Sunday homily he denounced divorce as a destroyer of the family in an effort to thwart any approval by Argentine Congress of a divorce legislation.⁸ Aramburu's conservative theological line was rewarded in March 1957, when he was elevated to archbishop when the metropolitan see of Tucumán became an archdiocese.⁹ His defense of the conservative moral line of the Catholic Church never altered.

As the archbishop of Tucumán, Aramburu requested aid for the sacred mission of Tucumán as a part of the larger holy mission of the Argentine Church. In honor of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Tucumán he pled for a reconstruction or a re-commemoration of the country to both a patriotic spirit and religious renewal of the people. He explained that urgent renovation of the diverse structures in the Church was needed because they had been corrupted. According to Aramburu, the country and the local community in Tucumán suffered from lack of confidence and disunion. No one, he claimed could deny that a great moral crisis of

⁸“Party Ousts Peronist,” *New York Times*, December 17, 1954; Bradley Graham, “Divorce Ban a Rallying Point in Argentina,” *The Washington Post*, April 20, 1986, Sunday Final Edition.

⁹“Juan Carlos Aramburu, Arzobispo emérito de Buenos Aires,” Cardenales, Agencia de Informaciones Católica (AIC) Prensa, <http://www.aciprensa.com/Cardenales/aramburu.htm> (accessed November 23, 2009); Miranda, “Biographies – Aramburu, Juan Carlos.”; Holy See Press Office, “Aramburu Card. Juan Carlos.”

conscience was occurring. Archbishop Aramburu asked everyone to collaborate to forge a new path. This path, already begun in Tucumán, followed the motto “Dios lo quiere” or “God wants you” indicating the divine desire for renewal and rededication of faith in the holy mission of Tucumán and Argentina.¹⁰ Archbishop Aramburu used his role as pastoral leader to urge a renewal of traditional Catholic practices in Argentine society, beginning with his own archdiocese.

In the late 1960s, Monsignor Aramburu displayed his considerable skill as a church leader. In June 1967 Pope Paul VI appointed Aramburu as coadjutor archbishop of Buenos Aires with the right of succession. The pope also named him *pro hac vice*¹¹ to the archiepiscopal titular see of Turre in Byzacena, another honorary title for Aramburu.¹² A year after his appointment as archbishop coadjutor, Monsignor Aramburu faced protests fomented by the MSTM. In December 1968, MSTM objected the military government’s efforts, spearheaded by President Juan Carlos Onganía, to eliminate the *villas miserias*. This plan sprouted out of the military government’s desire to end illegal land seizures and eradicate makeshift houses that appeared in the greater metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. Priests, most of whom worked with the *villas miserias*, led protests that escalated from standing silently to hunger strikes. Lay students and laborers soon joined the priests and the protests soon received nationwide media coverage and public recognition for MSTM. In January 1969, Monsignor Aramburu’s message to the clergy of the archdiocese of Buenos Aires prohibited them from distributing resolutions

¹⁰Juan Carlos Aramburu, “La Santa Misión de Tucumán, del Arzobispo de Tucumán” *Revista Eclesiástica Argentina* V, No. 27 (May-June 1962): 256-61.

¹¹*Pro hac vice* means “on this occasion only.”

¹²Holy See Press Office, “Aramburu Card. Juan Carlos.”

regarding the economic, social or political state and forbidding participation in any public act without first being granted permission from the archbishop of Buenos Aires. The current archbishop Antonio Caggiano was a known supporter of military president General Onganía.¹³ This message clearly targeted the MSTM priests, consequently, the priests responded. The group published a letter sent to Aramburu in which they argued that the documents of the Second Vatican Council and of Medellín brought the Church beyond the separation of spiritual and temporal affairs. The documents created in Medellín encouraged active denunciation of the abuses and injustices produced by the inequalities between rich and poor. The MSTM expressed alarm at the passivity of the Argentine Church saying that it lacked initiative and an orientation for the liberation of the poor.¹⁴ Monsignor Aramburu's role as archbishop coadjutor thrust him into the limelight in this crisis as he followed hierarchical orders to stop priest-led protests.

Aramburu's dealings with the MSTM influenced the remainder of his active pastoral career, including the way he reacted to the Dirty War. The MSTM followed up their public letters to Aramburu with an invitation to attend one of their monthly meetings to comment upon the issued prohibition.¹⁵ After his attendance, MSTM published a summary of the meeting, which revealed that Aramburu only wanted to achieve a greater unity and efficacy in the matter. Aramburu said there had been no intention in the communiqué to close doors on or ignore the MSTM's concerns. Rather, Aramburu

¹³Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 142-43.

¹⁴“Documento 7” and “Documento 8” in Domingo Bresci and Rolando Concatti, eds., *Sacerdotes para el tercer mundo*, 2nd edition (Buenos Aires: Publicaciones del Movimiento, 1970), 60-65.

¹⁵Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 143.

commented on the necessity of priest led actions as bishops could not be present in every situation, but he continued that such actions should be worked out in union or coordination with the priest's bishop. He stressed the need to maintain open communication and loyalty within the Church by following such channels.¹⁶

The saga between MSTM and the Argentine bishops continued to escalate, as did Monsignor Aramburu's role in it. The priests began their movement with obvious left leanings; however, as MSTM gained momentum its radicalization to the far left accelerated. Inclination to the far left brought MSTM into conflict with the conservative forces at work in Argentine society, which included the military government, the episcopacy, the media and conservative Catholics. Various military governments presided over Argentina over this time period all met with top church officials to persuade them to sanction the MSTM; their attempts failed. Aramburu's willingness to have an open dialogue with MSTM proved too radical for Argentine president General Onganía who attempted to thwart Aramburu's ascension to Antonio Caggiano's seat as archbishop of Buenos Aires.¹⁷ The simultaneous extreme politicization of the state spilled over into the Church bishops of Argentina became increasingly vocal against the MSTM. Earning a reputation for being soft on progressive priests, Aramburu remained silent despite the criticisms of his fellow bishops. His silence suggested to observers that he acted with the support of the Vatican. In August 1970, he published a letter calling for unity among all levels of the clergy.¹⁸ While a conservative himself, Aramburu did not

¹⁶“Documento 9” in Bresci, ed., *Sacerdotes para el tercer mundo*, 65-67.

¹⁷Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 166.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 172.

reject dialogue with different ideological persuasions. However, his dealings with MSTM indicated his inclination to use silence as a primary method of public communication.

When Aramburu felt he had something to say, he said it, but otherwise he kept his silence, believing that more voices in the political chaos of Argentina helped few. In 1973, he delivered a homily that urged collaboration to work toward reconciliation to forge a solid peace.¹⁹ This homily expressed Aramburu's and the Argentine hierarchy's growing concern over the turmoil, in which the Argentine state found itself embroiled. That same year, when the rock opera, *Jesus Christ Superstar*, arrived in Argentina, Msgr. Aramburu expressed his disapproval during Easter mass. He said that Catholics, "cannot accept that the figure of Christ be presented with self-doubts about his divinity, or be exhibited in circumstances or attitudes lacking decorum."²⁰ There was no explicit connection between the monsignor's comments and the burning of the Teatro Argentino on the opening night of *Jesus Christ Superstar* the following week.²¹ However, Aramburu's statement during mass could have been used as justification for the arson. In 1975, amidst the growing violence in Argentina, Archbishop Aramburu exhorted the general populace in an Easter homily to avoid violence and that hatred remained inadmissible in human relations.²² The archbishop remained conservative, and consistent

¹⁹“Homilia de Monseñor Aramburu en la Misa de Corpus Christi,” *Diario* (Parana, Argentina), June 22-23, 1973.

²⁰“Superstar’ Theater Burned in Argentina,” Special to the *New York Times*, May 3, 1973.

²¹Ibid.

²²“Una exhortación de monseñor Aramburu,” *La Nación*, March 31, 1975.

with orthodox Catholic thought, he abhorred violence. While he occasionally spoke out against attacks on the sanctity of the Church, his silences in the face of the increasing state violence had an unhealthy effect on Argentine Catholics. They, like their archbishop, remained silent as the atrocities of the Dirty War mounted.

In 1975, the year prior to the military assumption of power, Monsignor Aramburu officially succeeded to the primatial see of Buenos Aires. He ascended to his new position saying that he, in his new pastoral office, would continue to work for “peace, fraternity, reconciliation and the salvation of all.”²³ Always, throughout his pastoral career Aramburu demonstrated a preoccupation for maintaining an open dialogue between different groups within the Argentine Church in order to promote unity and internal peace. It most likely was this continuous exhortation for dialogue, peace and unity that resulted in Aramburu’s elevation to cardinal during Pope Paul VI’s consistory. He received the hallmark red biretta and the title of Saint Giovanni Battista dei Fiorentini (St. John of the Florentines) on May 24, 1976.²⁴ Two days later he received a letter from Pope Paul VI, who welcomed his new cardinal with a warm expression of esteem for Aramburu, his pastoral activity, and unconditional service to the Church.²⁵ Cardinal Aramburu was the first priest from Córdoba to be made a cardinal.²⁶ As ecclesiastical

²³“Despedida a Caggiano” *La Nación*, April 27, 1975.

²⁴ Miranda, “Biographies – Aramburu, Juan Carlos.”

²⁵Pope Paul VI, “Discurso del Papa Pablo VI al Nuevo Cardenal Juan Carlos Aramburu, 26 de mayo de 1976,” Holy See Documents, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/speeches/1976/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19760526_card-aramburu_sp.html (accessed November 23, 2009).

²⁶“Karlic, el segundo cardenal cordobés de la historia,” *La Voz del Interior* (Córdoba, Argentina), October 18, 2007.

leader of Buenos Aires, Cardinal Aramburu led the over one-third of the Argentine populace, but his personal formation valued unity among the Church over change and his ability to remain silent despite public criticism resulted in assumed acceptance of the Dirty War when it arrived.

As archbishop of Buenos Aires throughout the Dirty War in Argentina, Juan Carlos Aramburu was accused of inaction and disregard for his pastoral duties. Archbishop Aramburu never publicly criticized the military regime's actions, however he did expressed private disapproval directly to the military junta.²⁷ Many lamented the possible impact and influence lost by Archbishop Aramburu's public silence. Emilio Mignone suggested that the "powerful image of Cardinal Aramburu using the pulpit of the metropolitan cathedral to denounce this criminal activity – like Saint Ambrose in Milan before Theodosius – could have stopped the genocide."²⁸ Yet given the archbishop's personal background and path to power the Argentine people could not expect more.

As the pastoral leader of Buenos Aires Aramburu, for the most part, kept a low profile. He never denounced any regime abuses. More telling, he denied that the Argentine hierarchy's inactivity on behalf of Dirty War victims and refuted reports that there were mass graves in Argentina.²⁹ Even when violence directly touched his diocese

²⁷Jeffery Klaiber, S.J., *The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998), 77.

²⁸Emilio F. Mignone, *Witness to the Truth: The Complicity of Church and Dictatorship in Argentina, 1976-1983*, trans. Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988). 21

²⁹*Ibid.*, 36-37.

he remained impassive. He did attend a funeral mass at San Patricio's Catholic Church in Buenos Aires after the vicious killing of three priests and two seminarians. The fact that he attended rather than presided over the mass, which would have been normal, indicated a refusal to condemn the killings.³⁰ Aramburu, who as archbishop of Buenos Aires, could have used his authority to denounce the regime on this occasion, but remained steadfastly silent, abandoning the Catholic faithful to persecution.

Dedicated to the Poor in Chile, Raúl Silva Henríquez

Cardinal Juan Carlos Aramburu's counterpart in Chile, Raúl Silva Henríquez, took a stance opposite Aramburu's during the military regime. The archbishop of Santiago was as progressive and outspoken as the archbishop of Buenos Aires was conservative and silent. Raúl Silva Henríquez's background led to his formation as a progressive Church leader that openly criticized the Pinochet military regime.

Raúl Silva Henríquez was born on September 27, 1907. He was the sixteenth of nineteen children born to Mercedes Henríquez Encina and Ricardo Silva Silva. His parents probably never suspected their son would grow up to be one of the most prophetic and controversial figures in Chilean Church history. Ricardo Silva Silva's family originally descended from the Portuguese island of Madiera and was among the earliest immigrants to the Spanish colonies. Raúl's father belonged to the lower, yet still respectable, class of industrialists. His mother, Mercedes Henríquez Encina's family had been well off as governors and vice royalties in colonial times and managed to maintain

³⁰Juan de Onis, "Argentines Shocked by Slaying of Five at Church," Special to the *New York Times*, July 6, 1976.

their upper class status to throughout the centuries.³¹ This unusual union blossomed out of family connections and resulted in a unique setting for Raúl Silva Henríquez's arrival. The experiences of Silva's childhood, especially the influence of his father, helped shape him to become an extraordinary cardinal.

Ricardo, Silva's father, attended a Jesuit school, the *Colegio San Ignacio*, in Santiago as a youth and had fond memories of his experience there. Originally, Ricardo desired that all of his sons attend the school, but after the first several went and returned ill because he could not stomach the poor sustenance offered at *San Ignacio* after the rich provisions their mother provided at home. Thankfully, the Christian Brothers and their school arrived in Talca and Ricardo Silva sent his sons there for education.³² A few years after his First Communion in 1916, young Silva expressed to his father a desire to be a brother, like his teachers. His father suggested a more prudent course. He instructed Silva to first finish his studies and after receiving his degree he could be whatever he wanted.³³ This supportive reply would be echoed a few years later when as a young man Silva expressed his desire to join an unusual religious order.

After Silva finished his studies with the Christian Brothers he attended the high school at *Liceo Alemán* in Santiago underneath the tutelage of the Fathers of the Divine Word. He remained in Santiago to attend the law school of the *Universidad Católica de*

³¹Raúl Silva Henríquez and Ascanio Cavallo, *Memorias* vol. I (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Copygraph, 1991), 11, 14, 15.

³²*Ibid.*, 20-21.

³³*Ibid.*, 23.

Chile, where he received his degree in December 1929.³⁴ Having completed the studies expected of him, Silva returned to his original occupational desire, the priesthood. Originally, he had intended to enter the Jesuits because of his father's enjoyable experience as a child at the *Colegio San Ignacio* in Santiago. When Silva first contacted a priest in the order he was told on two separate occasions to return the next day. The third attempt at a meeting for information about joining the Jesuits at *San Ignacio* failed utterly as the doors were firmly shut and no one responded to Silva's pounding on the door and calls. Later, Silva confided his troubles to a friend, Luis Felipe Letelier, whose suggestion changed the course of Silva's life. Letelier invited Silva to meet Father Valetín Panzarasa, his own confessor. On the first try in December 1926, Silva met Father Panzarasa. Although, the father offered to write a letter to the rector of the *Colegio de los Jesuitas*, Silva declined. The young man explained that he believed the difficulties in obtaining a meeting with the Jesuits compared to the ease of meeting Father Panzarasa, a Salesian, clearly indicated that he needed to reconsider his religious order selection. At the end of their conversation Silva requested materials over the Salesian Congregation and their founder, Don Juan Bosco, to read. By the end of summer vacation in 1927, Silva wanted to join the Salesian Congregation.³⁵ His choice surprised many, including his family and members of the Salesian order.

The Salesians, named for Saint Francis de Sales, devoted themselves to the "exercise of spiritual and corporal works of charity toward the young, especially the

³⁴“Biografía del Sr. Cardenal Raúl Silva Henríquez,” Iglesia Chilena Biographies, <http://www.iglesia.cl/biblioteca/testigos/cardsilva/biografia.html> (accessed November 23, 2009).

³⁵Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias* vol. 1, 30-33.

poor,” and the education of young boys.³⁶ An order devoted to the service of the poor was not what most expected of Silva. Many of his family members and friends protested that the Salesian Congregation was too humble, without a bright public face among the Church. They felt that for a young man of Silva’s upbringing and education, he could aspire to better known religious orders. However, Silva remained firm in his decision and his father’s encouragement solidified his choice. When Silva wrote to his parents informing them of his decision, his father’s response echoed his first response to his son’s desire to lead a religious life – “haga lo que usted quiera” or do what you want. In Ricardo Silva Silva’s eyes, his son completed his studies as he had requested, therefore he was free to do as he chose.³⁷ With his father’s blessing and the reluctant support of his family, Raúl Silva Henríquez began his studies to become a priest in 1930.

Silva completed the traditional six years of seminary in four at the *Seminario Mayor de Macúl*, because of his advanced university education. Afterwards, in 1934, he travelled to Turín, Italy, to attend the *Instituto Teológico Salesiano* or the Salesian Theological Institute. One month into his studies at Turín, Silva received devastating news. Ricardo Silva Silva had passed away without his son at his side. The news, Silva claimed, delivered one of the worst blows of his life. His father had been his biggest supporter, the one to whom he confided his ambitions and who guided him in matters of faith. Silva felt this traumatic loss lingered throughout his entire time at Turín.³⁸ Despite

³⁶Ernest Marsh, “The Salesian Society,” in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912) retrieved from the New Advent: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13398b.htm> (accessed November 23, 2009).

³⁷Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. I, 35-36..

³⁸Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. I, 41, 48, and 53-54.

desolation at his father's death, Silva continued his ecclesiastical studies. During his third year, in 1937, the young man experienced another moment that altered the course of his life. The third year of study at Turín students underwent an in-depth evaluation by their superiors. The superiors voted on each student's future, to either grant the role of sub-deacon and acceptance into the order or to reject the student from the order and send him home. A sub-deacon helped the priest and the deacon celebrate mass. The superiors voted against Silva's acceptance into the Salesian Congregation and refused him the role of sub-deacon. The budding priest was shattered. He had been rejected because his superiors did not think he could not complete the religious ceremonies required of a Salesian priest. Young Silva, when he entered seminary, was not accustomed to the amount of kneeling required by the religious life. Since then he had acclimated to remaining on his knees for hours on end, indeed he spent so much time on his knees that he ruptured his synovial glands, the glands that lubricate the knee. At Turín, his knees aggravated him so much; he could no longer kneel for hours on end, as the role of sub-deacon required and for this reason the superiors at the Salesian Theological Institute rejected him. In shock and upset, Silva began his preparations to return to Chile. However, Silva's peers intervened and spoke to the general prefect, the second highest in the Salesian Congregation, who asked the superiors to reevaluate Silva's case. The reevaluation reversed the previous decision and Silva, believing the reversal miraculous, completed his studies with increased fervor. Raúl Silva Henríquez was finally ordained as a priest in July 1938.³⁹ The young priest then returned home to Chile ready to fulfill his pastoral mission.

³⁹Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. I, 63-64.

Father Silva spent the first five years of his priesthood teaching and later directing the Salesian Theological Institute in La Cisterna. There he became affectionately known as Don Raúl. The founder of the Salesian Congregation, Saint John Bosco or Don Bosco, wanted the order to strictly adhere to the secular or diocesan clerical hierarchy, for this reason they would not be called fathers, but misters, which in Chile translated to “don.” Don Raúl strongly believed in the social teachings of Don Bosco, and accepted that the priest's mission should be to convince the upper classes of obligation to share with the poor, on pain of exposure to the revolution and to plunder.⁴⁰ Throughout his years teaching Silva became more and more convinced of the rightness of Don Bosco’s teachings and wanted to build a church to honor him.

In 1944, Silva obtained permission to build a church to honor Don Bosco, but the order had no money. So with the help of lay faithful in and around in La Cisterna an organizational and financial campaign began to raise funds and construct the church. The campaign was so successful that the plan for the small church turned into a large one for the entire nation. Many told Silva again and again that it could not be done. He proved them wrong and the national church dedicated to Don Bosco was completed in 1950. During the campaign to obtain funds Don Raúl was transferred to the *Colegio Patrocinio de San José* to act as director of the school. The struggle to organize and erect the “impossible temple” ensured Silva a prominence among all Salesians and brought him to the notice of his superiors.⁴¹ However, his vision for the temple brought him his first true taste of criticism. Many of his fellow priests and religious brothers wrote to him

⁴⁰Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. I, 78, 71 and 80.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 92.

criticizing his selfishness, the Salesian Congregation and the Catholic Church in general already had too many projects and works to add another.⁴² This first taste of criticism and organizational experience prepared Don Raúl for his future controversial role in the Chilean Church by inuring him criticism's negative effects.

Don Raúl became an efficient problem fixer and organizational master, two traits that followed the remainder of his pastoral career. His reappointment as director of the Salesian Theological College in La Cisterna in 1950, displayed the Salesian's superiors understanding of Silva's talents. However, Silva petitioned to remain at *San Patricinio de San José* where his hard work had finally paid off as the school reflected a more positive atmosphere and order. His request was denied, so he returned to the Salesian Theological College in La Cisterna. There, Silva reintroduced a form of discipline and order to the *colegio* returning it to the orderly institution it had been when he first left it several years previously.⁴³

The organizational efforts and can do attitude of Don Raúl quickly involved him in the creation of an organization to direct and aid the many European immigrants after World War II.⁴⁴ His many works brought him to the notice of the papal nuncio, Sebastian Baggio, who constantly supported him throughout his career. His successful work with European migrants led to Silva's involvement in the foundation of Caritas Chile, which directed the all charity organizations in the country under the hand of the Catholic Church. He also became involved in Catholic Relief Services and a Latin American

⁴²Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. I, 89.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 107-08.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 119-122.

Religious Congress. All of his pastoral works resulted in his appointment as bishop of Valparaíso in 1959 by Pope John XXIII. Don Raúl accepted the position with the a statement of his goal, “to announce the kingdom of God to the poor.”⁴⁵ Silva’s devotion to the underprivileged was clear and his administrative capabilities would promote him to even higher levels under Pope John XXIII.

Bishop Raúl immediately set about to bring order to the diocese of Valparaíso through his driven and charismatic personality as well as with his connections in various social aid programs like Caritas. However, he would spend only nineteen months in Valparaíso, because the Holy See needed him for another purpose. The Holy See faced difficulties in finding a priest of sufficient experience and capabilities to become the archbishop of Santiago. Raúl confessed surprise at being asked, because he knew his strong personality occasionally caused problems with more conservative elements, but he submitted to the pontiff’s request that become the Chilean capital’s archbishop.⁴⁶ In 1961, he assumed the most difficult pastoral role in Chile.

He quickly proved himself committed to the social goals of *Rerum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*. He petitioned Rome to hold mass in Spanish before Vatican II.⁴⁷ Before he was appointed as bishop, Don Raúl, as president of Caritas Chile, learned the importance of land to the poor. In the late 1950s, the slums around Santiago where thousands lived in deplorable conditions experienced three separate fires. Don Raúl

⁴⁵Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. I, 193.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 207-210.

⁴⁷David Molineaux, “Chile honors memory of cardinal who opposed Pinochet,” *National Catholic Reporter*, vol. 35, no. 25 (April 23, 1999), 11.

helped distribute food and medical relief, and through his contact with the inhabitants he learned that the thing they needed most was land to work and build. Once he became archbishop, Don Raúl worked toward his pastoral mission of aiding the poor and distributed thousands of acres of unused Church land to landless peasants with Pope John XXIII's approval.⁴⁸ His social progressive acts were a manifestation of this Salesian pastoral formation and his own personal experiences in communicating and working with the students of the poor. He was quickly elevated to cardinal by Pope John XXIII in March 1962, receiving both the red cardinal hat and the title of S. Bernardo alle Terme.⁴⁹ Clearly, the progressive pontiff appreciated the abilities and work of the progressive Don Raúl.

His background with his emphasis on the obedience to the will of the hierarchy and his adherence to a peaceful, loving pastoral mission exhibited itself in the archbishop's actions in the late 1960s. He excommunicated all of the two hundred youths who took over a cathedral in Santiago and ordered religious sanctions against the eight priests who led the youths. While both the sanctions and the excommunications were lifted a few days later, Silva still considered the forcible takeover of the cathedral in Santiago one of the saddest days in Chile's ecclesiastical history. The youths denounced both Pope Paul VI's visit to Bogotá and even Silva himself protesting the lack of change and the suggesting that the pope's visit symbolized an approval of the horrible

⁴⁸Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. I, 147-8.

⁴⁹Salvador Miranda, "Biographies – Henríquez, Raúl Silva," in *The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church*, Florida International University Library. <http://www.fiu.edu/~mirandas/bios-s.htm#Silva2> (accessed November 23, 2009).

circumstances of the poor.⁵⁰ Silva could not and would not accept such flagrant disrespect of authority and the rejection of the Church's pastoral mission to love and care for all peacefully.

Despite his many works with the poorest of the poor, Don Raúl never sympathized with socialism or communism. He could not reconcile Christianity with any of Marxism's manifestations and his relationship with Christians for Socialism proved contentious. He believed that Marxism remained incompatible with Christianity; but he bore no ill will to those who followed Marxism. After Salvador Allende's inauguration in 1970, the cardinal hesitantly offered the socialist president a Bible. The cardinal remarked that he was unsure if the president would accept or read it. The new president replied of course he would accept and read the offered Bible because it told of the first revolution in history.⁵¹ Despite their ideological differences Allende and Silva shared a mutual respect for one another. Cardinal Silva led the Chilean episcopacy in asking for constitutional means to resolve the political and economic tensions in Chile leading up to the military coup in 1973.

When General Augusto Pinochet led the Chilean armed forces in a military coup against the Allende's government on September 11, 1973, a few among the Chilean Catholic Church hierarchy might have relaxed. While the Chilean bishops might denounce violence and the blatant disregard for the long-standing democratic tradition in

⁵⁰Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. II, 195-6; David Molineaux, "Chile honors memory of cardinal who opposed Pinochet," *National Catholic Reporter*, vol. 35, no. 25 (April 23, 1999), 11.

⁵¹Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, vol. II, 140-42.; David Molineaux, "Chile honors memory of cardinal who opposed Pinochet," *National Catholic Reporter*, vol. 35, no. 25 (April 23, 1999), 11.

their own Southern Cone nation, as Catholic clergymen they never felt comfortable with the Socialist-led government. Between socialism and the Catholic Church hierarchy in generally there existed too many ideological differences for reconciliation or complete ease in dealing with one another.

While the bishops breathed a sigh of relief after the military coup, human rights violations immediately became apparent. Cardinal Silva Henríquez hesitated to act immediately after the coup. He agonized about the situation. He knew that less than a month after the military coup, people were desperate for aid to find their disappeared loved ones. This search for aid provoked a response from the various religious communities. The Committee of Co-Operation for Peace, or the Pro-Paz Committee as it was known, formed from the major religious denominations of Chile: Catholic, Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostals, Jewish, and others.⁵² For the next two years, Pro-Paz would provide seekers and protesters with all of the services that the Vicariate of Solidarity later gave. These services included legal aid in the form of writs of *habeas corpus* and other legal recourse to find disappeared loved ones and medical services to those who had been subjected to the abuses of the regime as well as many services that provided food and work opportunities. The Catholic Church hierarchy supported Pro-Paz, but the connection remained loose, focusing on the ecumenicalism and the prevalence of suffering among all of peoples. While the Pro-Paz began its activism and denunciation almost immediately, the Catholic hierarchy took longer to move into open criticism.

⁵²Antonio Viera-Gallo, ed., “The Committee of Co-Operation for Peace and the Vicariate of Solidarity,” in Chile, 1980: Resource Guide, *International IDOC Bulletin* no. 6-7 (June-July 1980): 4

By mid-1974, the facts of the military dictatorship were obvious and the hierarchy had given up hope that the letters and meetings with the military junta had any affect. The Church's hierarchy, led by Cardinal Silva and others moved out into the open to denounce the military government's continued existence.⁵³ The Church's activism moved into high gear as Pinochet used flimsy pretexts to pressure Pro-Paz into closing its doors. General Pinochet demanded the dissolution of Pro-Paz because they aided many intended victims of the secret police into exile and because of alleged former connections with the Allende government.⁵⁴ Essentially, as soon as Pro-Paz was forced into disbanding, the Catholic Church stepped into action, beginning its public defiance of the dictatorship. In early 1976, Cardinal Silva announced the formation of a new Catholic organization, the Vicariate of Solidarity.⁵⁵ This new Catholic wing took on the exact same function of the Pro-Paz Committee, except with one very big difference; the Vicariate had the Catholic Church's protection.

With the Vicariate of Solidarity, Silva continued to lead the Chilean faithful in a resistance against Pinochet. His loud denunciations continued even after his official retirement in 1983. He offered his resignation to the pope at the required retirement age of seventy-five, but the cardinal felt he could still be useful to the Chilean people without the burden of leading the capital see. Don Raúl remained active throughout the dictatorship working for the alleviation of the poor and suffering under Pinochet. Cardinal Silva remained boldly outspoken against the regime long after his retirement.

⁵³Klaiber, 51.

⁵⁴Viero-Gallo, 4.

⁵⁵Ibid.

While traveling abroad in Western Europe Don Raúl strongly denounced the Pinochet regime, incurring the anger of the General Pinochet and his government.⁵⁶ However, Cardinal Silva never exercised caution when denouncing evils or defending human rights and retirement could hardly slow the feisty Salesian priest down. Silva's example of continued defiance and work for those who suffered under the regime demonstrated the influence of a single man's personality on the larger Church stance.

Chile's Pastor, Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín

Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín bore the burden of being Cardinal Silva's successor. More conservative and quieter than his predecessor, Cardinal Fresno nevertheless continued to support Silva's established social works and maintained resistance to the Pinochet dictatorship. By the time of his appointment as archbishop of Santiago, the global Catholic Church's leadership had taken a decisive conservative turn with the election of Pope John Paul II in October 1978. Fresno's more conservative background and discrete personality now suited the Church better than another outspoken progressive like Silva.

Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín was born on July 26, 1914, in the city he would ecclesiastically lead, to Luis Alfredo Fresno Ingunza and Elena Larraín Hurtado.⁵⁷ One of his later colleagues observed that Fresno was a scion of generations of landowners, some rich, others poor with large families, healthy and happy. All of them were fervent

⁵⁶“Chile Denounces Cardinal,” *Christian Century* 105, no. 9 (March 16, 1988), 274.

⁵⁷Salvador Miranda, “Biographies - Fresno Larraín, Juan Francisco,” in *The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church*, Florida International University Library, <http://www.fiu.edu/~mirandas/bios-f.htm#Fresno> (accessed November 23, 2009).

Catholics and socially conservative. In Don Pancho, as Fresno was affectionately known, all positives of the old Chilean society met.⁵⁸ In 1922, he attended the *Colegio de los Sagrados Corazones*, which he came to consider a second home after his parents' house.⁵⁹ His mother heavily influenced his outlook on life. He said that she was a woman of extraordinary faith that taught that nothing is impossible if one trusted in God. From a small child he understood from his mother that faith had deep impact upon events, having faith meant possessing an optimistic outlook because ultimately God would take care of everything.⁶⁰ He graduated from the *colegio* in 1930 to pursue studies in engineering at the *Universidad Católica de Chile*.⁶¹ After his decision to become a priest, young Fresno attended the Seminary in Santiago, Chile. In 1939, he received his licentiate in theology from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, the same institution where his counterpart, Juan Carlos Aramburu, archbishop of Buenos Aires received his doctorate in Canon Law. At twenty-three, he was ordained a priest in the Cathedral of Santiago by Horacio Campillo, the archbishop of Santiago, on December 18, 1937. From 1937-1958 young Fresno performed pastoral work in Santiago. He served as a spiritual director, then later as vice-director of the Pontifical Seminary in the capital.

⁵⁸“Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín,” in Bernardino Piñera, *33 Años del Episcopado Chileno*, (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Tiberíades, 2002), 67.

⁵⁹Author interviewed Cardenal Juan Francisco Fresno on July 29, 1992 in Jaime Caiceo Esudero, “El carácter formativo-religioso de un colegio de Iglesia: el colegio de los Sagrados Corazones de Santiago de Chile desde una perspectiva histórica,” *Anuario de la historia de la Iglesia en Chile*, vol. 13 (1995), 151.

⁶⁰Juan Francisco Fresno interviewed by Odette Magnet, “Asumo en un momento muy difícil,” *Hoy* no. 308 (June 15-21, 1983), 52.

⁶¹Jaime Caiceo Esudero, “El carácter formativo-religioso” in *Anuario de la historia de la Iglesia en Chile*, vol. 13 (1995), 147-48.

Fresno acted as a counselor of the National Catholic Action for Youth program. He also was named a pro-synodal judge for the archdiocese of Santiago.⁶² In these two positions, Fresno learned caution and the ability to pastor. A pro-synodal judge is chosen at the synod, the periodic gathering of the clergy in a diocese called by the bishop at least every two years. The judges' function is to comment upon causes that exist outside Rome's jurisdiction.⁶³ As counselor and judge, Fresno learned to guide the Church with caution. He learned that many difficulties in administratively guiding a diocese sometimes fell outside the control of the Church.

His careful and conservative approach brought him to the attention of Pope Pius XII, who called Msgr. Fresno to be bishop of the recently created diocese of Copiapó in June 1958. He was consecrated two months later, in August, by Alfredo Cifuentes, archbishop of La Serena in the church, *Santos Angeles Custodios* in Santiago. His motto as bishop was: *Adveniat regnum tuum* or thy kingdom come.⁶⁴ Don Pancho seemed perfectly suited for the role of bishop. Many described him as an ideal pastor, how he possessed a great benignity for the old, the sick, those among his district who were alone or sad. He was the priest everyone wanted, as one contemporary said, in the old parishes, the kind father of the growing community. However, his personality as a pastor was coupled with great administrative capabilities. Don Pancho could effectively govern a

⁶²Miranda, "Biographies - Fresno Larraín, Juan Francisco."

⁶³Catholic Encyclopedia Fanning, William. "Synod." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 14. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912. 17 Feb. 2010 <<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14388a.htm>>.

⁶⁴"Cardenal Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín," Los Cardenales Chilenos, <http://www.iglesia.cl/destacados/cardenal/cardenales.html> (accessed November 23, 2009); Salvador Miranda, "Biographies - Fresno Larraín, Juan Francisco."

diocese by forming focus groups and delegating responsibilities to solve problems.⁶⁵ His skills and abilities earned him a reputation as an effective pastor and leader, but the new bishop remained active beyond his home diocese. Don Pancho also attended the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) and in the Medellín meeting in 1968, where he participated in the opening of the Catholic Church to the world. His work abroad and at home was rewarded in 1967, when he was promoted to archbishop of the metropolitan see of La Serena. In his new post, Don Pancho dedicated himself to the local church. He created new parishes and reopened previously closed ones.⁶⁶ For example, in 1981, the archbishop rededicated and reopened a seminary in La Serena. He felt that it was so situated that it could serve as an inter-diocesan seminary, where the bishops of the north could send their young secular clergy to be formed for their pastoral futures.⁶⁷ Fresno also encouraged religious from different congregations to come to La Serena and increase their work in education for his diocese. He established a major seminary dedicated to Santa Curato d'Ars, which enabled the La Serena archdiocese for the first time in over fifteen years of insufficient vocations to the priesthood to ordain its own priests.⁶⁸ He

⁶⁵“Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín,” in Bernardino Piñera, *33 Años del Episcopado Chileno*, (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Tiberiades, 2002), 67.

⁶⁶“Fresno Larraín, Card. Juan Francisco,” The Holy See Press Office, College of Cardinals, Biographical Notes, Holy See Website, http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/cardinali_biografie/cardinali_bio_fresno-larrain_jf_en.html (accessed December 1, 2009); Salvador Miranda, “Biographies - Fresno Larraín, Juan Francisco.”

⁶⁷Misael Ramus I., “El seminario conciliar de la Serena,” in *Anuario de la historia de la Iglesia en Chile*, vol. 14 (1996), 32.

⁶⁸“Fresno Larraín, Card. Juan Francisco,” The Holy See Press Office.

also personally made his *ad limina* visit in 1974 as archbishop of La Serena.⁶⁹ By making the *ad limina* visit personally, not only did Fresno bring himself to the leadership of the Vatican, but he also demonstrated a deep commitment to fulfill his role as a pastor.

While Archbishop Fresno demonstrated a clear ability as a pastor and guardian of the spiritual welfare of those in his diocese, he remained a conservative and cautious leader. Indeed, he rejected the growing leftist influences in Chile, including the socialist president Salvador Allende. Less than a month after the military coup, Archbishop Fresno publicly accounted for the takeover. He asserted that the military had freed country's soul and prevented its ultimate destruction.⁷⁰ Indeed, his conservative bent also led him to reject the first mild criticism of the Pinochet regime that the Episcopal Conference of Chile (ECC) produced in April 1974. Don Pancho publicly admitted that he disapproved of some of the passages in the bishops' declaration.⁷¹ Additionally, in December 1974 Fresno was elected as president of the ECC, replacing Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez.⁷² This move represented the more restrained guidance that most

⁶⁹Carlos Oviedo Cavada, *Los Obispos de Chile, 1561-1978* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Salesiana, 1979), 89. An *ad limina Apostolorum* is the quinquennial or five-year report that all bishops are required to make to the Holy See, in addition to visiting Rome, personally or via delegate, to kneel at the tomb of Sts. Peter and Paul every ten years. In this report and through the visit the bishop details the state of his diocese or archdiocese. See Robert C. Broderick, ed. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, rev. ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1987), s.v. "Ad Limina."

⁷⁰*El Mercurio*, October 10, 1973 quoted in Smith, *The Church and Politics of Chile*, 292.

⁷¹Archbishop Juan Francisco Fresno, "Es necesario superar la situación de vencedores y vencidos," *El Día* (La Serena) May 19, 1974 quoted in Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile*, 296.

⁷²Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias*, III, 84.

Chilean bishops desired after it became obvious the dictatorship was there to stay. Don Raúl was too forthright in personality, but Fresno, always cautious, represented the more prudent course they wished to take. Perhaps, the Chilean bishops also felt that Fresno, who always desired unity and good relations among the people, would restore a cordial relationship with the military government. Indeed, in 1977 during his tenure as ECC president, this devoted pastor stated that the Chilean Church always sought the good for the country, but that it did not have political flags and maintained an attitude of independence and service before the government.⁷³ This indicated a willingness to work with government to promote unity and not division among the faithful of the Chilean Catholic Church.

In May 1983, Archbishop Fresno transferred to the metropolitan see of Santiago to succeed Raúl Silva Henríquez as archbishop of the capital.⁷⁴ Many supporters of the Pinochet regime welcomed the appointment of Fresno. The wife of General Augusto Pinochet famously stated, “that God has heard our prayers.”⁷⁵ Yet, many of the supporters spoke too soon. Indeed, perhaps Cardinal Silva Henríquez had the most accurate statement about Fresno’s appointment. Don Raúl also thanked God that Fresno was placed in charge, saying, “with his temperament he’s more cut out for this job than I am.”⁷⁶ Many Chilean Catholics felt a shift in the pastoral direction of the Church with

⁷³“Significado de los nuevos obispos,” *Hoy* no. 303 (May 11-17, 1983), 9.

⁷⁴Salvador Miranda, “Biographies - Fresno Larraín, Juan Francisco.”

⁷⁵Quoted in Obituary: “Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno,” *The Times* November 1, 2004.

⁷⁶Obituary: “Cardinal Juan Francisco Fresno,” *The Times* November 1, 2004.

the appointment of Archbishop Fresno as the successor of the renowned and progressive Cardinal Silva. However, Fresno saw things differently. He contended that there was no true shift in direction of the Church; according to the archbishop there was only one line within the Church - to preach the gospel. He did continue to qualify the question of a shift by emphasizing the two standards of the Catholic Church: to serve, not to be served and through the ministry of Jesus Christ produce unity. The newly designated archbishop of Santiago openly stated that he believed the Lord asked him to produce unity among His faithful.⁷⁷ Archbishop Fresno, by implying that he was best suited to promote unity, conversely indicated that his predecessor, Cardinal Silva Henríquez, performed the other Catholic Church standard of serving the people. However, the election of Fresno by the Holy See implied the Roman Curia's concern over tensions among Chilean Catholics produced by Silva's devotion to the poor. Fresno reopened communication with the military regime leaders in order to promote unity and reconciliation among the Chilean Church and the country as a whole. Though more conservative than his predecessor he continued Silva's work in opposing the military government. Fresno's desire to promote unity prevented any blatant disapproval of the military regimes abuses, but he did express disapproval in a quieter style.

Archbishop Juan Fresno was above all things a pastor who promoted peace, faith, unity and reconciliation all things that the divided Chilean Church needed if it were to survive the Pinochet dictatorship intact. The Holy See clearly intended to use Fresno's pastoral skills to encourage unity among a divided Chilean Church and to help heal the

⁷⁷Isabel Hohlberg, "Archbishop Fresno: 'El Señor me pide la unidad,'" *Hoy* no. 303 (May 11-17, 1983), 9.

rift between the Church and the Chilean government. It would seem that to fulfill these purposes the Vatican's selection proved on target, because within a few weeks of his official appointment Fresno accepted an invitation to eat lunch with President Pinochet. These actions clearly demonstrated Fresno's belief that the first step toward unity and reconciliation was keeping an open dialogue, even with those who differ dramatically ideologically.⁷⁸ Fulfilling the implied wish of Rome, Archbishop Fresno promoted unity and toned down the formerly flagrant defiance of the government by the Church. His toned down style was evident in 1984, during the annual Te Deum celebrations or traditional church-state services offering thanksgiving for independence from Spain, the Archbishop held the traditional seats for the government leaders but while presiding over the service called for an end to the political strife during his homily.⁷⁹

Archbishop Fresno's defiance could be quiet or loud. Indeed, his criticism of the military regime after a raid on a shantytown were so loud the government censored his statement. The cardinal asked for respect for all, even the poorest, and criticized the military's crackdown on unrest.⁸⁰ In May 1985 Msgr. Fresno received the signature red biretta and the title of S. Maria Immacolata di Lourdes a Boccea as he was elevated to cardinal by Pope John Paul II.⁸¹ His appointment as both archbishop in Santiago and his

⁷⁸“Significado de los nuevos obispos,” *Hoy* no. 303, (May 11-17, 1983), pg. 8-10; “Asumo en un momento muy difícil,” *Hoy* no. 308, (June 15-21, 1983), pg. 51-52; “Su debut,” *Hoy* no. 308, (June 15-21, 1983), pg. 53.

⁷⁹“3 Chilean Bishops Snub the Military,” *New York Times*, September 19, 1984.

⁸⁰“Chile Prelate Deplores Raid on Shantytown,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1984.

⁸¹Salvador Miranda, “Biographies - Fresno Larraín, Juan Francisco.”

ascension a cardinalship demonstrated the conservative turn of the Holy See after the death of Pope Paul VI.

Leading Buenos Aires and Santiago

The archbishops of Buenos Aires and Santiago bore the burden of leading approximately one third of their countries' population. However, each man responded to this enormous burden in the way that he had been formed to bear it. The personal formation of Aramburu and Fresno differed dramatically from the personal formation of Silva. These contrasting formations resulted in different responses to the military regimes in the Southern Cone: Aramburu remained silent, Silva denounced and Fresno held the status quo. While the capital archbishops reacted to the regimes in their own ways, the military vicars pastored the soldiers who carried out the atrocities of the military regimes.

CHAPTER FOUR

Whom Do They Serve, Mars or God?

Military Vicariate Heritage in the Southern Cone

Soldiers, for centuries, have demanded the presence of a religious authority at their side to comfort them in the face of battle and death; the soldiers of Argentina and Chile were no different. Chilean and Argentine militaries had Catholic priests by their side throughout the 1970s and 1980s while they suppressed and exterminated sectors of their own population. From the soldiers, sailors and air pilots who committed the day-to-day acts of torture and murder to the top of the hierarchy who gave orders, everyone within the military machinery had moral guidance in the form of a Catholic clergyman. Both Southern Cone states have had long traditions of having Catholic clergy serving the military. Each country established a military vicariate long before the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) recommended the creation of military vicariates in every state for the spiritual welfare of military personnel.¹ The tradition of intertwining military and religious personnel proved exceptionally strong in forming the actions the armed forces took during the military regimes.

A vicariate is the ecclesiastical jurisdiction that comes from the title vicar or the clergy who leads the designated population. A vicar is the title given to priests under the direct authority of the Holy See who are assigned, “whether they have episcopal

¹“Decree on the Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church,” no. 43 in *Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents*, I rev. 4th ed., Austin Flannery, O.P., ed. (Northport, NY: Costello Publishing Company, 1998), 589.

consecration or not, to govern a missionary district where the hierarchy has not been established.”² In the case of the military vicariate, the vicar’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction is the spiritual welfare of the military personnel, their families, and all other persons associated with the functioning of the military. The military vicar, while not an actual part of the national church hierarchy, is expected to work in cooperation with the diocesan bishops to see to the spiritual welfare of the military personnel.³ Given the military vicar’s jurisdiction and unique position outside the usual Catholic hierarchy, the priest or bishop who fills that role could, if he so chose, exercise enormous influence over the armed forces.

Few could or would deny the difficulties faced in morally guiding military personnel. These men of God provide pastoral care to a flock that will knowingly break commandments and violate the social teachings of the Catholic Church all for the sake of their homeland. While the role of the soldier is both dignified and necessary, the act of moral counseling such persons is an extremely fine line to find and walk. If, while guiding soldiers, the priest absolves too much too easily for the noble cause of country, both priest and soldiers can be set on the path to follow Mars, the Roman god of war. On the other hand, a priest who absolves nothing for the sake of country is worthless to the military. Such a priest strips soldiers of their confidence in the belief that fighting for peace and security in their homeland is worth the ultimate price, which compromises the

²Robert C. Broderick, ed. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, rev. ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1987), s.v. “Prefect Apostolic, also Vicar Apostolic.”

³“Decree on the Pastoral Office of Bishops in the Church,” no. 43 in *Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents*, I rev. 4th ed., Austin Flannery, O.P., ed. (Northport, NY: Costello Publishing Company, 1998), 589-590

armed forces' role. Guiding soldiers was and will always remain a complex task, yet despite the difficulties, military vicars claim a distinct position to attempt to determine the moral quality of the armed forces' actions. During the military regimes the vicars could have pricked the armed forces' conscience and demanded humane treatment of those the military viewed as threats. Yet, the role played by the military vicars during the military regimes remains ambiguous.

Archbishop Adolfo Servando Tortolo, Argentina's military vicar throughout the Dirty War, claimed that, "the wellspring of security for me is the active apostolic presence . . . in the military camp."⁴ The Chilean military vicar, Bishop Francisco J. Gillmore Stock stated that, "our beloved homeland bled economically, morally and spiritually, standing at the edge of chaos and a civil war to find its salvation in the armed forces."⁵ These men were the religious leaders of the soldiers who performed the human rights abuses of during the military regimes that engulfed the Southern Cone in the 1970s and 1980s. Their guidance had the power to grant or deny absolution to the armed forces' actions. The military vicars' formation therefore played a pivotal role in the religious life during the dictatorships.

The vicars in both Southern Cone countries proved conservative theologically, however the same theological conservatism translated into very different reactions and presentations of the military vicars in each state. In Argentina, the military vicar's personal fame, conservatism, and close friendships with a number of military leaders

⁴"Documento del vicario monseñor Tortolo," *La Nación*, October 20, 1975.

⁵"Homilía del vicario general castrense de Chile Francisco J. Gillmore Stock: Escuela Militar del Libertador Bernardo O'Higgins Riquelme, 11 de septiembre, 1981," Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection. University of Texas, Austin, 2.

contributed to the public appearance of Church complicity with the regime. Yet, in Chile, the more reserved personalities of the military vicars combined with a progressive capital city archbishop, resulted in low-public profile vicars. This low profile obscured these vicars' roles and scholars have tended to ignore their personal backgrounds and actions. The relations between Church and military in the formation of a military vicariate in Chile and Argentina differed significantly enough to influence actions taken by the military vicar during the military regimes. However, the circumstances surrounding military vicars in the 1970s and 1980s were similar enough for a ready comparison of their actions. Only by delving into the military vicars' personal histories can a true understanding of their actions be grasped. The vicars' responses to the military regimes allows for comprehension of whether they served, and hence led others to serve, God or Mars.

Intertwined and Choking in Argentina

During the colonial era, Pope Clement XII created the first military vicariate, in what would become Argentina, on February 4, 1736 during the reign of King Felipe V. Following the rules of *patronato real* the king, or his official, chose the military chaplains and vicars.⁶ During and after independence, the provisional revolutionary government several times created and abolished a system to provide chaplains to military personnel. The state claimed the authority of the *patronato* and formed their own military vicariate asking the bishops to provide clergy. Interestingly, in the 1813 version of the military vicariate the state stipulated that clergy serving as military chaplains should be secular or

⁶Ludovico García de Loydi, "El Vicario Castrense" *Archivum: Revista de la junta de Historia Eclesiastica* IV (July-December 1960): 688.

diocesan clergy and not regular clergy or members of religious orders. This exclusion stands out given that during the early nineteenth century religious orders predominated.⁷ However, even when the government eliminated the military vicariate, chaplains still accompanied the armed forces into battle. In the Paraguayan War, the army and navy were united under one general military vicariate, however by 1898 the Argentine state had two military vicariates, one for the navy, the other for the army.⁸ In an effort to provide a permanent system for pastoral guidance to the armed forces the Argentine Congress passed two laws (4,031 and 4,707) in 1905. These laws gave the Argentine army their present form – their system of promotions and retirement, and the imposition of obligatory military service, and the system for officer training. The same laws organized the presence of chaplains permanently within the armed forces. The government based these laws on the Prussian Army idea of having complete control over the individual.⁹ Under this system, the priests “served” in the armed forces and became subject to the authority of the military command and its regulations. It granted priests the rank, promotion, retirement, salaries and other privileges afforded to officers. From a religious point of view chaplains remained under the bishop’s jurisdiction to whom they belonged through incardination of service or who performed their ordination, though this connection proved mostly a mere formality. This system resulted in military chaplains

⁷Ludovico García de Loydi, “El Vicario Castrense” *Archivum: Revista de la junta de Historia Eclesiastica* IV (July-December 1960): 691.

⁸Ibid., 696.

⁹Emilio F. Mignone, *Witness to the Truth: The Complicity of Church and Dictatorship in Argentina, 1976-1983* Phillip Berryman trans. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988), 6.

who tended to be “attracted to an easy life with a good income and few obligations. Such priests had often had problems of a moral nature in their own dioceses.”¹⁰ Even before establishment of the 1905 laws for military priests, the state created military vicariate signified military jurisdiction over chaplains, not ecclesiastical jurisdiction.¹¹ In Argentina, the priest guiding the military was more soldier than pastor.

The Church made several attempts to correct this situation starting in 1915. It raised the question of the Holy See creating a *real* ecclesiastical military vicariate and the issue was raised several more times before a serious discussion began in the mid-1940s.¹² While these discussions occurred, the state continued using its own military vicariate as in 1945, a third separate military vicariate was created for the air force.¹³ It would take a decade of negotiation before the establishment of an ecclesiastical military vicariate, the first since the colonial era. Relations between the Holy See and the Argentine government remained awkward as the state argued that the creation of a vicariate belonged to both state, as a legislative act, and Holy See. Both sides argued over how the vicariate should be set up. The state wanted three separate vicariates for the three different branches of the armed forces and the Vatican refused, believing an overarching

¹⁰Emilio F. Mignone, *Witness to the Truth: The Complicity of Church and Dictatorship in Argentina, 1976-1983* Phillip Berryman trans. (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1988), 6-7; Dunford, David. "Incardination and Excardination." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 7. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. 17 Feb. 2010 <<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07704a.htm>>.

¹¹de Loydi, “El Vicario Castrense,” *Archivum*, 694.

¹²Noberto Padilla and Juan G. Navarro Floria, *Asistencia religiosa a las fuerzas armadas: En el 40 aniversario del Acuerdo entre la nación Argentina y la Santa Sede sobre jurisdicción castrense* (Buenos Aires: Congreso de la Nación), 9.

¹³de Loydi, “El Vicario Castrense,” *Archivum*, 696.

military vicariate for the whole of the armed forces provided better spiritual coordination.¹⁴ Finally, in 1957, the Holy See created an Argentine military vicariate under the Aramburu administration. The vicariate consisted of a single general military vicar, who would have three major chaplains one for each branch: army, navy and air force. The chaplains would no longer receive officers' rank and the pope, with consent of the Argentine president, would appoint the military vicar.¹⁵ In 1960 the military vicariate included twenty-two churches and chapels for the army, nine for the navy and one for the air force.¹⁶ Pope Paul VI appointed archbishop Adolfo Servando Tortolo as the military vicar only a year before the Dirty War began. His personal convictions and personality shaped the tenor and operation of this office and beyond.

Distance Forms a New Culture in Chile

In contrast to the tumultuous creation of the military vicariate in Argentina, the Chilean military vicariate developed with comparably little fuss. After independence, the Spanish military vicariate longer exercised any authority in Chile, so the military depended upon the Chilean Catholic Church to provide chaplains. This arrangement meant that any military chaplain remained dependent upon the diocese, or ecclesiastical jurisdiction, of the places that they passed through while accompanying the military. Obviously, such a system had considerable drawbacks that became apparent during times of war. Nevertheless, the Chileans, like the Argentines, created a "military vicariate"

¹⁴Padilla and Floria, *Asistencia religiosa a las fuerzas armadas*, 9-15.

¹⁵Ibid., 22.

¹⁶R.P. Antonio Donini S.J., "Panorama Estadística de la Iglesia Argentina en 1960," *Revista Eclesiástica Argentina* 25 (January-February 1962), 47-48.

structure without a papal decree to provide clergymen for soldiers. In 1850, the Chilean hierarchy did request and was granted a papal decree, *Supplicatum esi*, that entitled it to provide religious services for the military, but Chile still lacked a proper military vicariate. Indeed, because the Chilean military chaplains' ecclesiastical jurisdiction moved along as they did, when the chaplains left Chilean territory in the War of the Pacific, their ecclesiastical authority became the enemy's bishops. Quickly, the Chilean hierarchy moved to fix this problem and through lengthy correspondence with the papal nuncio obtained permission from Pope Leo XIII to grant the ordinary or diocese of Santiago the ability to name, equip and be the ecclesiastical authority of the military chaplains.¹⁷ The pastoral care of the military remained structured in such a manner for thirty years, before the Vatican created a military vicariate for Chile.

Pope Pius X granted Chile one of the first "new" military vicariates in 1910. The papal bull, *In hac Beatissimi Petri Cathedra*, replaced the older vicariate with a new form.¹⁸ It set up the vicariate as a separate ecclesiastical jurisdiction, of the ordinaries or dioceses. The vicariate would be responsible for the spiritual education and welfare of all the armed forces in Chile. The chaplains of the military vicariate received the rank, salary and benefits, including retirement pensions, equivalent to Chilean soldiers. Also, and very importantly, the vicariate itself chose the general military vicar, from within its own ranks, not the state. Though of course the vicariate was to listen to the advice of the

¹⁷José Joaquín Matte Varas, "Presencia de los capellanes castrenses en la Guerra del Pacífico," *Historia* 15 (1980): 179- 181.

¹⁸Hernán Vidal, *Las Capellanías Castrenses durante la Dictadura: Hurgando en la ética militar chilena* (Chile: Mosquito Editores: 2005), 124.

state on its selection, it was not required to heed the advice.¹⁹ This remained an important distinction from the creation of the military vicariate in Argentina almost five decades later, where the military vicar was chosen by the pope, yet needed the Argentine president's approval for the appointment. The tradition of separation and the ability to appoint the military vicar in Chile without the governmental approval meant there was a greater chance that those appointed as vicar would reflect the position of the Church and not the civil authorities.

Since its creation, the Chilean military vicariate has remained relatively unchanged. The Sacred Consistorial Congregation's instruction *Sollemne semper* produced in 1951 clarified the ecclesiastical jurisdictions and norms of military vicariates.²⁰ In the latter part of the Pinochet dictatorship, in 1986, Pope John Paul II issued an apostolic constitution, *Spirituali Militum Curae*, which provided general norms for all military vicariate, and elevating them to ordinaries. As the Chilean military vicariate already fit the instructions put forth by the apostolic constitution it was immediately elevated to an ordinariate.²¹ This relatively unhampered tradition of service resulted in a systemized acceptance of the Chilean military vicariate.

Into this atmosphere of long tradition of service of military vicariate came two men: Bishop Francisco Xavier Gillmore Stock and Bishop José Joaquín Matte Varas.

¹⁹Juan Ignacio González Errázuriz, *Iglesia y Fuerzas Armadas: Estudio canónico y jurídico sobre la asistencia espiritual a las Fuerzas Armadas en Chile* (Santiago, Chile: Universidad de los Andes, 1994), 17-18.

²¹SEPCAS, *La Iglesia Particular en el medio castrense*, (Bogotá: CELAM, 1988), 15-21. An ordinariate "is an ecclesiastical jurisdiction which for the benefit of the people and for special purposes is established by the Church" or the equivalent of a diocese in ecclesiastical terms. See Robert C. Broderick, ed. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, rev. ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1987), s.v. "Ordinariate."

They morally guided the armed forces throughout the military dictatorship. The long tradition of the Chilean military vicariate and the progressive Chilean hierarchy leadership during the dictatorship has overshadowed to the roles Bishop Gillmore and Bishop Matte as military vicar. However, examining their personal formation reveals a previously unnoticed influence on the armed forces during the military dictatorship.

Argentina's Charismatic Ultraconservative, Adolfo Servando Tortolo

Archbishop Tortolo, as general military vicar of the Argentine armed forces during the Dirty War, was and remains a figure of considerable controversy. His personality and conservative theological stances gave ammunition to his critics and won commendations from his admirers. Born on November 10, 1911 in the town of Nueve de Julio, his ecclesiastical life began at the age of eleven when he joined the recently founded seminary of San José, La Plata. He was ordained at age twenty-three on December 21, 1934, in the church of La Plata Seminary. He returned to his hometown to celebrate his first mass in the parochial church two days later. Tortolo served as a cooperative vicar, or an associate minister, for the parish of Chacabuco, before being transferred two months later to the parish of San Ignacio de Loyola in Junín where he served until May 1939. There he earned a reputation for possessing deep and profound formation spiritually, doctrinally, and as a pastor. In 1941, he worked administratively as an ecclesiastical notary in the Bishop of Mercedes's Curia. He worked his way up to Secretary Chancellor of the diocese. Three years later he was named vicar general of the

Mercedes episcopacy.²² His style of “cultured spirituality” earned Tortolo a good reputation. It was also during this time he formed ties with the military with the local army garrison.²³ He also worked with various Catholic groups including *Acción Católica Argentina* (ACA). Apparently, his pastoral work during his early career as a priest gleaned enough notice from the hierarchy for Tortolo to receive the title of domestic prelate of His Holiness.²⁴ The title has no accompanying jurisdiction or authority in the Church, but is an important honorary title.²⁵ In 1956, he was named titular bishop of Ceciri and auxiliary bishop of Paraná and later that year he was consecrated as a bishop.²⁶ Over the next several years, Tortolo wrote clearly and concisely about his concern over the Church’s direction. A very theologically conservative man, he could even be classified as “ultraconservative,” he believed that the modern Church faced a crisis on multiple fronts, but especially in the formation of its clergy. He saw considerable danger in what he viewed as the lack of internal formation of priests. He claimed that modern priests were not prepared to “die,” or give themselves over entirely to the divine calling of pastoral work, so that Christ could live in them. Tortolo did not believe that the new clergy were given sufficient training in internal sacrifice and ordering for them to

²²“Monseñor Adolfo Servando Tortolo,” Arquidiócesis de Paraná, <http://www.arzparan.org.ar/Obispos/Tortolo/tortolobiografia.html> (accessed December 10, 2009); “Monseñor Tortolo es viario castrense,” *La Nación*, July 14, 1975.

²³Emilio F. Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 3.

²⁴“Monseñor Adolfo Servando Tortolo,” Arquidiócesis de Paraná.

²⁵Robert C. Broderick, ed. *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, rev. ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1987), s.v. “Prelate.”

²⁶“Monseñor Adolfo Servando Tortolo,” Arquidiócesis de Paraná.

effectively pastor. The apostolic works that priests were called to perform Tortolo believed were supernatural works, therefore the priest needed superior internal formation to be an instrument of God's hand. This lack of training, he believed, prevented the full expression of Christ's divine work in priest causing enervation among the pastoral mission of evangelization. He focused on the need to re-Christianize the modern world that had fallen into moral destitution and returned to paganism.²⁷ Tortolo also saw obedience to the Church hierarchy as a necessary part of the priest's pastoral mission. To him the hierarchy formed the foundation of the Church and the its mission was the same as the one Christ gave "as I was sent by my Father, so I send you." As the Catholic hierarchy received its power and authority from Christ himself, it must therefore always be obeyed. Tortolo referenced three different popes in his exhortation to return to obedience to the hierarchy.²⁸ Through his articulate writings, Tortolo quickly gained a reputation as theologically conservative prelate.

His conservative reputation and military ties were firmly in place by the time he assumed the bishopric of Catamarca in 1960. Bishop Tortolo arrived to take up his position in an Air Force plane, accompanied by General Víctor Cordes, Commander of the 3rd Army Division among other notables in the political and military realms.²⁹ At the reception to welcome Tortolo to his new job, his mother was also present and she

²⁷Adolfo Tortolo, "La crisis del clero joven," *Revista ecclesiastica argentina* no. 2 (March-April 1958): 33-37; Adolfo Tortolo, "Misión teológica de San Juan Vianney," *Revista ecclesiastica argentina* no. 9 (May-June 1959): 219-302.

²⁸Adolfo Tortolo, "La crisis del clero joven," *Revista ecclesiastica argentina* no. 2 (March-April 1958): 37-41.

²⁹"Mons. Dr. Adolfo G. Tortolo, Obispo de Catamara," *Revista ecclesiastica argentina* 3, no. 16 (July-August 1960): 370-372.

embraced her son with tears of pride and gratitude at her son being made a bishop.³⁰

Tortolo immediately devoted himself to his pastoral work in Catamarca. He took large pastoral travel trips, at times on the back of donkey, to visit even the most remote corners of the diocese.³¹ Bishop Tortolo was above all else an evangelist and he utilized his natural charisma to promote his ultraconservative ideology throughout his career.

His prominence as an evangelizer resulted in his transfer to archdiocese of Paraná, where he assumed that metropolitan see in January 1963. As archbishop of Paraná, Tortolo not only continued to write and speak about the crisis of priests in the pastoral mission.³² Despite attending all the sessions of Vatican II, Tortolo seemed unmoved by the idea of new openness. Indeed, he never mentions Pope John XXIII or Pope Paul VI in his writings, but instead emphasized their conservative predecessors like Pope Leo XIII and Pope Pius XII. While he never would publicly reject Vatican II, in private quarters, Tortolo quietly continued pre-conciliar practices throughout his career. As archbishop he controlled the diocesan seminary of Paraná and promoted his conservatism. There he trained reorganized and fine-tuned the theological instruction to reflect pre-Vatican II thinking.³³ The theologically conservative priests produced by the Paraná seminary under Tortolo's direction caused Pope John Paul II, also a conservative

³⁰Ibid., 371; "Monseñor Tortolo es vicario castrense," *La Nación*, July 21, 1975.

³¹"Monseñor Adolfo Servando Tortolo," Arquidiócesis de Paraná.

³²Adolfo Tortolo, "Carta Pastoral al Clero," *Revista eclesiastica argentina* no. 26 (March-April 1962): 101-107.

³³Emilio F. Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 3; Adolfo Tortolo, "La Esperanza Sacerdotal," *Mikael* 1, no. 2 (1973): 5-15.

theologian, to call it a “golden seminary.”³⁴ Tortolo kept his diocese like a “fortress protecting itself against the changes emanating out of the [Vatican II] Council.”³⁵ He even invited Marcel Lefebvre, an ultra-traditional French archbishop, to visit his diocese before Lefebvre’s revolt against the Vatican.³⁶ Lefebvre publicly rejected the changes put forth by the Second Vatican Council, such as saying mass in the vernacular, as well as a more ecumenical approach to other Christian denominations and non-Christian religions. The French archbishop also openly defied orders of multiple popes on numerous occasions.³⁷ However, an interesting additional note to the Lefebvre-Tortolo connection occurred when Lefebvre was prevented from saying a traditional Latin mass in Argentina in 1977. The police who stopped the motorcade bearing Lefebvre said their superiors did not authorize the mass.³⁸ Given Bishop Tortolo’s emphasis on public obedience to the hierarchy, it remains likely, though unconfirmed, that he influenced the decision to halt the Lefebvre motorcade.

³⁴“Monseñor Adolfo Servando Tortolo,” Arquidiócesis de Paraná.

³⁵Klaiber, *The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998), 78.

³⁶Ibid.; “Pope Paul Warns Ex-French Prelate,” *New York Times*, August 28, 1976.

³⁷Peter Steinfels, “A Devotion to the Past: Marcel Lefebvre” *New York Times*, July 1, 1988; Robert C. Doty, “Bid Made to Block Text on the Jews,” Special to the *New York Times*, October 14, 1965; “A French Bishop Continues Defiance, Holds Mass in Latin,” Special to the *New York Times*, July 5, 1976; “Dissident French Bishop Restates His Defiance of Pope on Doctrine,” *New York Times*, September 9, 1976; “A Traditionalist’s Hopes for Vatican Accord Dim,” *New York Times*, August 26, 1984; Henry Kamms, “John Paul Stresses Priestly Obedience,” Special to the *New York Times*, June 18, 1984.

³⁸“Argentines Prohibit Mass by Controversial Prelate,” *New York Times*, July 21, 1977.

Argentina in the late 1960s was radicalized and the Church divided. The MSTM openly contradicted and argued against the Argentine Catholic hierarchy. This predicament strengthened Tortolo's belief that Vatican II had created a crisis in the Church regarding ecclesiastical authority and obedience. In 1970, at the plenary session of the CEA selected Adolfo Servando Tortolo as president and led the episcopacy through this treacherous time. At this same session the CEA issued a statement in response to the MSTM, criticizing their radicalization. By then, the MSTM had been infected with the radicalization that pervaded the political atmosphere of the country. The civil authorities viewed them as part of the growing left threat and asked the CEA to take a firm stance against them.³⁹ Military President Roberto Marcelo Levingston Laborda personally met with Tortolo twice to plead for stronger sanctions against MSTM. Yet, despite his close ties to the military organization and his renowned conservative stance on many issues, Tortolo held his ground against Levingston refusing the de facto president's request to sanction the radically progressive priests. Tortolo told the Levingston that the CEA's stance, taken up in August was more than sufficient.⁴⁰ Tortolo's defiance demonstrated his strong belief in public obedience to the Church hierarchy, even over the state. The highest Argentine Church authority, the episcopal council, with support from Pope Paul VI, tolerated MSTM, so Tortolo, as a subordinate to that body, could not contradict its stance.

³⁹Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 151.

⁴⁰“Preocupa al gobierno y a las Fuerzas Armadas el auge de la actividad de los llamados Sacerdotes del Tercer Mundo,” *La Razón*, November 9, 1970, in Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 175.

When MSTM held their Fourth National Congress in Córdoba in July 1971, they sent an expression of gratitude to the pope for the social opening of the Church. In August the progressive Pope Paul VI, responded with an apostolic blessing for MSTM. Tortolo quickly tried to minimize the import of the blessing by stating, in a press conference, that the blessing was merely a response to a personal request by the priests. Tortolo later expressed in private to his fellow bishops that the blessing “ does not have significance nor does it mean directly or indirectly some recognition of this so-called ‘movement.’”⁴¹ Again, Tortolo clearly demonstrated his conservative leaning. He downplayed the pope’s response to the MSTM, because the Holy See’s blessing translated to a tacit approval of the MSTM, meaning that he too would at least publicly have to approve the existence of the group. Also of note was the private expression of disapproval of MSTM and the pope’s response to only a few colleges of equal hierarchical ranking. Never would Tortolo publicly criticize the hierarchy or the pope.

Tortolo’s selection as military vicar in 1975 bore the influence of top military officers and his friendships with military leaders.⁴² His appointment brought new vigor to the post, which had been neglected as his predecessors had focused upon other pastoral duties. Tortolo visited all the military garrisons in the country and kept in close contact with the many of the commanding officers.⁴³ His commitment to his job as military

⁴¹Domingo Bresci and Rolando Concatti, eds, *Sacerdotes para el tercer mundo* (Buenos Aires: Publicaciones del Movimiento, 1972), 33, quoted in Michael Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 182.

⁴²Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 7; Padilla and Floria, *Asistencia religiosa a las fuerzas armadas*, 22.

⁴³Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 7.

vicar reflected his dedication to fulfilling the evangelizing role as pastoral leader. On July 20, 1975 a religious ceremony celebrated Tortolo's assumption of the title and powers of military vicar. The ceremony attended by Archbishop of Buenos Aires, Monseñor Juan C. Aramburu and pro-vicar Monseñor Victorio Bonamín. During the ceremony a decree signed by the apostolic nuncio, Pio Laghi, in the name of the pope, empowered Tortolo with the pastoral authority to execute his duties as military vicar. A critical note in the paper that detailed the ceremony explained that the decree read still needed to be signed by the executive power for approval, indicating unconsciously perhaps the dramatically close ties that remained between Church, military, and state in Argentina.⁴⁴ Several days later, a civil ceremony with the President Isabel Perón formally recognized monsignor Tortolo as military vicar of the armed forces. The president praised the pope's choice of Tortolo, whose strong personality were what the Argentine soldiers needed in troubled times and wished the new vicar luck in fulfilling his role as pastoral guide to the sons who defended their homeland.⁴⁵ Shortly after both confirmations, ecclesiastical and civil, of his appointment the new military vicar released a pastoral document. In it he indicated, that he believed the base of Argentina's security as a country rested in the hands of the armed forces and for that reason he felt that the presence of Christ, through military chaplains, was necessary to guide the souls to a uniform ideal.⁴⁶ Tortolo threw himself into his role with his typical enthusiastic embrace of opportunities for evangelization; however, fulfillment of this particular pastoral

⁴⁴“Asumió el vicario castrense,” *La Nación*, July 21, 1975.

⁴⁵“Asumió ayer el vicario castrense,” *La Nación*, August 11, 1975.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

mission would soon cause him grief when Argentina later became embroiled in the Dirty War. Archbishop Tortolo's conservatism led the armed forces in a new direction, his pre-Vatican II approach set a dangerous precedent for acceptance of violence in the face of eradicating heresies.

Family Formed to Serve in Chile, Francisco Javier Gillmore Stock

Bishop Francisco Javiers Gillmore Stock, the last military vicar of the Chilean armed forces, encouraged soldiers throughout the military dictatorship that their roles as protectors of the homeland from outside evil forces, like communism or Marxism, was divine providence. However, all too frequently his role in providing religious justification for the armed forces was concealed by the struggle between General Pinochet against Archbishop of Santiago, Raúl Silva Henríquez. Nevertheless, Bishop Gillmore's formation enabled him to make praising remarks about the military throughout this first decade of the regime. This pro-military cleric was born on January 9, 1908 in Iquique. Francisco Javier Gillmore Stock was one of eight children born to Juan Gillmore Allen and Ana Stock Catalinich.⁴⁷ He studied at the Seminary of Santiago and received his ordination as a priest in the Cathedral of Santiago on December 17, 1932, by the Archbishop of Santiago, Msgr. José Horacio Campillo. First assigned as vicar-cooperator or associate pastor to the parish of Quilpué, he served for three years before being named army chaplain on May 1, 1935. In July 1952 he received the post of Chief Army Chaplain. He was named the General Military Vicar, or the religious

⁴⁷"In Memoriam: Eduardo Juan Enrique Gillmore Stock" *El Mercurio*, September 22, 2006; Carlos Oviedo Cavada, *Los Obispos de Chile, 1561-1978* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Salesiana, 1979), 92.

authority over all of the armed forces, in October 1959.⁴⁸ As military vicar he showed great concern over the lack of proper clerics to serve and religiously instruct the military personnel; indeed, the military vicariate did not possess its own seminary to train the necessary priests. Through much hard work and coordination with other bishops and religious orders, he fought to bring up and maintain the level of pastoral care in the armed forces. One fellow bishop claimed that Gillmore was a very kind man, who always smiled. He also claimed that Gillmore wore the military uniforms of both navy and army with the heart of a priest.⁴⁹ This description of the vicar as a uniformed priest, demonstrated the intrinsic tie between that the military and with its vicariate, developed over a long history together.

In addition to his military pastoral duties, Pope John XXIII selected Gillmore as titular bishop of Auzia on September 4, 1962. He was consecrated as a bishop in Santiago at the Basilica of Salvador on December 16, 1962 by Mons. Gaetano Alibrandi, the papal nuncio. At the same time, he received the official title of bishop of the military vicariate.⁵⁰ As a bishop he adopted the motto: *Miles Christi Iesu* or Jesus Christ's soldier.⁵¹ This motto echoed appropriately of the pastoral soldier. As a priest and bishop, Gillmore devoted over half a century to the pastoral care of military personnel. His family had a history of serving the military; his own brother was a military man from the

⁴⁸Cavada, *Los Obispos de Chile, 1561-1978*, 92; *Catalogo Biografico Eclesiastico Chileno, 1963* (Santiago, Chile: Proveedora del Culto, 1963), 49.

⁴⁹Piñera, *33 Años del Episcopado Chileno (1958-1990)*, 77.

⁵⁰Recall, that the military "vicar" did not have to be a bishop, merely a priest, in order to assume the post.

⁵¹Cavada, *Los Obispos de Chile, 1561-1978*, 92.

age of eighteen.⁵² Unsurprisingly, this devotion proved exactly what the military wanted. He served as a useful avenue of communication between military government and Church leaders. On the day of the coup, the church leaders reached out to Gillmore for information. Archbishop of Santiago, Raúl Silva Henríquez, attempted to contact the military vicar throughout the siege of the presidential palace to ask for accurate information on what was occurring as well as for suggestions about what the Chilean hierarchy should do in reaction to these events. However, all Don Raúl's attempts to contact Gillmore were in vain, no one would know or no one would divulge the military vicar's whereabouts.⁵³ Presumably, Bishop Gillmore could not be found because he was present at some military post or headquarters throughout the siege. However, immediately after the military coup in 1973, Gillmore helped Bishops José Manuel Santos and Sergio Contreras obtain a military escort to meet Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez in his house after the military curfew for the Permanent Committee of the Chilean Episcopal Conference. A few days after providing the escort, he asked Archbishop Silva, on behalf of the military junta, to celebrate the liturgical *Te Deum* the Chilean national day.⁵⁴ In providing help for the Church and asking for on behalf of the military, Gillmore clearly showed a divided loyalty. In the early hours of the military

⁵²Piñera, *33 Años del Episcopado Chileno (1958-1990)*, 77; "In Memoriam: Eduardo Juan Enrique Gillmore Stock" *El Mercurio*, September 22, 2006.

⁵³Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias II*, 284-5.

⁵⁴Mario Aguilar, "Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, the Catholic Church, and the Pinochet Regime, 1973-1980: Public Responses to a National Security State," *Catholic Historical Review* 89, no. 4 (October 2003): 719; Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias II*, 285.

regime in Chile, he attempted to serve both God and Mars, but ultimately only one master would win – Mars.

Throughout the Pinochet dictatorship, Bishop Gillmore Stock remained hidden in the shadows as he quietly praised the role of the Chilean military. His lexicon throughout the dictatorship encouraged the abuses performed by soldiers, because they justly removed the threat of communism from the Chilean homeland. Indeed, Gillmore did everything he could to ease the guilt of soldiers. When he celebrated a mass honoring the second anniversary of the military coup he offered general absolution for the sins of those present at the beginning of the mass. In giving absolution without the vocal admission to the soldiers gathered at the mass Gillmore circumvented the usual practice of the penitential sacrament. Traditionally, this kind of absolution is only given before entering battle when there is no opportunity for the private profession of sin in confession.⁵⁵ In granting absolution without making the soldiers to admit any wrong doing the military vicar, cleansed their souls and justified their actions. In the homily given during the second anniversary celebration, Bishop Gillmore gave thanks to God for allowing freedom to be returned to Chile through the hands of the armed forces. The vicar claimed that the armed forces restored order and dignity to the country after the anxiety and hatred of the recent past.⁵⁶ Nor would it be the last time that Gillmore celebrated the accomplishments of the military regime. The following year, on the same occasion, the vicar praised the authentic democratic life that the armed forces had restored to Chile; a

⁵⁵ Brian H. Smith, *The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism* (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1982), 300.

⁵⁶“Misa de Acción de Gracias en la Escuela Militar,” *El Mercurio* September 12, 1975.

democracy based upon the basic, ancient Christian principles. Gillmore continued that the criticisms of the world press against the state were of hatred and another insidious manifestation of the dangerous power of materialistic Marxism. In light of the continued threat of Marxism, the vicar asked who would be better suited to reconstruct Chile than those estimable men who saved Chile from the irresponsible previous administration. At the end of this occasion, the Bishop offered a prayer for those soldiers who had died to free the homeland.⁵⁷ Even during his last year as military vicar, on the tenth anniversary of the military coup, Gillmore praised the armed forces' actions. He gave thanks to God for military's victory over the past difficulties of hate, violence and terrorism.⁵⁸ Bishop Gillmore's lexicon and actions throughout the Pinochet dictatorship only further strengthened the religious justification that the armed forces could claim for their abuses. The military vicar provided comfort and encouragement to the armed forces and ultimately led them to serve Mars rather than God.

A Scholar for Chile's Military, José Joaquín Matte Varas

Bishop Gillmore's successor, Bishop José Joaquín Matte Varas became the first bishop of the Military Ordinate. The military vicariate had been elevated in accordance with the apostolic constitution of Pope John Paul II. The first military bishop was born on April 17, 1923 in Santiago, Chile, to Carlos Matte Eyzaguirre and Isabel Varas Montt. He studied philosophy and the Pontifical Seminary on Santiago before advancing to theology at the School of Theology in the Catholic University of Chile. He received his theology degree in 1947 and worked for a time as state teacher of religion. Varas was

⁵⁷“Homenaje a caídos el 11 Septiembre,” *El Mercurio*, September 12, 1976.

⁵⁸“Pinochet en Misa de Acción de Gracias,” *El Mercurio*, September 12, 1983.

ordained a priest by Cardinal José María Caro, the Archbishop of Santiago, on September 20, 1947. He worked as a secretary of Cardinal José María Caro the year after his ordination and became a military chaplain in 1955. He continued that pastoral work until 1978. A large period of his time as a military chaplain overlapped with his duties by teaching religion in the district secondary schools of Santiago from 1959 to 1969. In 1983, Varas became secretary to Cardinal Fresno, the archbishop of Santiago, before being appointed as bishop of the Military Ordinate and as titular bishop of Alba. Consecrated as a bishop on December 1983, by Cardinal Fresno in the Cathedral of Santiago, Bishop Matte chose *Mihi vivere Christus est*, or “For me, Christ is Life” as his episcopal motto.⁵⁹ In and around all of his pastoral work, Varas proved a very active and productive man.

Affectionately called “Joaco,” he was scholarly. He came from a family of great men and both sides of his family, father’s and mother’s, were heavily involved in the politics of the state. A fellow bishop described him as a man of deep piety and always joyful despite suffering painfully from diabetes, which limited his activities. As a scholar he dedicated himself to remembering leading men of the Chilean Church, primarily military or naval chaplains. He wrote several short biographies and essays on the men who led the religious formation of the armed forces in Chile. He seemed an academic in the form of a priest. Varas was a member of many academic and scholarly societies, including: Society of History and Geography; Historical Academy of the Military; Society of the History of the Chilean Church and spent time as national director of

⁵⁹“Monseñor José Joaquín Matte Varas, Obispo castrense, emérito de,” Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, http://www.iglesia.cl/obispos/obispos_matriz.php?apellidos=Matte Varas (accessed December 15, 2009).

catechism (1960-1973).⁶⁰ He wrote on several topics, including: the Chilean town Tantauco; the presence of military chaplains in the War of the Pacific; haciendas Montalván and Cuiva en Perú; and biographical sketches of men like Manuel Montt and Crescente Errazuriz. All of this scholarly work resulted in a well-rounded priest who served the military and the Catholic Church.

As a scholar and priest, Bishop Varas offered a different guidance to the military when he began his duties as military vicar in November 1983. While Varas had through his scholarly work praised the honor and values of the armed forces, most of whom were Catholic, he never justified their actions. Upon assumption of his pastoral duties Varas offered a new hope for Chile. In an interview, the new vicar evasively admitted that he was in no real place to judge, but stated that he believed that in Chile there was a desire for democracy.⁶¹ Recognition of this sentiment in Chile represented a shift in the pastoral leadership of the military. Varas, as new military vicar, expressed the necessity of having armed forces for the protection of the state because terrorism existed in the world, however at the same time he also denounced excesses of such security forces.⁶² In Varas's leadership the armed forces experienced a different slant on their actions. The vicar carefully praised the values of the armed forces, but claimed that they were also essentially Christian Chilean. The vicar insisted that these values, the value of faith

⁶⁰Bernardino Piñera C, Arzobispo emérito de La Serena, *33 Años del Episcopado Chileno (1958-1990): Bocetos* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Tiberiades, 2002), 127-128.. "Monseñor José Joaquín Matte Varas, Obispo castrense, emérito de," Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, http://www.iglesia.cl/obispos/obispos_matriz.php?apellidos=MatteVaras (accessed December 15, 2009).

⁶¹"Creo que en Chile hay un deseo de democracia," *Hoy* no. 333, December 7-13, 1983, pg. 17.

⁶²*Ibid.*

especially, only had worth if they were understood with the context of the Gospel.⁶³ Varas never claimed, as Gillmore did, that the armed forces were the liberators of Chile, but he also never openly criticized their actions. This vicar led his soldier flock to follow God through Mars. He maintained the honor and values of the military, but ultimately tried to channel those through a Christian understanding – in other words, in his pastoral work, Varas acknowledged Mars while he attempted to primarily serve God.

Choosing to Serve Mars Over God

The military vicars led the men who perpetrated the crimes under the military regimes in Chile and Argentina. Military vicars could have guided soldiers to follow the commandments of God, therefore tempering the extent of the regimes' abuses. However, the personal formation of each vicar resulted in an allegiance to Mars, thereby encouraging and excusing the actions of the armed forces. While the vicars excused military actions the rest of the Southern Cone needed pastoral guidance in these times of crisis.

⁶³“Obispo destacó valores patrios,” *El Mercurio*, September 12, 1984.

CHAPTER FIVE

A Spectrum of the Church's Men

The Roman Catholic Church, despite its perceived uniformity, is quite diverse in the opinions and personalities of its clergy. As the Church's faithful extend across every continent a system of organization needed to be formed to maintain not only doctrinal coherence and uniformity, but also to keep the ultimate leader of the Catholic Church, the Pope, informed of the needs of Catholics everywhere. Additionally, after the State of Vatican City officially became a legally recognized country with the conclusion of the Lateran Treaty in 1929, the city-state needed ambassadors to represent the Church's interests abroad. The system of papal nuncios or Vatican ambassadors arose to fulfill this aim. Those who work as apostolic nuncios are rigorously trained and chosen for their loyalty to the Holy See. A papal nuncio's term averages three years per post.¹ This length is much shorter than those of ordinary secular ambassadors, which can last over a decade. This shorter term is the reason that Chile and Argentina had multiple apostolic nuncios throughout the military rule. However, for both Southern Cone countries there was a single nuncio who served through the vast majority of the military regime and therefore was associated with the Church's international role during that time. This chapter discusses the personal formation of the papal nuncios as instruments of the universal Roman Church.

¹Thomas Reese, *Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organization of the Catholic Church*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 16-19 and 152.

Additionally, the chapter includes descriptions of the individual development of four other bishops who played roles during the military regimes. There are too many bishops in Chile and Argentina to describe all of them individually, however, describing the personalities of another two bishops from each country provides greater depth into the character of the national episcopacies that formed the Church's actions during the military regimes. Their backgrounds demonstrate that the Argentine and Chilean Catholic Church held diversity in its ranks. This variation shows that while the countries' episcopacies acted as a united body each member formed their own opinions and shaped their sees. The four auxiliary bishops detailed in this chapter present a broader picture of the Catholic Church in the Southern Cone.

To Connect Argentina to Rome: Pio Laghi

At the end of the Dirty War, Cardinal Pio Laghi, the papal nuncio during much of that period became embroiled in controversy. Born to a poor rural family in Castiglione di Forlì, Italy on May 21, 1922, Cardinal Pio was the youngest of five children. Because his family lacked resources, he owed his advancement to the patronage of others. When he was six, his family moved to Faenz in the Catholic parish of Santo Stefano. It was here that Laghi fell under the guidance of two priests: Fathers Barisani and Balbi. These men helped the family economically and afforded Laghi the chance at an elementary education. As a young man, Pio contributed his wages as a shop attendant to his family. Successful in elementary school, Laghi moved on to secondary education at the Faenz Salesian Institute in 1933. A few years later he attended the Seminary of Forlì for undergraduate studies, earning a degree in philosophy. Laghi pursued graduate education in the Pontifical Lateran University where he studied theology and earned a doctorate in

theology in 1942. Later, in 1950, he completed a second doctorate in Canon Law. His rigorous studies and pursuit of higher education reflected his desire to enter the priesthood, a goal that was achieved in 1946.² Not long after his ordination, Laghi received the honor of being selected to enter the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy to receive training for the Holy See's diplomatic service. The diplomatic service is the elite of the Vatican civil service and admits entrance to approximately thirty priests each year. Those selected share several characteristics: common sense, the ability to handle intensive academic work, and above all loyalty to the Holy See. Only those with a reputation for unquestioning support of Vatican teachings and decisions are considered qualified to serve as diplomatic representatives of the Holy See. Up until the 1950s, only members of Italian noble families were permitted to serve. In the 1950s, approximately seventy-five to eighty percent of those who attended the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy and entered into diplomatic service were Italians.³ Laghi entered the academy at a time of transition – while Italians still formed the majority of the diplomatic corps, candidates no longer had to be from distinguished families. No doubt, Laghi and his family were honored by his selection to this elite corps of diplomats capable of wielding enormous influence in the name of the Holy See. Laghi graduated from the Pontifical

²Salvador Miranda, "Biographies – Laghi, Pio," in *The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church*, Florida International University Library, <http://www.fiu.edu/~mirandas/bios-1.htm#Laghi> (accessed January 23, 2010); Holy See Press Office, "Laghi, Card. Pio," Biographical Notes, College of Cardinals, Holy See website, http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/cardinali_biografie/cardinali_bio_laghi_p_en.html (accessed January 23, 2010).

³Reese, *Inside the Vatican*, 149-150.

Ecclesiastical Academy in March 1952.⁴ He immediately he moved into a lifetime of service in the Holy See's diplomatic corps. He strongly influenced local churches to follow the Vatican's line and kept Rome informed about local conditions.

Pio Laghi advanced quickly through the diplomatic ranks and held several important positions before being posted in Argentina. His first assignment was as a secretary to the nunciature Managua, Nicaragua. There he began to learn the culture of Latin America. Two years later he was transferred to the apostolic delegation in Washington, D.C., where he served first as a secretary and later as auditor. He would later return to the United States after the Dirty War. In 1964, he was recalled to Rome and served a quinquennium, a period of five years, in the Vatican's Secretary of State on the Council for Public Affairs (now the Section for Relations with States). In this post, he became intimately acquainted with the political wants and desires of the Church. The knowledge gained here enabled him to be more exacting in persuading local churches to follow the Vatican's will. At the end of his service in Rome, Laghi was rewarded with a titular see of Mauriana, an honorary title. However, in June 1969, shortly after his completion of the quinquennium, Laghi received his first assignment as a full apostolic delegate or nuncio, which required bishopric ordination. Bishop Laghi's first major posting was as apostolic delegate to Jerusalem and Palestine (the Vatican did not have relations with the state of Israel at this time, hence the odd phrasing of the title). Coming three years after the Six Day War, this tough political-mouthful posting, proved the making of Laghi's career. He loved the challenge of Middle East politics and reacted well under the pressures to make his assignment there a success. As testament of his

⁴Miranda, "Biographies – Laghi, Pio."

political prowess, Laghi was also assigned, during his time in Jerusalem, to be part of the Holy See's delegation to the United Nations conference on human rights in Teheran, Iran.⁵ After his first major posting in the Middle East, Nuncio Laghi slowly continued to work his way up through more prominent and therefore difficult political postings. After more than two decades of successful diplomatic service, Laghi received one of his most difficult assignments yet - Argentina.

During tense situations and while acting in his official capacity Laghi seemed remote to observers, but those who met the diplomat Laghi in informal situations described him to disarmingly full of candor, but always stopping short of revealing too much.⁶ Many have, and Laghi himself has, described him as a conduit of Vatican relations. Nuncio Laghi ensured that all communications between his post and the Vatican funneled through him personally. Describing himself as a filter, Laghi viewed his job as passing on relevant and condensed dialogue to and from the Holy See. This filtering function, along with his smooth diplomatic style, brought Laghi to Argentina. When he transferred to Argentina as apostolic nuncio in April 1974, the country was teetering on the brink of civil war.⁷ As President Juan Domingo Perón, recently elected to office after a nineteen-year exile, suffered from declining health as his political movement shattered into left and right factions. When he died in July 1974, the country fell victim to armed groups fighting for political control in the streets. This was the

⁵ Arthur Jones, "Laghi: delegate who liked to play politics," *National Catholic Reporter* October 16, 1992, 6; Miranda, "Biographies – Laghi, Pio;" Holy See Press Office, "Laghi, Card. Pio."

⁶ Jones, "Laghi: delegate who liked to play politics."

⁷ Miranda, "Biographies – Laghi, Pio;" Holy See Press Office, "Laghi, Card. Pio."

Argentine reality that Laghi faced. But as many have attested, he prepared well. A priest who met Laghi en-route to his post recalled observing the nuncio reading *El 45* by Félix Luna, a prominent Argentine historian, to understand the Perón phenomena that pervaded Argentina. When the flight ended, this priest remembered being astonished at the transformation from man just arriving in Argentina to a man seemingly expert on Argentina.⁸ Clearly, by the time Nuncio Laghi presented himself for duty in Buenos Aires his professional mask as representative of papal authority to the local church was fully in place. Here, Laghi accomplished the tasks given to him by the pope: first, to renew a unified spirit in the Argentine episcopacy and second, to regulate diplomatic relations between Rome and the Argentine political power.⁹ He cast a calm, observant eye over the situation in Argentina in 1974, reported to the Holy See and waited for the final unraveling of Argentine society in the military regime to come.

Nuncio Laghi's role in the Dirty War was and still is shrouded in controversy. Only after the return to democracy did information concerning his activities begin to leak out. The exposed details provide an interesting and often directly controversial role for the apostolic nuncio in his role during the Dirty War. Approximately a month after the military takeover, Laghi led the diplomatic corps in recognition of the new Argentine government and establishing diplomatic relations.¹⁰ His primary mission during this time

⁸Jorge Casaretto, "El paso de Pio Laghi entre nosotros," *Criterio* 82, no. 2346 (March 2009): 93-94.

⁹Casaretto, "El paso de Pio Laghi entre nosotros," 93; Jones, "Laghi: delegate who liked to play politics;" Jorge M. Mejía, "El ejemplo del cardenal Laghi," *Criterio* 82, no. 2346 (March 2009), 90.

¹⁰"Recibió la Junta al cuerpo diplomático," *La Nación*, April 26, 1976.

was to rejuvenate a divided Argentine episcopacy and normalize diplomatic relations with the Argentine political power and the Vatican. He insisted on keeping the channels of communication open rather than stand against the illegal actions of the military government.

Throughout the Dirty War, Archbishop Laghi sustained close social relations with many of the generals that ruled the various military juntas. Indeed, he often played tennis with Argentine Navy Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera and even baptized the admiral's children. In 1977, the nuncio met with U.S. government officials to discuss the Dirty War in Argentina. A memorandum in the U.S. State Department documents revealed the contents of that conversation at the height of the Dirty War. Laghi shared his conviction that President Jorge Videla and other leaders were good men at heart. Videla in particular, Laghi believed was a good Catholic who expressed deep concern over the personal religious implications of the actions taken to fulfill his responsibilities. Despite these qualifying remarks, the nuncio did not hesitate to reveal to US officials in 1977 that "there was guilt in the leaders of the country; they knew they have committed evil in human rights and do not need to be told of their guilt by visitors. This would be 'rubbing salt into the wounds.'"¹¹ Pio Laghi reported that many of the military men struggled greatly with matters of conscience. These problems, of course, were brought to the military chaplains for spiritual advisement. However, while the men of the military might experience troubling consciences, Laghi continued that these men firmly believed that their actions were necessary and that they had a real, tangible fear of terrorists. According to Laghi, the military men were convinced that guerrillas might take over a

¹¹Arthur Jones, "Documents reveal nuncio's cautious human rights stances," *National Catholic Register* 38, no. 37 (August 30, 2002), pg. 16.

few of the country's provinces. It was this fear that partially accounted for the brutal tactics used to fight subversion. In regard to the Argentine bishops and himself, Laghi explained that they took a very cautious approach to their pressure on the military government concerning the human rights abuses.¹² He admitted that while a small number of the Argentine bishops were on the extreme right or left most remained moderate and wished to place themselves above the political struggle.¹³ Emilio F. Mignone, the human rights lawyer met with Laghi three different times to discuss the disappearance of his own daughter, Monica. Mignone relates that the first time they met Laghi listened intently to everything he said and mentioned that he would report the disappearance to the government but assured Mignone that he was powerless. The second time they met according to Mignone, Laghi barely listened, rapidly changed the subject and attempted to find excuses for what the government was doing. The third and final time the pair met Mignone states that Laghi admitted that Argentina was governed by criminals.¹⁴ Nuncio Laghi clearly knew what occurred underneath the patriotic veneer of the military government, however he never used his position as papal representative to intervene in a public manner, leaving the faithful abandoned by the official representative of the Vatican in Argentina.

¹²Arthur Jones, "Documents reveal nuncio's cautious human rights stances," *National Catholic Register* 38, no. 37 (August 30, 2002), pg. 16.

¹³Arthur Jones, "Documents reveal nuncio's cautious human rights stances," *National Catholic Register* 38, no. 37 (August 30, 2002), pg. 16; An opinion confirmed by other outside sources, such as Jeffery Klaiber, S.J., *The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1998), 76-79.

¹⁴Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 45.

The only time that Laghi publicly intervened during the Dirty War was during the Beagle Channel crisis. A few islands in the Beagle Channel, a small channel that separates the islands of Tierra del Fuego at the very tip of the South American continent, became a source of great contention and an issue of sovereignty between Argentina and Chile in 1978. The two countries nearly went to war over the sovereignty of the islands. Laghi worked with the president of the CEA, the papal nuncio of Chile and others to prevent war. When papal mediation was decided upon, he escorted and assisted the pope's personal ambassador, Cardinal Antonio Samoré, in discussion with the Argentine military junta.¹⁵ The Vatican and its representative were ready to intervene when two Catholic states were about to go to war, but the nuncio would not publicly protest the victimization of alleged socialists, Marxists, or communists. This refusal to defend leftist activists, even Catholic leftists, demonstrated Laghi's absolute loyalty to the Holy See's agenda. In November 1978, Pope John Paul II became pontiff and his election represented a decisive turn in the Roman Curia back to traditional Catholic conservatism and a virulent disapproval of leftist leanings. Laghi followed the Vatican's conservative leanings in protesting the potential war between two Catholic right wing governments and remaining silent during the Argentine military led right-wing government's human rights abuses.

Toward the end of the Dirty War Pio Laghi left Argentina. He had served in the Southern Cone country for six years, twice the length usually given to papal nuncios.¹⁶

¹⁵“El deseo es encontrar un entendimiento,” *La Nación*, December 27, 1978; “La Junta recibió al enviado papal,” *La Nación*, December 28, 1978.

¹⁶Reese, *Inside the Vatican*, 152.

After the resolution of the Beagle Channel crisis, he was assigned as apostolic delegate to the United States in 1980. There he fell under increasing scrutiny as information about his dealings with the Argentine military surfaced. It began when Laghi's name suddenly appeared on a list of over one thousand people connected with the military repression that was published in November 1984, a year after the return to civil rule in Argentina. The magazine that published the list, *El Periodista de Buenos Aires*, claimed that the National Commission on Disappeared Persons or CONADEP generated the list based upon documentation gathered for its previously published report, *Nunca Más*. The list was deleted in the report after discussion with President Raúl Alfonsín.¹⁷ The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo charged Laghi with complicity and asked the Italian Justice Ministry to prosecute him.¹⁸ The Mothers have collected testimony from several priests, a bishop, and a nun who allegedly saw Laghi at several military detention/torture centers.¹⁹ Jacobo Timmerman, a well-known journalist and victim of the Dirty War, claimed that Laghi interacted with the military regime leaders in order to save lives and believed that Laghi lived with piety and greatly suffered internally from everything that surrounded him

¹⁷Emilio F. Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 42.

¹⁸The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo are a group of women who took it upon themselves to protest the disappearance of their loved ones. In April 1977, they began a silent, weekly protest in the Plaza de Mayo, which is located in front of the Ministry of the Interior building, where most inquiries about the disappeared were directed. The mothers wore signature white handkerchiefs in their hair and held pictures of their disappeared loved ones. They have vowed to continually protest until the whereabouts of every disappeared one is identified and every person involved implicitly or explicitly in supporting the Dirty War has been prosecuted for their crimes. See Jo Fisher, *Mothers of the Disappeared* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1989).

¹⁹“Argentine ‘Mothers’ Accuse Vatican Envoy of War Crimes,” *Church & State* (July-August 1997): 22; “Argentine mothers want Laghi prosecuted,” *National Catholic Register*, May 30, 1997, 2.

during the military regime.²⁰ Some such as Robert Cox, editor of *Buenos Aires Herald* from 1968 to 1979 took a more nuanced defense of Laghi. Cox stated that Laghi completely opposed the military's human rights abuses, but that he did not feel, as a foreigner, had the right to tell the Argentine hierarchy what to do. However, Cox cautioned that it would be wrong to scoff at the allegations brought up by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo who have long acted as Argentina's conscience regarding the atrocities committed during the Dirty War.²¹ Despite the a large number of accusations over the years, Pio Laghi denied any implicit or explicit accusation that charged him with human rights abuses. Indeed, he evaluated his role with, "Perhaps I was not a hero, but I was certainly not an accomplice."²² However, many in Argentina feel, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo especially, that Laghi was an accomplice throughout the military regime. He failed in his pastoral duty to protect the Argentine faithful against abuse, he failed to follow Christ's example of sacrificing himself for the sake of others as Mignone once pointed out to him in conversation.²³ Yet, this neglect did not hinder Laghi's advancement after leaving Argentina. He had followed Vatican orders to unite the bishops and normalized diplomatic relations with the Argentine government; therefore to the Holy See his mission was a success.

²⁰Alberto Amato, "Murió Pío Laghi, un cardenal polemico durante la dictadura," *Clarín*, December 1, 2009, clarin.com, <http://www.clarin.com/diario/2009/01/12/elpais/p-01837803.htm> (accessed January 12, 2010).

²¹Gary MacEoin, "Group claims 20 witnesses against Laghi," *National Catholic Reporter*, June 20, 1997, 11.

²²Quoted in John L. Allen, Jr., "These Paths Lead to Rome," *National Catholic Reporter*, June 2, 2000, 16.

²³Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 45-46.

An Argentine Progressive Turned Conservative, Raúl Francisco Primatesta

Another clergyman who rose to prominence before the tumult broke in Argentina was Raúl Francisco Primatesta. He served as president of the CEA throughout the military regime. In this position, his influence could have been instrumental in leading the national episcopacy toward denunciation of the military regime rather than complicity with it. Primatesta's personal formation resulted in elevation to a cardinality in 1973 and later CEA president in 1976. His ascension indicated his own turn toward the right as well as the conservative slant of both Rome and the Argentine episcopacy.

Primatesta's background and theological development provide clues as to why such a potentially instrumental figure remained unused. Raúl Francisco Primatesta was born on April 14, 1919, in Capilla del Señor, in the province of La Plata, Argentina. He received his ordination as a priest in Rome in 1942. He first was assigned to the Seminary of La Plata, where he served as a faculty member in the minor seminary before being promoted to as a prefect general of discipline, vice-rector and then rector. His fruitful educational work earned him elevation to titular bishop of Tananis by Pope Pius XII in June 1957.²⁴ His ordination as bishop was performed by the archbishop of La Plata, but was interestingly assisted by the Bishop Adolfo Tortolo, later the military vicar during the Dirty War. This interesting connection manifested again years later when Primatesta succeeded Tortolo as president of the CEA. While never as virulently ultraconservative like Tortolo, Primatesta followed in his predecessor's orthodox footsteps by becoming increasingly conservative throughout his pastoral career.

²⁴Salvador Miranda, "Biographies – Primatesta, Raúl Francisco," in *The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church*, Florida International University Library, <http://www.fiu.edu/~mirandas/bios-p.htm#Primatesta> (accessed January 23, 2010).

Primatesta was named auxiliary bishop of La Plata in 1957. He served there for four years before being transferred to the see of San Rafael in Mendoza in June 1961. He attended all the sessions of the Second Vatican Council and participated in the re-opening of the universal Church. This pastoral progressivism resulted in Pope Paul VI's naming him as archbishop of Córdoba in 1965.²⁵ However, from his appointment as archbishop to his elevation to cardinal in 1973, Archbishop Primatesta steadily shifted toward conservatism.

In part the upheaval in Argentina, the Church and society contributed to Primatesta's turn from progressivism. In 1966 and 1969, the archbishop dealt patiently with conflicts that occurred with the church and in Córdoba. Indeed, Primatesta led the church through one of the most hostile movements in the metropolitan see. In 1969, the MSTM, held their Second National Congress in Córdoba where these liberation theology priests promoted Church's involvement in politics and society that contradicted the Second Vatican Council's stance. Vatican II accepted the reality of modern society with the separation of Church and state. The council affirmed that the Church leaders had a responsibility to infuse society with Christian values, however the Vatican II also stated that the Church was to remain uninvolved in politics. The council held that the bishop's role was to guide and as necessary only comment on politics when the political atmosphere threatened Catholic values. CELAM in Medellín in 1968 reaffirmed the pastoral responsibility to instill Christian values in secular society. The MSTM took this idea and radicalized it by arguing that infusing society involved becoming actively

²⁵Miranda, "Biographies – Primatesta, Raúl Francisco."

involved in politics and economics, which would transform society.²⁶ This radical interpretation unsettled Primatesta along with many other Argentine church leaders, however the true difficulty of 1969 came after MSTM's congress. MSTM was only one of many manifestations of growing progressivism in Argentina. May 1969 demonstrated the growing mayhem of Argentine society caused by demonstrations. Student protests erupted in universities across the country and MSTM clergy joined them by offering meeting places and denouncing the repression tactics used by security forces to stop the demonstrations. In Córdoba, the country's second largest city, this unrest turned to rioting as battles between police forces, students and workers lasted for over a week in what became famously known as the *cordobazo*.²⁷ Archbishop Primatesta urged peace and patience throughout this difficult hour. However, increased chaos caused by constant government turn over from 1955, with the ousting of Juan Perón, and the growing division among the Argentine Catholic Church over issues of liberation theology pushed a potentially progressive force to conservatism. Alliance with the traditionally right-wing political forces of Argentina assured peace just the discipline of the Catholic hierarchy prevented division in the leadership of the Argentine Church during the societal disorder. Archbishop Primatesta's skill in handling difficult, chaotic situations coupled with his movement toward orthodoxy resulted in his promotion within the Argentine episcopacy.

²⁶“Decree on the Apostolate of Lay People: Vatican II *Apostolicam Actuositatem*, 18 November 1965,” no. 5-7 in *Vatican Council II, Volume I: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents*, rev. ed., Austin Flannery, O.P. (Northport, NY: Costello Publishing Company, 1998), 772-75; Michael A. Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland: Religion and Politics in Argentina* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 145.

²⁷Burdick, *For God and the Fatherland*, 146-47.

By the time that Archbishop Primatesta was elected as first vice-president of the CEA, in 1970 he had sealed his conversion from lukewarm progressive to conservative. He said at a conference at the Military Lyceum of General Peace that Medellín did not represent the doctrine of the Catholic Church, but merely an orientation or focus for Latin America. Primatesta fell among many Argentines who believed that Argentina was more European than Latin American.²⁸ As a consequence of this attitude, many among the clergy and the general populace ignored the exhortations of the Council and Medellín to have a more open approach to the secular world. Remaining close-minded prevented an intellectual consideration of the appeal of different ideological systems, like communism, socialism, and Marxism, among the poorer populace. Primatesta's handling of the difficult situation in Córdoba earned him elevation to cardinal in March 1973.²⁹ Pope Paul VI also named Cardinal Primatesta as a member of the Sacred Congregation for the Sacraments and Divine Worship in 1973. This congregation directs the international Catholic Church on the appropriate expression of the Sacraments and the formulation or order of the Mass. This became the third congregation that Primatesta participated in that governed the theology of the universal Catholic Church. He previously had served on the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and the Sacred Congregation for the Religious and Secular Institutions.³⁰ Both these congregations dealt with how bishops and religious or secular institutions were to fulfill their role as guiders and educators to the Catholic

²⁸“Un paso atrás, dos adelante,” *Dinamis* 21, (June 1970): 30. This article discusses the election of Primatesta and others in the CEA in 1970.

²⁹Miranda, “Biographies – Primatesta, Raúl Francisco.”

³⁰“Nuevo cargo para Primatesta en el Vaticano,” *La Nación*, October 6, 1975.

faithful throughout the world. Increasingly, Primatesta became a man with international connections in the Catholic Church. His original progressivism opened doors for elevation under Pope Paul VI (1963-1978), and his turn toward conservatism placed him ideally for international connections in the next papacy.

Cardinal Primatesta's conservative tendencies strengthened as increasing political disruption ravaged the Argentine state. The legacy of Perón and the increasing militancy among both the left and the right produced a withdrawal to the conservative origins of the Church. Primatesta embraced the traditional alliance of the Church with conservative powers and strove to forestall added chaos. In mid-1974, President Juan Perón's ill health had taken its toll on the country. Primatesta attempted to calm the rising tide of disorder as he exhorted the faithful in his archdiocese to pray for the president.³¹ These exhortations and the homilies given by Primatesta the year prior to the military takeover merely confirmed his move toward conservatism. He rigidly adhered to and praised the pastoral hierarchy. He claimed that "to not listen to the bishop was to close our ears to Christ . . . to love the bishop is to love Christ."³² Primatesta resisted liberation theology because of the radical uses to which it had been put destroyed the peace he craved in Argentina. His comments on peace showed a desperate desire to steer the country into calmness. He exhorted Argentines to find common ground and restore peace to the state otherwise violence and disorder in the economy, military, and society would continue to

³¹"Exhorta a orar el cardenal Primatesta," *La Nación*, June 30, 1974.

³²Raúl Francisco Primatesta, "La plenitud sacerdotal del Obispo" in *Todos uno solo: homilias del Cardenal Primatesta*, (Córdoba: Talleres Gráficos, 1976),

disrupt the families of the homeland.³³ Throughout this tumultuous build-up, Primatesta continued to support the traditional function and allegiance of the Church, in other words, he clung to the superficial pastoral role of pre-Vatican II and aligned himself with those political forces in power. The situation in Argentina sent Cardinal Primatesta, though originally a tepid progressive, to conservatism. In 1976, his election as president of CEA made that turn clear. For six years, he had served as first vice-president under ultraconservative Adolfo Tortolo. As Argentina stood on the precipice of a brutal military regime, Primatesta's election as CEA president symbolized a softening of the episcopate's hard-line conservatism of Tortolo.³⁴ However, Primatesta's own slow turn to conservatism since his election as archbishop of Córdoba in 1965, betrayed any hope of softening the conservative stance. His background demonstrated that he would use the CEA's presidency to urge greater reconciliation and unity in the Argentine Catholic Church. So instead at the cost of silence from the CEA as the military proceeded to eliminate what it termed enemies of the state during the Dirty War.

While Primatesta led the CEA to ignore human rights abuses, he acted vigorously throughout the military regime in the international sphere. Chile and Argentina nearly went to war over the Beagle Channel, however violence was prevented by the timely suggestion of papal mediation. Evidence suggested that both the papal nuncios in Chile and Argentina received direct orders to do as much as possible to avert war between the

³³Raúl Francisco Primatesta, "Mensaje en la jornada de la paz," in *Todos uno solo: homilias del Cardenal Primatesta*, (Córdoba: Talleres Gráficos, 1976).

³⁴"La elección del nuevo titular del Episcopado," *La Nación*, May 9, 1976.

two countries.³⁵ Cardinal Primatesta was one who suggested the use of a papal mediator when all other forms of peaceful negotiations failed.³⁶ Maintaining peace between the two right-wing Catholic countries seemed a top priority for the Argentine bishops, especially Primatesta, who knew Pope John Paul II. Indeed, Primatesta even traveled to the Vatican in December 1978, most likely to discuss the chance of averting war through papal mediation.³⁷ There Primatesta's policy of silence on the domestic front and outspokenness on the international scene was probably affirmed. Pope John Paul II (1978-2005) was a conservative who supported international harmony at the cost of domestic peace. The Vatican and Primatesta ignored the atrocities of the Dirty War because the right-wing military persecuted leftists who partially or entirely adhered to the "godless" doctrines of socialism, Marxism, or communism. Conservative Primatesta could protest the loss of right-wing soldiers fighting one another, but not the loss of civilian lives. Internationally, Primatesta quickly became involved in preventing, under the new conservative pontiff, the loss of right-wing Catholic military men.

This political engagement on an international scale threatened the thin shield that the Argentine episcopacy claimed for not being involved. The issue of political involvement for any clergy of any faith since the advent of the separation of Church and state is highly controversial. Primatesta endangered the Argentine bishops' flimsy

³⁵“Conmueve al Vaticano la posibilidad de una guerra,” *La Nación* December 17, 1978.

³⁶Obituary of Cardinal Raúl Francisco Primatesta, *The Times* (UK), May 22, 2006.

³⁷“Informé Primatesta al Episcopado de su viaje,” *La Nación*, December 20, 1978; “El cardenal Primatesta fue recibido por el Papa,” *La Nación*, December 17, 1978.

defense of seeing the Dirty War as a mere political issue; hence the involvement of the Church threatened the separation of Church and state. This line of reasoning resulted in the general secretary of the CEA's sharp response when questioned by journalists as to whether or not the episcopal conference discussed the Beagle situation. The secretary, Carlos Galán, said no, because the topic of the Beagle Channel did not relate to the function of bishops.³⁸ Despite the claim that Primatesta had not gone to Rome in December 1978 with any specific agenda and that the episcopal conference failed to discuss the Beagle situation, mere days later the Pope designated a special envoy to resolve tensions.³⁹ Through the work of the pontifical envoy, both national episcopacies, and both military governments, the two countries did not go to war over the islands in the Beagle Channel.

Cardinal Primatesta's role as an international player for the Catholic Church did not end with the resolution of the Beagle Channel conflict in 1979. A few years later with the outbreak of the Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands War Primatesta proved an instrumental liaison for the Pope John Paul II. The jet-setting pope planned a controversial trip to meet with the Archbishop of Westminster during his visit to the United Kingdom in May-June 1982. However, the Argentine military invaded the islands in early April, setting off war. This threatened the pontiff's long planned and anticipated trip to further Christian unity. The visit would have been seen, in Argentina, as favoring a Protestant country over the ninety percent Catholic state of Argentina; as leader of the

³⁸“Una exhortación a la paz del Episcopado argentino,” *La Nación* December 21, 1978.

³⁹“El cardenal Antonio Samoré es el enviado especial del Sumo Pontifice,” *La Nación*, December 24, 1978.

universal Catholic Church the pope was placed in a difficult position. He used his pontificate as a way to promote Christian church unity, but he could not have promoted such Christian unity if *Catholic* unity was threatened by his visit to Britain. Both Cardinal Primatesta and Cardinal Juan Carlos Aramburu worked to keep unity in the Argentine Catholic Church over this issue by arranging for the pope to visit Argentina approximately a week after leaving Britain. This maintained unity among Argentine Catholics and allowed the pope to continue his visit to the United Kingdom to promote Christian unity.⁴⁰ Primatesta, rather than lead and defend his own flock, only acted when international Church needed his assistance.

Serving Argentina's Less Fortunate, Enrique Angel Angelelli Carletti

Bold and out-spoken without regard for the consequences best described the bishop of La Rioja, Enrique Angel Angelelli Carletti. He was born in Córdoba on July 17, 1923, as the first child of Juan Angelelli and Celina Carletti, both Italian immigrants that lived in the outskirts of the city. Angelelli learned a strong work ethic and an appreciation of the strength it took to maintain a decent life for a family as a land worker. A bishop resulting from these roots seemed almost impossible, especially as Angelelli proved a mischievous child who stole fruits from orchards as he passed and challenged the nuns at school. This changed in the late 1930s when the Angelelli's moved twice and Angelelli felt called to become a priest. Interestingly, the bishop who would become the

⁴⁰“Cardinal Raul Francisco Primatesta,” *The Independent* May 5, 2006.

loudest denouncer of military violence had a younger brother who decided to enter the Armed Forces.⁴¹

Angelelli's first-hand experience of work magnified the religious training he later received. Though only fifteen years old when he entered the seminary of Córdoba, his capabilities as a priest shown brightly enough for his superiors to send the young man to Rome to finish his pastoral training.⁴² In Rome he attended the Pío Latin American School where he was ordained as a priest in 1949 at the age of twenty-six. Angelelli pursued further education, obtaining a degree canonical law at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome.⁴³ His early life experience with hard land work opened up his mind to the socially progressive strains in his religious education. The Church long taught its own of responsibility to Christ's flock, but Angelelli's own background enabled him to understand that teaching in a tangible way.

After the young priest returned to Argentina he began a pastoral career that focused on working with those less fortunate. He was first assigned as a cooperative vicar to the San José parish in Alto Alberdi, a city of Córdoba. The modest little villages that Angelelli visited while fulfilling his pastoral work at San José awakened the young priest to the realities of the dispossessed and ignited in him a life-long ambition to serve the poor. In 1952, he became an advisor to the Young Workers Council (JOC) and later an advisor to the Young Catholic University (JUC), where he encouraged work for social

⁴¹Pedro Siwak, "Mons. Enrique Angelelli: Con un oído en el pueblo y el otro en el evangelio," in *Obispos protagonistas en la Iglesia del Siglo XX* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Guadalupe,), 11-12.

⁴²Ibid., 12.

⁴³Ibid.

reforms and compromises. For a time he served as a professor of Canonical Law and the Social Doctrine of the Church in the Mayor Seminary of Córdoba where he later served as rector. He also participated in Acción Católica. Angelelli served at Christ the Worker Chapel in Córdoba where he tried to fulfill what he felt was his pastoral obligation to serve the poor and the workers, however his ambitions were hampered by anti-worker and traditionalist sentiment among the hierarchy. Clearly, his career demonstrated that he envisioned the sentiment of Medellín long before that international ecclesiastical conference took place. Indeed, his bold work for the poor resulted in his appointment as auxiliary bishop of Córdoba and titular bishop of Listra in December 1960 by Pope John XXIII (1958-1963).⁴⁴ Angelelli's progressive work clearly struck a cord with the most progressive pope in Catholic history. His appointment recognized a new direction in the Catholic Church led by a reformist pope.

As auxiliary bishop of Córdoba, Angelelli actively participated social reforms and worked explicitly with labor unions and other poor advocacy groups. However, his active and public participation as a bishop escalated the tensions already existent in Córdoba. As soon as an opportunity arose, the Argentine hierarchy recommended Angelelli for a position far away from Córdoba, as bishop of La Rioja.⁴⁵ Despite the Argentine hierarchy's intentions, however, shipping Angelelli out to the distant diocese of La Rioja did not silence his voice protesting the injustices in Argentine society.

⁴⁴Luis Miguel Baronetto, *Reportajes a Mons. Angelelli: con algunos apuntes para una biografía a de Enrique Angelelli* (Córdoba, Argentina: Editorial Letra, 1988), 102-104.

⁴⁵Ibid., 104-105.

Upon becoming bishop of La Rioja in 1968, Angelelli demonstrated his servant like attitude by declaring, “I am not here to be served, but to serve. I will serve everyone, without any distinction to their social class, their way of thinking or believing. Like Jesus, I want to be the servant of our brothers of the poor.”⁴⁶ His heart was given to the poor and the people of his diocese. Angelelli determined to do best that he could for the peasants who lived so far from civilization. He refused to preach or encourage resignation. Too often in the past the Church taught, and consequently the secular world adopted the attitude, that those who suffered at the bottom levels of society should be resigned to their fate because their reward would be in heaven. Angelelli said, “God is jealous of the pueblo,” meaning that God elected the poor in response to the prideful people. However, Angelelli took pains to remind those around him in both the religious and social community that the history of salvation did not begin in Christ’s death, but in his life.⁴⁷ Angelelli pushed the concept of the “riojana” people - an identity that those of his diocese were more real, more human, more in touch with the riches of humanity than those who dwelt in big cities. The man/woman of the city, the bishop explained, consumed and while they may be rich economically or rich in power and influence; they had no peace, run from themselves and have lost their sense of life. However, the man/woman riojana away from the city may be stripped of these temporal things, but in being stripped of them he/she experiences the riches of divinely given humanity – the poor shall inherit. Because God lives in among the poor, such as the riojana inhabitants, and they experience their humanity more fully than those who dwell in large cities like

⁴⁶Siwak, “Mons. Enrique Angelelli” in *Obispos protagonistas*, 15.

⁴⁷Enrique Angelelli interviewed by Sergio Barbieri, “Enrique Angelelli, obispo de La Rioja: ‘Yo no puedo predicar la resignación,’” *Crisis* 2, no 13 (May 1974), 54-57.

Buenos Aires or Córdoba, their struggles should be addressed. The lack of water and land for riojana inhabitants needed to be corrected. The people who have no land or water, who hunger and thirst, become resigned to merely existing. According to Angelelli God does not want resignation, therefore he cannot preach acceptance or resignation to the people of La Rioja.⁴⁸ Bishop Angelelli's inspiring respect for the inhabitants of La Rioja never stopped at words full of nothing but empty sentiment. Instead, he pulled like-minded people from all areas to come and work in his diocese. One of the nuns that served in La Rioja mentioned that when Angelelli was installed as a bishop in 1968 there were only six religious communities in the diocese and the majority of them resided in the city. However, in the interior and the barrios there were no religious clergy or clergy who dedicated themselves to a particular order or congregation. After a few years of Bishop Angelelli there were sixteen religious communities in the interior and barrios of the La Rioja diocese.⁴⁹ Even in remote corners of the country, Angelelli proved an effective, progressive leader working for change.

Bishop Angelelli believed in social justice and a commitment to work with the campesinos. Indeed, it was his work with them that ruffled the feathers of not only the Argentine Catholic hierarchy, but also the conservative civil authorities. Bishop Enrique Angelelli promoted the use and participation of workers cooperatives. His homilies on the social injustice of the world had already caused him to be accused of being a *tercermundista* or third-world promoter, which meant communist in the late 1960s and

⁴⁸Enrique Angelelli interviewed by Sergio Barbieri, "Enrique Angelelli, obispo de La Rioja: 'Yo no puedo predicar la resignación,'" *Crisis* 2, no 13 (May 1974), 54-57.

⁴⁹Siwak, "Mons. Enrique Angelelli," in *Obispos protagonistas*, 16.

early 1970s - a dangerous allegation as the extreme right grew more and more powerful with the promotion of “tradition, family and propriety.”⁵⁰ Despite this, Angelelli persisted. He promoted peasant cooperatives at the risk of earning the enmity of the owners of the *latifundios* or great estates of La Rioja. The provincial civilian government believed that the promotion of cooperatives was communist and hence a threat to the Argentine homeland.⁵¹ The work of Angelelli in La Rioja angered the landowners; his efforts threatened their existence and way of life. They began a campaign to remove him from their diocese, lodging complaints with the Holy See, the Argentine episcopate and the various military governments intermixed with the civilian governments. However, the power to appoint and remove bishops lay with Pope Paul VI (1963-1978). The pontiff sent the archbishop of Santa Fe, Vicente Zazpe, to La Rioja in 1973 to investigate the denunciations against Angelelli. Upon completion of his investigation, but before his departure, Zazpe publicly stated that the pastoral work occurring as La Rioja was the work of the universal Catholic Church. Indeed, upon Zazpe’s report Pope Paul VI sent a personal letter to Angelelli expressing his confidence in his pastoral work.⁵² Despite this papal affirmation of Bishop Angelelli’s work the powerful continued to attempt to discredit him.

In the tumultuous run-up to the military takeover in March 1976 that displaced President Isabel Perón, a few priests of La Rioja were arrested, interrogated and jailed.

⁵⁰Siwak, “Mons. Enrique Angelelli,” in *Obispos protagonistas*, 17-19.

⁵¹Ibid., 17-19.

⁵²Emilio F. Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 138; “La Pastoral, Las Piedras y La Carta Papal” in *Reportajes a Mons. Angelelli*, 90-91.

Angelelli took this as a prophetic sign of the coming increased violence and persecution. In February 1976, less than a month before the coup, Angelelli wrote to his fellow bishops asking the episcopate to clarify the pastoral mission of the Church. A defined mission of the Church was needed because the powerful conservative, especially those in, and linked to, distorted the Catholic faith to suit their own interests, hence interfering with the bishops' pastoral work. Argentine conservative factions rejected the Catholic Church of Pope John XXIII (1963-1968) and Pope Paul VI (1963-1978), choosing to deny their progressive leadership as part of the true Catholic faith and favoring the Church of notoriously conservative Pope Pius XII. Angelelli argued that Argentine Catholics needed a defined mission and acceptance of the work of Popes John XXIII and Paul VI from the Argentine episcopacy in order to prevent the distortion and rejection of the true faith by the military leaders in what would surely be an upcoming coup.⁵³ Tragically, the CEA did not heed Bishop Angelelli's words.

After the military seized control of the Argentine government, Angelelli sensed his days were numbered. Suspecting what was coming and facing it requires a different kind of strength. Bishop Angelelli decided to defend his parishioners against the military government's actions. The movement by the large landowners in the area to have him removed from the diocese La Rioja failed because of Pope Paul VI's support. However, with the military in power, in 1976, it became a matter of time before the landowners achieved their wish, because the armed forces were their traditional allies. Angelelli confided to his close friend and archbishop of Santa Fe, Vicente Zazpe, that "among my Argentine bishop brothers, I stand alone." A few days before his death on July 22,

⁵³Mignone, *Witness to the Truth*, 139.

1976, Bishop Angelelli celebrated mass in Chamental and in his homily denounced the horrible killings of two priests in Chamental four days previously. The day prior to his own death, Angelelli met a group of regular men and women and diocesan priests that expressed concern for the bishop's life, he acknowledged their concerns, but refused to bend to pressure to curb his denunciations.⁵⁴ Bishop Angelelli knew the military and their elite connections were coming for him and on August 4, 1976, he died in a suspicious automobile crash.

There was evidence that the bishop's death was no accident. Shortly after the death of Angelelli, the papers he was carrying in his briefcase arrived at the Government House with a note that they were intended for General Harguindeguy, the interior minister under the military junta. Peregrin Fernández, another victim of the military regime, recounted that after he was transferred to the Presidential Plaza Hospital Bishop Angelelli's body came in for autopsy. According to Fernández, those guarding him commented on the bishop's death with derogatory comments, like "this had to happen to this communist priest, the son of a"⁵⁵ Although it was reported as a simple automobile accident most Argentines believed that Angelelli's death was an assassination. Most significantly, the "accident" sent a clear signal to those paying attention, especially those among the clergy. The assassination conveyed a very simple, yet highly effective message from the military that even a bishop's ordination could not

⁵⁴Siwak, "Mons. Enrique Angelelli," in *Obispos protagonistas*, 10.

⁵⁵Testimony of Peregrin Fernández given to the UN Working Group and Testimony of Plutarco Antonio Schaller, file no. 4952, *Nunca Más* CONADEP http://web.archive.org/web/20031014141555/nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_238.htm (accessed January 23, 2010).

protect those who stood against the military regime publicly. Angelelli's death, occurring less than six months after the initial military takeover, served to caution any other Argentine bishops considering open denunciations. They took the message and remained silent in the face of accelerating military brutality.

Connecting the Church to Chile, Angelo Sodano

Chile, like Argentina, had a link to the universal Catholic Church in Rome. However, the Chilean apostolic nuncio, Angelo Sodano's personal formation resulted in conservative powerhouse that doggedly supported the Pinochet regime. Angelo Sodano was born on November 23, 1927 in Isloa d'Asti, Italy. He was the second of six children born to Giovanni and Delfina Sodano. His father Giovanni served for three terms in the Italian Parliament (1948 until 1963) as a Christian Democrat deputy. Young Sodano entered the Seminary of Asti to become a priest; there he studied philosophy and theology. The seminary, while conveniently located in his home province, also was well known for promoting dogmatic Catholic theology. Later, he continued his education in Rome, where he obtained both a doctorate in theology from the Pontifical Gregorian University and a doctorate in Canon Law at the Pontifical Lateran University. He graduated and was ordained as a priest by Umberto Rossi, the bishop of Asti, on September 23, 1950. After his ordination he performed pastoral work in the diocese of Asti with the youth apostolate and became a faculty member at his own seminary teaching the conservative theology.⁵⁶ His rigorous, successful academic work, in

⁵⁶ Salvador Miranda, "Biographies – Sodano, Angelo," in *The Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church*, Florida International University Library, <http://www.fiu.edu/>

addition to his acceptance and promotion of dogmatic theology earned him a diplomatic service future.

Father Sodano was recruited into the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy for training to enter the Holy See's diplomatic service. Upon graduation in 1959, Sodano became one of the elite civil servants that served the Vatican. If he performed his job well he would rise to prominence and influence in the Holy See.⁵⁷ He successively served as secretary of the nunciature, or the Holy See's embassy, in Ecuador, Peru and Chile. He was honored as a chaplain of His Holiness in June 1963 and served as an official in the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church from 1968-1977.⁵⁸ For the most part, his career as a foreign diplomat went smoothly, however, an incident in Chile foreshadowed the role Sodano would play in the Pinochet regime.

In the late 1960s, during the Catholic University crisis in Chile Cardinal Silva turned to Sodano as his link to the Vatican, because the current nuncio to Chile was incommunicado due to a secluded holiday in Italy. Sodano became the channel of communication between the archbishop of Santiago and the Holy See. However, Sodano's forceful handling of the situation worsened the crisis rather than easing it. He refused to compromise with the students in any manner, consequently Silva was forced to broker a deal with the agitators that ultimately had no room for change. The students wanted the removal of the conservative rector of Santiago's Catholic University, which

~mirandas/bios-s.htm#Sodano (accessed January 23, 2010); Holy See Press Office, "Sodano, Card. Angelo," Biographical Notes, College of Cardinals, in the Holy See website, http://www.vatican.va/news_services/press/documentazione/documents/cardinali_biografie/cardinali_bio_sodano_a_en.html (accessed January 31, 2010).

⁵⁷Miranda, "Biographies – Sodano, Angelo;" Reese, *Inside the Vatican*, 153.

⁵⁸Miranda, "Biographies – Sodano, Angelo."

angered many of the hierarchy who took this as a personal affront on the episcopate. Sodano's instructions insisted that the rector remain on, there was no room for compromise. At first, Sodano got his wish the rector kept his position. Ultimately, however, Sodano failed in his objective because the rector resigned, refusing to work in such a political climate. The Vatican rejected the rector's resignation and Sodano was sent to persuade the rector to return to his post. He refused despite desperate pleas from Sodano to remain at the Catholic University of Santiago.⁵⁹ Later, according to a Church source, his handling of the Catholic universities reform controversy in Chile did not please the Vatican under Pope Paul VI.⁶⁰ This failure proved most illuminating. Though merely following the Vatican's orders to quell the protests, Sodano's refusal to compromise with a reform demonstrated that he was at odds with the progressivism displayed by Silva and Pope Paul VI.

Despite this small set back, Sodano continued his work in the nunciature until he was elected titular archbishop of Nova di Cesare in November 1977 and he was concentrated the following year in the cathedral of his home province, Asti.⁶¹ Interestingly, Cardinal Antonio Samoré, who consecrated Sodano as an archbishop would be the same man that he would call on later that year as papal mediator for the Beagle crisis. In 1978, Sodano's appointment as apostolic nuncio in Chile to replace the beloved Monsignor Sótero Sanz Villalba indicated a return to classic conservatism in the Roman

⁵⁹Raúl Silva Henríquez, *Memorias II*, 99-106.

⁶⁰Tim Frasca, "Secretary Sodano does it Vatican's way," *National Catholic Reporter*, December 21, 1990, 13.

⁶¹Miranda, "Biographies – Sodano, Angelo."

Curia, that would a year later elect Pope John Paul I (1978) and Pope John Paul II (1978-2005).

When Angelo Sodano began his work as apostolic nuncio to Chile in 1978, the country lay upon the brink of war with Argentina over the Beagle Channel. He immediately called for papal intervention. Sodano represented the Holy See and its increasingly conservative leanings under Pope John Paul II, as a consequence his nunciature in Santiago became the headquarters for the pro-Pinochet side of the Church. Throughout his time in Chile, Sodano used his influence to appoint a consistent procession of conservative bishops to newly vacant posts. Most agree that Sodano engineered the selection of Juan Francisco Fresno as replacement for progressive Archbishop of Santiago, Raúl Silva Henríquez. One of his conservative appointments, Antonio Moreno, the bishop of Concepción, prohibited priests and nuns from participating in public protests against Pinochet. Sodano also disapproved publicly of the Sebastiano Acevedo Movement, which consisted of laity and religious staging demonstrations outside secret detention centers and police stations to protest the extrajudicial torture occurring inside. Sodano himself suffered a few tense moments, when in 1983, members of a leftist group took sanctuary in the nunciature to escape from the secret police who were pursuing them. The group placed Sodano as papal nuncio in an awkward position. He insisted they be allowed to leave the country. In 1987, Sodano proved instrumental in organizing Pope John Paul II's visit to Chile. The pope's visit sent mixed messages. While the pontiff called the Pinochet government transitional in its nature, he administered Communion to the general and appeared publicly with him on the balcony of the presidential home to supporters. As the plebiscite in 1988 approached,

Sodano was seen at televised gathering of Pinochet supporters.⁶² Throughout the military dictatorship, Archbishop Sodano acted as a foil to the progressive activism of the Vicariate of Solidarity.

Foreigner at Home on Chilean Soil, Jorge Hourton Poisson

Chile's episcopacy comprised of a number of diverse people, including a foreigner made at home in the Southern Cone country, Jorge Hourton Poisson, who became an outspoken critic of the military regime. His personal background informed Hourton to stand against injustices. He was born in Saubuesse, Bayonne, France on May 27, 1926, to Bernardo Hourton Haget and Juana Poisson Iribaren. He was the sixth of their seven surviving children. Although, born "Georges" the bishop preferred the Jorge of his adopted country. His father, Bernardo, long before his marriage to Jorge's mother desired to travel to Chile for better economic opportunities. Not only was there a large current within France to travel to America, but also neighbors of Bernardo had made the transition to Chile, so Hourton's father had a clear example of a success in the move. It was with this understanding that a great aunt, suggested Bernardo marry Juana who came from a strong Christian family and who was open to the trans-Atlantic move. Shortly after Juana and Bernardo were married World War I broke out and he was called to enlist for service. Although, Jorge's father fought in World War I, and although he never recounted tales of the war to his children, Jorge was left with a deep impression of the terror and effects of war on men. Finally, almost two decades after their marriage began Bernardo traveled to Chile to set up a new life for his family and Juana followed later

⁶²John L. Allen, Jr., "These paths lead to Rome," *National Catholic Reporter* 36, no. 31 (June 2, 2000): 14; Tim Frasca, "Secretary Sodano does it Vatican's Way," *National Catholic Reporter* 27, no 9 (December 21, 1990): 13.

with all seven children, Jorge was only six years old.⁶³ This sense of adventure and the ability to take a deep leap of faith to try something new was a trait Jorge inherited from his father and would serve him throughout his career as a priest and bishop.

The Hourton family moved to the outskirts of Santiago, to a small house where they lived for fifteen years. Bernardo insisted that because his children lived in Chile that they learn Spanish, and become acculturated with the Chilean mindset. He ensured this by enrolling all of his children in public school instead of the French school formed by other French immigrants to Chile. One of the easiest adaptations for the Hourton children to make was the religious enculturation. Although they had travelled across an ocean the order of the mass and the Latin responses to proved the same. During this transition period, young Jorge learned to appreciate the universality of the Catholic Church, an awareness that remained with him for the rest of his life. Jorge and his younger brother transition to Chilean life the easiest because of their young age. While money was tight growing up, his mother made his home a joyous place and taught her son the power of deep and reflective Christianity. Indeed, so well did Juana educate her son, Jorge in the ways of faith that when he received his First Communion and Confirmation at the age of nine, he felt determined to take his Catholic faith seriously because it seemed beautiful to him. However, Jorge admitted that he did not understand then the direction this desire would take him. He behaved as many young boys behave dreaming of involvement in great military battles.⁶⁴ Despite his desire to take his faith

⁶³Jorge Hourton, *Memorias de un obispo sobreviviente: Episcopado y Dictadura* (Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2009), 9-12.

⁶⁴Hourton, *Memorias de un obispo sobreviviente*, 13-16.

seriously young Jorge seemed unlikely to ever enter priesthood when he entered adolescence.

As with most people, Jorge's adolescence was filled with a growing understanding of the political and social world around him as well as the awkward moments of growing into adulthood. The activism he displayed as an adult throughout his years as a clergyman under the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile manifested itself in a few actively rebellious years as he transitioned from child to awkward teenager. His mother's constant prayers throughout this trying time deeply affected Hourton, and, after his rebellion, influenced his desire to become a priest. It was also during this time that he was exposed to social reform, many of his classmates were sons of members of the Falange National Party that protested the extremism of the right. This introduction awoke in young Hourton an awareness of the social problems in Chile. He also participated in Catholic Action, he even served as a secretary for two Catholic Action centers in 1941. By the end of the following year, at age sixteen, these influences had taken their course and young Hourton felt certainty in his desire to be a priest.⁶⁵ Jorge entered seminary with a sense of social justice and an inherited spirit of adventure.

Hourton attended the Pontifical Seminary of Santiago, excelled as a student and was given prefect duties over his classmates. He pursued a doctorate in theology at Santiago's Catholic University and in 1949, received his ordination. This momentous event was marred by his father's death. His father died of complications of diabetes the night before Hourton's ordination and the first mass the young priest celebrated was a requiem mass for his father. This sad event, Hourton believed came as a sign of divine

⁶⁵Hourton, *Memorias de un obispo sobreviviente*, 16-29.

providence to teach him that one offered pain to God and continued on in His service. Shortly after his ordination Hourton received a surprise, he was accepted to the Angelicum in Rome to study philosophy.⁶⁶ Shortly after he completed his studies in Rome, Monsignor Hourton returned to Chile to become a philosophy professor at the seminary of Santiago. However, he did not remain at a single institution for long, quickly his success as a progressive teacher earned him teaching posts at a variety of other institutions, including Santiago's Catholic University and a variety of other seminaries in the capital.⁶⁷ Over the next several years, he became renowned as a man of great faith and thought. His reputation as an effective educator and his publications granted him the title of auxiliary bishop of Ponte Monte, Chile in 1969. Four years later when the military coup occurred, he became outspoken against the regime.

Bishop Hourton felt uneasy about the continued presence of the military regime at the end of 1973. He issued a Christmas letter to the pastoral leaders in his diocese of Puerto Montt. In it he recognized the benefits of the military's intervention the three months previously because it liberated Chile from the threat of communism or Marxism, ended the politicization of the country and returned order to public life. However, he criticized the military regime's abuses that he considered unnecessary, including torture, limitations on freedom of association as well as many others.⁶⁸ In a mass honoring, World Day of Social Encyclicals and the twelfth World Day Bishop Hourton stressed the

⁶⁶Hourton, *Memorias*, 33-43.

⁶⁷Ibid., 65-87.

⁶⁸Bishop Jorge Hourton P., "Mensaje de Navidad de 1973," mimeographed (Puerot Montt, December 17, 1973) quoted in Smith, *The Church and Politicis in Chile*, 293.

openness of communication as a necessary component of democracy and therefore something that the Chileans should strive for, even under the repressive dictatorship.⁶⁹

Speaking to the Chileans, Carlos González Cruchaga

The people of Talca still speak with affection for their former bishop, Carlos González Cruchaga. He served them for almost three decades. This warm, knowledgeable man who spoke out for the workers and the oppressed was born on June 8, 1921 as the third child of Guillermo González Echenique's and Elena Cruchaga Tocornal's six children. His family was conservative, but had a sense of humor that González learned to use with abundance. His godfather was his cousin, Father Alberto Hurtado Cruchaga⁷⁰ a man who would have a great impact in Carlos's later adolescence. As spiritual director of the Colegio San Ignacio de Santiago, Father Alberto lit a fire for the spiritual vocation in young González. In 1937, he enrolled in the Catholic University to study Agronomics, but suspended his studies there when he realized that he truly had desire to enter the priesthood. González entered the Major Seminary of Santiago in 1938. As part of his priest formation studies he completed a course of study at the Catholic University of Chile where he graduated with a degree in theology. In September 1944 Gonzales received his ordination as a priest from Monseñor José María Caro.⁷¹ As the

⁶⁹“Homilía reflexiva” *Hoy* May 18-24, 1983 pg. 14.

⁷⁰Father Alberto Hurtado Cruchaga was canonized by the Roman Catholic Church in 2005, See Angelo Sodano, “Una hora de gracia para la Nación chilena y para la Compañía de Jesús,” *Mensaje* vol. 54, no. 544 (November 2005), 62-64.

⁷¹María Cecilia Tapia Castro, ed. *Humanidad y Fe: Monseñor Carlos González Cruchaga, Homenaje en sus sesenta años de sacerdocio* (Talca, Chile: Editorial Universidad de Talca, 2004), 12.

connection between Hurtado and González became widely known, González was asked frequently after his ordination why he had not become a Jesuit priest like his cousin. González would responded that, unlike his cousin, he had not wished to make teaching his priority. Instead, González felt being directly committed to the community and diocesan work of being a priest was more important.⁷² Don Carlos spent a number of his years in the beginning of his career fulfilling a variety of pastoral works. He acted as national adviser for the Catholic Youth Worker (JOC) and served as Prefect of Theologies and Spiritual Director in the Pontifical Seminary of Santiago. In 1967, at Pope Paul VI's direction Don Carlos succeeded Bishop Manuel Larraín, another progressive leader of the Chilean Catholic Church as Bishop of Talca. The vast majority of his pastoral career demonstrated his preoccupation with the religious formation the people, priests, seminarians and religious in general.⁷³ Don Carlos' background demonstrated a lengthy history of concern for the community he served and enabled him to speak out against the abuses of the military dictatorship.

Don Carlos González truly felt the persecution of the Catholic Church in Chile under General Pinochet. Indeed, he claimed that prior to the military coup people paid very little attention to what the Church and its leaders, the bishops, did or said. However, as soon as the disappearances of political parties and of the opposition press began people

⁷²Diocese de Talca Website, http://diocesisdetalca.cl/documentos/biogra_C_Gonzalez.htm (accessed February 10, 2010); Episcopal Conferencia Chilena http://www.iglesia.cl/obispos/obispos_matriz.php?apellidos=Gonz%Ellez%20Cruchaga (accessed February 10, 2010); María Cecilia Tapia Castro, ed. *Humanidad y Fe: Monseñor Carlos González Cruchaga, Homenaje en sus sesenta años de sacerdocio* (Talca, Chile: Editorial Universidad de Talca, 2004), 12-13.

⁷³Episcopal Conferencia Chilena, http://www.iglesia.cl/obispos/obispos_matriz.php?apellidos=Gonz%Ellez%20Cruchaga (accessed February 10, 2010).

instantly turned to the Church. Don Carlos insisted that the Catholic Church had not converted into any political power or alternative for Chile, but rather that people used the Church as such.⁷⁴ However, regardless of whether or not the people paid attention to what the Chilean episcopate said, they needed to say it. Bishop González strongly felt this impulse and in December 1980, he and two other bishops issued a public statement that declared those in their representative diocese were automatically excommunicated for torture, ordering torture and those who fail to stop torture.⁷⁵ But not every act committed by the Chilean bishops or even Bishop González was one of defiance and boldness. Rather there were countless moments where these clergymen acted exactly as clergymen should act, as spiritual leaders and comforters. One young man, Fernando Reyes, who had been persecuted and tortured under the military dictatorship he recounted how many thought he was a terrorist, a revolutionary, anti-patriotic and an altogether bad person because of his political leanings. Many treated him poorly because of those leanings, yet Don Carlos straightforwardly looked him in the eye and said simply, “you, sir, are not bad.” This small act of simple reconfirmation helped the Reyes enormously. He later would turn to Bishop González for help calling him the voice for himself and his organization when they had no voice.⁷⁶ González’s personal formation as a pastor for the people and background of direct involvement with the local community allowed him to

⁷⁴“Carlos González: Persecución a la Iglesia,” *Boletín 7* (Mexico: Comité Cristiano Mexicano de Apoyo a los Perseguidos en Chile, 1976): 13.

⁷⁵“Excomuniación a torturadores,” *Mensaje 30* (January-February 1981): 68.

⁷⁶Testimony of Fernando Reyes in *Humanidad y Fe: Monseñor Carlos González Cruchaga, Homenaje en sus sesenta años de sacerdocio* (Talca, Chile: Editorial Universidad de Talca, 2004), 75-6.

have unique skills and strength to act as a protestor against the abuses that his followers suffered during the regime.

An Assortment of Church Men

The Catholic Church's structure allows a greater amount of depth in personalities than most believe possible at first. The top-down hierarchy of the Church directly formed and influenced the actions of the two papal nuncios throughout the military regimes. The inaction of the nuncios reflected a conservative turn among the Church as a whole. However, the other bishops in both Chile and Argentina examined here demonstrate a wider array of personalities in the episcopacies of the Southern Cone, reinforcing that not all the Church acted uniformly on the international or national level.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion

Comparing Bishops in Argentina and Chile

The backgrounds of the bishops who led their countries during the military regimes occurred against a larger societal backdrop that explains and sometimes had influenced on their responses. Argentina's tumultuous affair between Church and state compared to Chile's manageable ties between the two provided completely different environments, in which these bishops developed. Both episcopacies felt the new trends in the universal Roman Catholic Church with the progressive influences of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and the Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellin, Colombia in 1968. Each national episcopacy reacted differently to this shifting focus toward the poor of their flock. While only the Chilean episcopate embraced this new openness and dedication to the less fortunate, the Argentine episcopate held tight to their traditional alliance with powerful conservative political forces and the military. This contrasting reaction to the trends of the universal Church demonstrated that key differences in their Church-state relations that influenced formation of the bishops who directed their Church's stances throughout the military regimes. Chile officially separated Church and state four decades before Argentina, allowing the Chilean episcopacy to earn its own voice. Additionally, when Argentina finally separated it did at a moment of tremendous upheaval in the country causing the Church leadership to cling to their traditional allies. Certainly the environment of each country influenced the decisions of the Chilean and Argentine episcopacies, however, the unique personal

formation of key bishops in each country heavily influenced the stances of their episcopacy toward the military regimes.

One of the most notable differences between the two Southern Cone countries was the personalities of the capital archbishops. Santiago's Silva had a loud and opinionated personality that did not hesitate to denounce what he saw as wrong, even at the cost of damaging relations with the military regime. However, Buenos Aires's Aramburu was the perfect foil to Silva. Aramburu's personality demanded more prudence and his earlier pastoral career demonstrated his ability to remain silent even in the face of great criticism. Buenos Aires's archbishop's cautious personality forced him to keep channels of communication open by not publicly denouncing the regime, just as he kept potential for discussion alive in his handling of the MSTM in the late 1960s. Silva's successor, Archbishop Fresno, likewise had a cautious personality that demanded he open lines of communication. However, a difference in these two men's cases produced startlingly results. Fresno had the progressive groundwork of the Vicariate of Solidarity and the episcopal denunciations laid out for him by his outspoken predecessor Silva. If Fresno continued those practices, with less vigor than his predecessor, which he did, then he would still be able to re-open communication with the military government, but prevent the abandonment of the human rights work already accomplished. In Argentina, Aramburu did not have this previously laid foundation. In fact, to denounce openly the military regime would have destroyed the channels of communication completely and perhaps lead to martyrdom.

One of the most influential differences in the personal formation of these capital archbishops was how each man chose to serve the Church. Silva chose to be a member

of a religious congregation; something his successor, Fresno, and his Argentine counterpart, Aramburu, did not choose to do. Silva, who had grown up in a very large family had been encouraged to speak his mind and vocalize his opinions, though always in a respectful manner. His pastoral formation with the Salesian order reinforced this personality trait as it emphasized frank dialogue with the poor they served. Don Raúl as a result of his background was opinionated, vocal, progressive and blunt. He always remained utterly devoted to the poor. Even after his promotion to cardinal he continued to work directly with the poor. He conferred with those he served and aided them; he personally plowed some of the land distributed by the Church's land distribution project.¹ The diocesan or secular clergy training that Aramburu and Fresno received emphasized a more conservative approach both theologically and in their pastoral training. While both Aramburu and Fresno attended the meetings of Medellín, which affirmed the Latin American Church's preference for the poor, neither had the formational training or close contact with the poor to reinforce an understanding of the poor. Lack of personal awareness of the suffering of the poor in Aramburu and Fresno resulted in a weaker resolve to act on their behalf during the military regimes. Their diocesan training as well as their more prudent temperaments made Aramburu and Fresno cautious leaders under the military regimes. Silva's temperament did not dispose itself to conducive working relations with a military government. Straightforwardly Silva called things what they were, so upon discovering the human right abuses perpetrated by the Pinochet government he denounced them. However, his personality resulted in public acts and statements of defiance, which led to a freezing of relations between the Chilean hierarchy

¹Edward C. Burks, "Cardinal Demands More Haste in Chilean Reforms," Special to the *New York Times*, August 13, 1963.

and the military regime. Argentina's capital man, Archbishop Aramburu, and Chile's second capital man, Archbishop Fresno had opposite temperaments from Silva. These two men had similar pastoral formation and they received degrees from the same pontifical university in Rome. Both Aramburu and Fresno throughout their pastoral career displayed a prudent conservatism. The two men stressed unity and a willingness to dialogue with a person or group who differed from their own opinions. Aramburu's handling of the MSTM crisis in the late 1960s and early 1970s demonstrated his ability to hold silent in the face of public criticisms and his determination to keep channels of communication open. Fresno's devotion to unity among his flock resulted in a cautious course of communication with the military leaders, something he established through his presidency of the ECC (*Conferencia Episcopal de Chile*) prior to being named Santiago's archbishop. The personalities of these two men reflected a quieter, conservative kind of leadership in the Catholic Church, one that believed unity among the faithful required dialogue with all parties. Clearly, the personal formation and personalities of the capital archbishops had a significant impact on the episcopacies' stances during the military regime.

However, while the capital archbishops' personal formation heavily influenced the Church-state relations during the regime, the military vicars had a significant impact on the religious justification of the armed forces. The personal formation of the men who served as military vicars left telling insights into the actions these bishops would take during the military regimes. Clearly, all three men who advised the soldiers and led the religious arm of the armed forces split their loyalties between Mars, the god of War, and the one sovereign deity they professed to serve, God. Yet, Argentina's Adolfo Servando

Tortolo, and Chile's Francisco Javier Gillmore Stock and José Joaquín Matte Varas did not see this as split in loyalties. Each of them believed that they served as a pastoral guide to men who served a higher purpose of cleansing their countries of radical filth (socialism, communism, Marxism) and restore unity and peace to their states. The personal formation of the military vicars resolves the Mars versus God conflict apparent to the observer.

In Chile, military vicar Bishop Gillmore came from a family that had a tradition of serving in the armed forces. While he might have a desire to serve God, there was no doubt given his background as to what capacity he would serve Him. The vicar's bishop's motto, Jesus Christ's soldier, spoke volumes as to how Gillmore intended to serve God – as a military man with pastoral training. The fact that Gillmore's own pastoral colleagues claim that he wore army and navy uniforms instead of priestly garb indicated the vicar's comfort with the military appearance and lifestyle. Additionally, Bishop Gillmore's great concern with staffing the military vicariate demonstrated that he took his responsibilities to the armed forces seriously. Gillmore's quietly militant personality and family history of military loyalty and service led to his role in praising the Chilean armed forces for their work during the Pinochet dictatorship, hence ultimately serving Mars instead of God.

Bishop Gillmore's successor, military ordinary José Joaquín Matte Varas, proved a more ambiguous character. Nevertheless, his personal formation revealed a key awareness as to with whom his ultimate allegiance lay – God through Mars. Matte did not have the military tradition of Gillmore that dictated how he would serve during his pastoral career. Indeed most of his pastoral career remained chained to inside duties,

such as secretarial work. His diabetes in later years limited his mobility and he proved capable of overcoming his physical limitations through academic work. The wide range of things that Matte wrote on indicated that he had a broad range of interests and saw his service as military vicar in the broader historical scope of Chile and the Church. While he honored the military chaplains of the past, he did not revere them. Instead, Matte proved capable of distinguishing the different roles that military chaplains and vicars were asked to play, in recognizing this differentiation between military supporter and religious authority, Matte chose to serve one through the other. Gillmore did not recognize this distinction, he remained wrapped up solely in his military supporter role, but Matte seeing the duality of his role chose to serve God while working for Mars. Bishop Matte's bishop motto: For me, Christ is Life; revealed deference to his responsibilities as a priest over those as a part of the military machinery – serving God through Mars.

In Argentina, Tortolo's personality and ultraconservatism ultimately paid allegiance to Mars. His natural charisma and zeal for evangelization launched his pastoral career and led him to ultimately possess a great deal of influence as an archbishop before becoming a military vicar. Indeed, his reaction against the chaos of his country and the clerical crisis he felt was wrought by Vatican II enforced his conservative stand. He rejected progressive doctrine put forth in the Second Vatican Council and returned to earlier, stricter Catholic doctrinal lines that repudiated different opinions as heresies to be eradicated. By the time Tortolo became military vicar his conservatism and rejection of other, alternative ideas in Catholicism resulted in a theological arsenal to be used to support the military regime's aims. Additionally, the young tradition of a

papal scripted military vicariate in Argentina allowed Tortolo to mold the office to suit his personality – to serve Mars.

The military vicars held enormous potential power during the military regimes. These bishops could have awakened the consciences of every soldier in the armed forces, but they did not. The loss of such power can only be answered through the examination of the military vicars' personal formation. The background of the military vicars of Argentina and Chile divulged clues as to how and why their leadership during the military regimes ultimately served Mars over God.

While the military vicars supported the military regimes proclaimed values, thereby providing religious justification for their existence the papal nuncios of each country followed Vatican orders to remain silent. The apostolic nuncios to the Southern Cone countries had similar backgrounds and personal formation. However, because of Chile's progressive leadership's denunciation of the Pinochet regime, Nuncio Angelo Sodano's conservative support of it startled. Nuncio Pio Laghi's close affiliation with some of the military leaders paled in comparison to Sodano's intimate ties with General Pinochet. Yet, Argentina did not have a forceful denouncer against the military regime, like Chile did in Silva, and this lack magnified Laghi's public silence and association with the military leaders. Laghi had been given a specific mission when he was assigned to Argentina in 1974, he had been ordered to promote unity among Argentine bishops and normalize diplomatic relations with the Argentine state. His tasks would have been endangered if he had publicly denounced the abuses in the Dirty War, however, service to the Vatican does not demand a blatant neglect of pastoral duties. By failing to address the abuses publicly or even in private with the bi-weekly tennis matches with Admiral

Massera, a military junta leader, Laghi abandoned his priestly obligation and acted in complicity with the military regime. Sodano, in contrast, to Laghi's silent presence in Argentina proved a loud supporter of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. From the moment Sodano arrived in Chile in 1978, he was openly friendly and supportive of Pinochet's administration thereby giving religious credence to the dictatorship. He also used his influence as the Pope John Paul II's representative to engineer appointment of more conservative leadership in the Chilean hierarchy, such as Archbishop Fresno to replace Archbishop Silva in Santiago. Sodano, too, acted in complicity with the military regime in Chile. In fact, Sodano's open support for the Pinochet regime at times was worse than Laghi's silent presence during the Dirty War. Sodano clearly abandoned his pastoral duty to protect the faithful, choosing instead to remain a politician who ignored abuses. Both nuncios however, chose to act when the two countries were on the brink of war regarding the Beagle Channel. To prevent right-wing Catholic soldiers from killing one another was sufficiently urgent to warrant their public intervention, however, the victimization and murder of left-leaning faithful Catholics and innocents required inaction. Both Laghi and Sodano served as apostolic nuncios throughout the majority of the military regimes in the Southern Cone and connected the local Church to the universal one. In their roles as nuncios they chose to act as politicians rather than priests acting complicity with the military regimes.

The vocation to the priesthood in the Catholic Church attracted and continues to attract a wide variety of personalities. The Church accepts all kinds of men, from every background and formation as long as the young man is willing to serve the God, His people, and His Church, and respect the authorities of the Church. The diversity of

personalities in the men who meet those qualifications can be enormous. Indeed, the only arguable discrimination of the Church comes from the upper levels of the hierarchy, from the Pope, and from the national episcopacies. The pope's tendencies and the approval or disapproval of the state hierarchy are the most decisive factors when determining which monsignor will be advanced to bishop over another. Thus, Cardinal Raúl Francisco Primatesta, Bishop Enrique Angel Angelelli, Bishop Jorge Hourton Poisson, and Bishop Carlos González Cruchaga provided a small panorama of the diversity that can rise to a level of power and influence in the Church despite or even because of the Pope's and the national episcopacies leanings. These men provide startling evidence that the Catholic Church in the Southern Cone during the military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s proved diverse in personalities and loyalties. On the furthest right of the political and theological spectrum lay Cardinal Primatesta who had begun his pastoral career as a lukewarm progressive. His initial progressivism in Argentina and participation on Vatican Council II prompted Pope Paul VI to name him as archbishop of Córdoba. However, Primatesta could not maintain his progressivism. The chaos of the Argentine society pushed him to the right. His experience throughout the *corbada* incited considerable unease in the archbishop and forced him to turn to the traditional right-wing alliances of the Argentine Catholic Church for comfort. During moments like the *corbada* Primatesta saw the dangers of liberation theology. He witnessed the opening of the Church in Vatican Council II and Medellín as abuses that misdirected causing disorder. This drove him to return to the traditional theology and hierarchical obedience of the Church. Following Church orders was what prompted the president of the CEA to intervene during the

Beagle Crisis. Without the prompting of the hierarchy, Primatesta remained silent in the face of the abuses of the Dirty War.

In direct contrast to Primatesta's conservatism was Argentina's Bishop Enrique Angel Angelelli who embraced service to the poor and paid for his devotion to them. Angelelli's early experience with work and early pastoral career formed him to be a proactive bishop that fought vigorously to right the social injustices existent in society through his pastoral role. Appointed under Pope John XXIII (1958-1963), Angelelli's elevation to bishop represented the opening of the Church and a progressive turn in the leadership of the Church. As a bishop his labors for the poor and the workers angered the rich and powerful who had connections with the military leadership. Indeed, even the conservative members of the Argentine hierarchy were frustrated with Angelelli's works. However, attempts to remove him from his bishopric failed when the progressive Pope Paul VI (1963-1978), not only refused to remove him, but also expressed approval of his work. The personal formation of Angelelli, his early pastoral work with social reform, and the progressive leadership of the universal Church all combined to create an undeniable advocate for the oppressed in the bishopric of La Rioja. His advocacy and public criticisms of the regime's abuses made him a martyr in the first few months of the Dirty War, which effectively communicated a warning to any other potential outspoken critics among the Argentine Catholic hierarchy. Angelelli's assassination symbolized the death of hope for denunciation among the episcopacy, but reminded the Catholic faithful that some pastoral leaders took their duty to serve the least of God's people seriously.

In Chile, there was little of the radical diversity that was exhibited in Argentina by Primatesta and Angelelli. Instead, Bishop Jorge Hourton Poisson and Bishop Carlos

González Cruchaga came to embody service to the oppressed under the Pinochet dictatorship. Hourton, who had emigrated from France, fell in love with his new homeland early in life and remained utterly devoted to it. Hourton's early contacts with people among the Falange Nacional party, a progressive democratic party, and his own participation in the social reform Catholic Action group in Chile opened his young eyes to a broader understanding of justice and knowledge. In school, these contacts and his insatiable pursuit of knowledge led him to a career of philosophy and education where he devoted his life to forming others to intellectually judge different political ideologies and their attractiveness. Hourton's reputation as a great intellect made him a powerful public detractor of the regime as he used his reason and faith to criticize its abuses. He was a wise critic who promoted a greater sense of openness and community in the Church. Hourton's colleague, Bishop Carlos González Cruchaga, had a different personal formation that led to similar denunciations. González growing up heavily influenced by his cousin, Father Hurtado, who later was canonized. This close connection, while igniting the pastoral fire in González made him realize that education was not his destiny. Instead, González chose the life of a diocesan priest devoted himself to the life of his community. He worked endlessly as bishop of Talca to better the lives of his parishioners. González made efforts, even as a bishop, to have personal contact with his flock. This devotion to close contact with parishioners enabled him to see and understand the suffering the Pinochet dictatorship inflicted on the Chilean people. It prompted González to fulfill his pastoral obligation and protest the abuses of the regime. He offered succor for those who had been persecuted and publicly denounced the violent crimes perpetrated on innocent victims in Chile under the dictatorship. While each of

these two bishops, Hourton and González, took opposite paths regarding their attitude toward education, Hourton embraced it while González rejected it, their personal formations led them to both be outspoken critics of the regime.

The personal formation of the capital archbishops, the military vicars, the papal nuncios and other bishops in the episcopacies, determined the stances of the Chilean and Argentine Catholic hierarchies. Chile's bishops proved that differing personalities and backgrounds can result in the same stance. Archbishop Silva was a loud and forthright man who vigorously served the poor, while his successor Archbishop Fresno had a more prudent personality and was dedicated to the unity of the Chilean Church. However, both men denounced the Pinochet regime as their own personalities allowed. Other Chilean bishops, like Bishop Hourton and Bishop González, also denounced the regime despite taking different pastoral approaches. Hourton was the great intellect who used reason to reject the regime, while González's great compassion for the Chilean community prompted him to denounce their unjust suffering. However, the Chilean hierarchy shared conservative members who supported the military regime, just as Argentina's conservatives did. Chile's military vicars and papal nuncio supported or justified the Pinochet regime. Bishop Gillmore served Mars as he constantly thanked God for the armed forces that had saved Chile from Marxist destruction. Gillmore's successor, Bishop Varas's personal background as a scholar focusing on the role of military chaplains enlightened him to the duality of his role as pastor and military man. He used this duality to praise the values of the armed forces, which he qualified were Chilean in essence, but he never called the armed forces saviors and emphasized their role as peace protectors. These conservative Chilean bishops were overshadowed by their louder,

progressive and protesting fellows. However, the conservatives in Chile found a rallying point in the papal nuncio, Angelo Sodano. He publicly and actively supported the Pinochet regime because of its right-wing allegiance against atheist leftist forces. Indeed, the onetime Sodano intervened on Vatican orders to halt potential violence was to protect the right-wing soldiers. Sodano's counterpart in Argentina, Pio Laghi, also only stepped forward to public persona stop war over the Beagle Channel. Each nuncio was personally formed in obedience to the Vatican. On orders they served the Holy See's political aims rather than following their pastoral duty to denounce. Another Argentine key bishop, Cardinal Primatesta, also kept quiet until directed to intervene by the Vatican. Primatesta had begun his pastoral career as a progressive, which led to his promotion, however the radicalization of Argentine society convinced him of the dangers of progressive attitudes like liberation theology and left ideologies. To Primatesta those who promoted a leftist agenda were the instruments of chaos in Argentina and he could do without their presence in his bid to restore peace. Both the nuncios and Primatesta felt that the torture and murder of leftist subversives were acceptable collateral damage in the fight against the left. The Argentine military vicar, Archbishop Tortolo, was an even more virulent conservative than Primatesta. His private rejection of Vatican II's teachings, his belief that progressivism destroyed the formation of the new generation of clergy and his conviction that promoters of reform were dangerous made him an ideal military vicar – in the eyes of the military leaders at least. His personal formation encouraged the use of Catholic teachings to justify the actions of the armed forces throughout the Dirty War. Perhaps as equally culpable was the capital archbishop, Aramburu, as leader of Buenos Aires he remained silent. His personal background

demonstrated his prudent manner in the face of crisis and his belief that communication between parties, no matter how different, prevented his public criticism of the regime and the suffering of many Argentines. Bishop Angelelli of La Rioja was one of those who suffered. His personal background opened his eyes to the need for social reform and pastoral care of the poor, even in the face of violence he boldly continued his service to them by denouncing the regime. For his outspokenness he was martyred.

Each of the bishops detailed in this thesis had an impact on the stance of their national episcopacy. Their formation resulted in two different reactions reflective of the divisions in the Catholic Church in the twentieth century. Chile's Catholic hierarchy, led by Archbishop Silva, infused with the reforming message for the Church reacted to protect the people of that country, while the Argentine episcopate, in defense of the traditional role of the Church and was led by Archbishop Aramburu and Archbishop Primatesta, remained silent as their flock suffered torture and murder. The personal backgrounds of each of these bishops directly contributed to their individual stance and the episcopacies' stances, the two were intrinsically linked. The bishops' formation produced the hierarchies' responses to the military regimes in the Southern Cone. From this violent era in Chile and Argentina, history can observe that individuals acting from positions of power can make a difference – as it did positively in Chile and negatively in Argentina.

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